793.94 Commission/739: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britam (Mellon) to the Secretary of State
10. Following is memorandum received this morning referred to in the last paragraph of my 8, January 13, 9 p.m.
“My Dear Ambassador, When you communicated to me yesterday the message from Mr. Stimson, I promised to send you a note by way of reply before leaving for Geneva tomorrow morning.
As regards the Manchurian situation, my information is that the effort which the League have been making to find a basis for conciliation is likely to fail. I do not at all regret that the effort has been made, for not only does article 15 of the Covenant call for this as the first step, but the fact that it has been made gives all the more authority to any declaration which the League may make hereafter. Monsieur Hymans as President and Sir Eric Drummond are, I believe, still discussing the possibilities of a basis of settlement between the parties, and I shall hear more about this when I reach Geneva on Monday, but for my part, I regretfully agree with Mr. Stimson that the effort must probably be regarded as having led to no agreement. Consequently we pass to the next stage.
I strongly hold that the next step should be taken without delay. To allow unnecessary time to elapse will do harm all round. And the next step, to my mind, is quite clearly marked out by the circumstances. Of course, it is a step to be taken by the League and I [Page 89] do not wish to anticipate by individual pronouncement what the League will do. But this country will undoubtedly act in the matter as a loyal member of the League and, as I told you in our conversation yesterday, I think that the League has no other course before it but to adopt the Lytton Report. I have already, in my speech at Geneva, called attention to the unique authority of that document. It is not only unanimous but is the work of the chosen representatives of five countries. These five distinguished men have been over the ground and have reached their conclusions as a result of acquiring a wealth of information which is unrivaled, and after hearing what the parties had to say. And when I say that in my view the League should adopt the Lytton Report, I mean that they should not only declare that they accept chapters 1–8, but that they should recommend a mode of settlement on the lines indicated in chapters 9 and 10.
I am very glad indeed to find that this is strictly along the lines which Mr. Stimson himself approves. Indeed, I do not see any point in which we are in difference. The form in which these and subsequent matters are expressed is, of course, a question which the Secretariat and members of the League will have to discuss and decide, but the principal [point?] of the matter is that what I have indicated should be done, and should be done quickly, as the next step.
I note with much interest Mr. Stimson’s statement that so far as United States policy is concerned ‘there is no reason to anticipate a change hereafter’ and I recall that Mr. Atherton explained to me yesterday that I might understand this as implying that Mr. Roosevelt was associated with the view expressed. The same thing is true on this side. We have no intention of departing from the course already indicated by our past declarations or by what I have said above.
As regards recent events at Shanhaikwan, Mr. Stimson will be aware of our view that an offer of mediation by the powers for the purpose of localizing it is not immediately desirable. Our Ambassador in Tokyo believes that mediation would hinder rather than facilitate the attainment of that object, and there seems in fact a considerable likelihood of the affair being localized by agreement between the two parties. If agreement is not easily reached, it will be on account of major questions—the control of Jehol and the Northward movement of Chinese troops—with which it would be difficult for us to deal as mediators apart from the League as a whole. If necessary, the question of mediation will no doubt be considered by the Assembly or its Committee. The local action of British officers at Chinwangtao, to which Mr. Stimson refers, consisted in an offer to facilitate a meeting of the Chinese and Japanese commanders by providing neutral ground for the purpose in a British sloop now at that port. The offer was made locally, without instructions from His Majesty’s Government and is not intended to involve active mediation.
As regards Jehol, the position is that the Province was covered by the original proclamation of the Manchukuo state, to which the Governor of the Province was a party, though his allegiance has since been doubtful. It seems certain that the Japanese intend at their moment, which may not be just yet, to see to its incorporation in Manchukuo, but I hesitate to say whether action to this end will be [Page 90] regarded by the League as more than part and parcel of their action in converting Manchuria into a new state. The invasion of China south of the Great Wall would evidently be on a different footing, but there seems no real reason at present to suppose that the Japanese contemplate such a step: their action at Shanhaikwan and Chiumen seems rather designed to shut out from Jehol the Chinese forces recently sent North. I find it difficult to discuss in advance the question of the steps which the League should take if and when the Japanese advance into Jehol or South of the Great Wall.
In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Stimson for informing me of his views and attitude in these matters. I have done my best to give him my own in what precedes, and shall be only too ready to keep in touch with him as events develop.
Yours very sincerely, John Simon”.
- Telegram in two sections.↩