793.94 Commission/732: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson)
1. Gibson’s 2, January 10, 11 p.m. from Brussels, repeated to you.
As you will realize from previous telegrams, Department has been convinced that measures of conciliation have under existing circumstances practically no chance of success. This view is confirmed by the most recent developments in the situation, the failure of British efforts at mediation in connection with Shanhaikwan, conversations with Japanese Ambassador here, and other evidences.
The Japanese affirm definitely and emphatically that they will adhere to the contention that the existence of “Manchoukuo” as an independent state must be accepted and negotiations must be between [Page 62] them and China without any outside interference. They still insist that the whole question is one between them and China and is no rightful concern of the rest of the world. This amounts to repudiation of their obligations under the multilateral treaties, including the Covenant of the League, and denial of any right of jurisdiction on the part of the League. They declare that they “cannot withdraw” from the positions which they have taken, both physical and political. They even go so far as to ask that the world “close its eyes” and “turn its back” for an indefinite period of time and leave it to them to work out the situation in the Far East in their own way. This amounts to (a) refusal on their part to make any concessions while asking that the world make every concession. Their demand is that Japan’s face be saved entirely, her hands be left entirely free and her forcefully acquired gains be conceded to her, at the expense to the world of a shameful abandonment of principles, stultification of treaty provisions and peace machinery, and, on the part of the League, complete loss of face.
Thus, there is a clearly drawn issue. Japan’s course makes national policy and self-conceived interest paramount in international relations. It tends to nullify the whole effort which has been made since the European war to establish the principle of world interest and to provide machinery for settling international disputes by pacific means. These ideas are irreconcilable. The world cannot at this moment coerce Japan. But it does not follow that Japan must be permitted to coerce the world.
The real issue at this moment is whether Japan shall be permitted not only to impose her will in the Far East by force but to achieve a diplomatic victory over the whole world—especially the whole group of states that are bound together by the Covenant of the League—by a process of skillfully devised and resolutely carried out diplomatic intimidation. The League cannot put an end to the hostilities between Japan and China; it cannot shape the course of events in the Far East; but it could, if it would, express clearly and unequivocally its view, in the light of its Covenant, of what is happening there and could take a stand in opposition thereto.
Referring specifically to Hymans’ statement that he would greatly value an intimation as to our attitude. I do not see how I can state more clearly than it has been stated repeatedly both in communications through diplomatic channels and in my public utterances and through the press, what is the view of this Government. However, by way of effort, I authorize you to say to Hymans that: (1) This Government cannot undertake to give guidance to the League. Such effort, if indulged in, would defeat its own ends: it would amount to unwarranted interference in what is the League’s business; it would [Page 63] irritate Japan and strengthen the Japanese military among their own people; and it would bring gratuitously upon us criticism here. In general, it would do more harm than good. The attitude, however, of the American Government and people ought surely by this time to be known and understood in Geneva. This Government is on record with an unequivocal declaration of the non-recognition doctrine. Our views were further expressed in my letter to Senator Borah and my speech of August 8. Our opinion and attitude are in no way changed. The report of the Lytton Commission has confirmed our estimate of the facts and of principles which should be given consideration. The Lytton report has been regarded in this country as evidence of progress in the development of peace machinery. Failure on the part of the League to give that report any seal of approval will be regarded in this country as a most serious backward step. We see at present no warrant for a belief that efforts at conciliation will in the near future have any chance of success. The present Administration has clearly voiced its belief that resort by the world to use of sanctions would be unwise in principle and would not have our support; but except for that we have in no way qualified our position, as expressed in our telegram of October 5, 1931 for communication to Drummond,85 to the formula contained in which we have since repeatedly referred and the substance of which we have repeatedly reiterated. We have said and we still say: the League has jurisdiction in this matter and it should exercise it; to such decisions as the League may make and such action as it may take the American Government will endeavor, preserving the right of independent judgment, and functioning through diplomatic channels, to give its support. This is the attitude of the present Administration and we have every reason to believe that it will be the attitude of the new Administration. The history of the past 16 months should make it clear that we have not only been willing to go as far as the League shows itself willing to go but on the whole have been willing to go further. How the League can persist in entertaining or affirming doubt with regard to our attitude I am unable to comprehend. This misunderstanding may have the same origin as the stories in the American press that the League itself is weakening in regard to principles. This I cannot believe since one of the great purposes of the League is to maintain intact those principles on which the peace structure of the world is being reared. The firm adherence to principles does not mean that conciliation is no longer possible, but by paying exclusive attention to conciliation the principles which give the League its strength may be lost. The League must, however, use its own judgment and make its own decisions. The [Page 64] United States cannot think for it, be its adviser or dictate to it. Where it decides wisely, we stand ready to cooperate.
For your confidential information, I doubt whether the situation as regards possible British and French attitude at the forthcoming meeting is as hopeless as Hymans appears to believe. There are some evidences that France may prove useful. There are some new reasons why Sir John Simon may be expected to be less completely committed than he appeared to be at the last meeting to the one idea of conciliation only.
- See telegram No. 73, October 9, 1931, 6 p.m., to the Consul at Geneva, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 17.↩