724.3415/2934
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)
Mr. Espil, the Argentine Ambassador, called and read me a strictly confidential cable from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina asking him to ask us whether the United States would join in with the neighboring Governments in trying to force an armistice on Bolivia and Paraguay. He said that Argentina would deal with Paraguay if we would deal with Bolivia. He suggested that we invoke the Kellogg Pact59 on Bolivia and also point out to Bolivia the “incontestable value” of the aid which American bankers might lend to Bolivia.
I told Mr. Espil that as the United States had been acting in this matter with the other neutral countries we would want to act only in conjunction with our neutral colleagues. Secondly, I pointed out that Bolivia is not a party to the Kellogg Pact, and thirdly, that despite charges to the contrary, this Government does not practice economic imperialism such as is envisaged by the mention of aid from American bankers. Fourthly, I pointed out that to mention any aid the bankers might give, might be looked upon as holding out some hope to Bolivia of financial assistance from American bankers, whereas this Government has no control over private bankers and does not ask them to make loans to foreign Governments. Furthermore, as he well knew, there is no chance whatsoever of Bolivia, or any other South American Government, getting a loan in this market for many years to come.
I also told Mr. Espil that this appeared to be a suggestion outside of the proposal which had been made to Bolivia and Paraguay by the four neighboring countries on the basis of the Mendoza conversation and that I thought it only fogged the issue to have too many proposals before the two contending countries. I told him quite frankly that I thought the best hope of success was to concentrate on their recent proposal, which I understood had been accepted in principle by Bolivia, and that the Paraguayan President at least seemed favorably disposed toward it although he thought he might have some difficulty with the General Staff regarding the concentration of Bolivian forces at Ballivián but he had promised to use his best endeavors to overcome [Page 276] this opposition. I said I thought they had best concentrate along that line. I added that if his Government was contemplating bringing about an armistice through bringing pressure to bear I did not know of any pressure that could be brought on those countries by any other countries than the four which border thereon.
Mr. Espil said that he agreed with me and that he would answer in that sense. He said he thought my suggestion of concentrating on the Mendoza formula was a very good one.
- Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩