Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/5755: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Johnson)

Washington, January 14, 1933—9 p.m.

16. Nanking’s January 10, 5 p.m. and your 36, January 9, 7 p.m. and 46, January 13, 4 p.m.

For your specific guidance.

1. As the memorandum mentioned in Nanking’s January 10, 5 p.m. asks nothing, the Department therefore views it as a Chinese declaration, made for purposes of record which requires no reply. If Peck is pressed for a reply, there would be no objection to his informing the Chinese authorities orally of the above view.

2. From the last paragraph of your 46, January 13, 4 p.m. it would seem that the informal suggestion contained in the last paragraph of Nanking’s January 10, 5 p.m., namely that the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901 attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government from abusing its privileges under that Protocol, was not made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the other interested legations. With regard to that suggestion, the Department is informing the Chinese Legation orally that it believes that the circumstances of the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan flow from factors of the conflict between China and Japan and not from provisions of the Boxer Protocol and that, if developments should involve the provisions of that Protocol, this Government would give consideration to those developments as the necessity arises and in the light of this Government’s rights and obligations thereunder.

For your general guidance.

3. As the Department views the situation as it is developing, the question of the applicability of provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the provisions of the “Conditions for Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin” of July 15, 1902,⁹⁷ may become involved and also, growing out of these provisions, such questions as (a) keeping open communications between Peiping and the sea, (b) Chinese troop movements along the line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, (c) possible Japanese military moves along that railway and elsewhere south of the Great Wall, and (d) the security of foreign lives and property at Tientsin and at Peiping. In connection with the applicability of the provisions of the “Conditions for the Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin”, the Department desires that you constantly keep in mind the fact that, although these “Conditions” contain some provisions that may logically be held to flow from the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, the American Government was never formally a party to those “Conditions”.

4. With regard to the Boxer Protocol, to which the American Government is a signatory, Articles 7 and 9 thereof are the provisions of possible applicability in the present situation. These Articles provide for the exclusive use and control of the Legation Quarter at Peiping by the legations; for the maintenance by each Power of a guard in that Quarter for the defense of its legation; and for the occupancy of certain points between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, to be determined by an agreement between the signatory powers, for the maintenance of open communication between Peiping and the sea. The purpose of stationing a military guard at Peiping and along the railway, shorn of technicalities and placed in proper perspective, was to safeguard foreign lives and property, especially the legations, against attacks by Chinese forces. The mission of our forces should be regarded essentially as that of providing special protection in situ⁹⁸ for the lives and property of foreign nationals, including the legations, and, in case of emergency calling for evacuation, making available an armed escort to the sea. It should not be regarded as a rightful or a practicable function of these forces to regulate or hamper the legitimate activities of Chinese armed forces, either on the defensive or on the offensive, in connection with the prosecution of hostilities in a quarrel between China and a foreign power. Furthermore, the provisions of the Protocol were certainly not designed for the purpose of giving a foreign power some peculiar advantage on Chinese soil in a military contest in which it might engage with China.

5. In case Japan should use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between Peiping and the sea and use those troops or her guard at Peiping to conduct operations against the Chinese, it is believed that the United States and the other Protocol powers would be justified in making announcement that in their opinion Japan’s action could not in any way be based on the provisions of the Protocol and/or in making representations to Japan. Whether the Japanese authorities heed or disregard these representations, we and the other signatory powers, if hostilities continue, would be confronted with the task of protecting our nationals in the area of hostilities as best we could—a matter which will have to be worked out by the military commanders on the spot. It is likely, however, that if the Japanese make a determined military movement south of the Great Wall, participation in that movement by the comparatively small Japanese Protocol force would be merely a minor incident in a major campaign of armed invasion of Chinese soil, justification for which under the provisions of the Protocol or the “Conditions” the Japanese would hardly claim except for purposes of camouflage and/or propaganda.

6. With regard to the “Conditions”, to which the American Government is not formally a party, there are found therein certain provisions which go beyond those found in the Boxer Protocol, namely, undertakings by the Chinese Government (a) not to station or march any troops within 20 Chinese Li of Tientsin, (b) nor to move troops within a 2-mile zone on either side of the railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, (c) nor to establish maritime defenses at the mouth of the Peiho, at Chinwangtao and at Shanhaikwan. In so far as the Department is as yet officially informed, the Japanese Government, which was a signatory to these “Conditions”, has not invoked them, although there have been some press reports to the effect that it might do so. These reports, however, appear to confuse these “Conditions” with the provisions of the Boxer Protocol as such. If the Japanese Government should attempt to invoke these “Conditions” in the present hostilities, the Department, regardless of the attitude which may be taken by the other signatory powers, namely, France, Great Britain and Italy, doubts whether we would be prepared to join in an attempt to restrict Chinese troop movements on the basis of the provisions referred to.

7. In the situation as outlined above, the Department feels that the Minister and his interested colleagues should be giving consideration to the question of the kind and degree of protection that might under the circumstances be afforded the lives and property of their respective nationals in case the present hostilities extend to Tientsin and Peiping. The Department realizes the difficulties involved in working out in advance a definite plan. There are, however, two aspects under which the question might be considered: first, the consideration of the possibility of a neutralization plan which, however, the interested Ministers and Military Attachés at Peiping and the British Government, when the matter was under discussion last autumn, did not regard at that time as practicable and, second, the consideration of such means as the military commanders at Tientsin and Peiping may deem desirable and practicable for the protection of American lives either in situ or by evacuation.

8. With regard to a neutralization plan, the Department was inclined last autumn to favor such a plan. That view was, however, entertained before hostilities reached their present stage. Now, in so far as the Department is informed, the Chinese appear determined to resist in the Tientsin and Peiping areas further Japanese encroachments upon Chinese soil. A neutralization plan would require that the Chinese withdraw their troops from this area. If there could be any assurance that the Japanese also would withdraw from this area, such a plan might be suggested by friendly, interested powers without giving ground for a feeling that the plan would be discriminatory. At the present stage of developments, the demilitarization of the Peiping-Tientsin area would appear an impediment to the Chinese if they should desire to attempt to prevent the Japanese from entering Jehol, because they would then be forced to march their troops a long distance overland to enter Jehol from the west. The Department is not, therefore, for the moment, prepared to advocate such a plan, although it would not be opposed to assisting in the inauguration of such a plan if the Chinese are agreeable to it or if the other interested powers wish to propose it as a plan thought best designed to protect foreign interests.

9. With regard to the protection of foreign lives in situ or by evacuation, the Department feels that the military commanders both at Peiping and Tientsin should be giving this matter their careful attention, keeping in close touch with the Diplomatic Body at Peiping and the Consular Body at Tientsin.

10. The French Government has approached the Department through the French Ambassador here with regard to the questions involved, and the Department is informing the French Ambassador substantially in accord with the above.

11. In the light of the above, the Department desires that you continue to consult with your interested colleagues, attempting to devise such arrangements as may seem desirable and practicable to meet the situation as it develops and keeping the Department informed promptly of developments.

Stimson

97. See despatch No. 1046, July 15, 1902, from the Minister in China (E. H. Conger), Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 198.

98. The Minister in China in his telegram No. 55, January 16, 7 p.m., stated: “I do not interpret phrase ‘in situ’ in paragraphs 4 and 7 as meaning protection of outlying and isolated American life or property where located. Please instruct.” (793.94/5756)

    The Department replied in telegram No. 18, January 16, 6 p.m.: “That interpretation is correct. The expression ‘in situ’ is used in general reference to location within the areas referred to in the Protocol of 1901.” (793.94/5756)