761.04/677
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 2, 1934.]
Sir: Supplementing my confidential despatch No. 606 of December 4, 1933,11 I have the honor to inform the Department that at the dinner at the Soviet Embassy on December 12, given by the Soviet Ambassador for myself and staff, Mr. Yureneff said to me that in his view if the Japanese Army intends to attack Soviet Russia, it will be more likely to open an offensive in the spring of 1934 than at a later date, basing his opinion on the theory that after 1934 time will tell in favor of Russia in point of combat efficiency. The Department will recollect that in the judgment of our Military Attaché, the Japanese Army will not reach the zenith of its combat efficiency until the spring of 1935, and that only after that date will the time factor count in favor of the Russians. Mr. Yureneff however asserted that Soviet Russia is already fully prepared to meet any Japanese menace that may develop at any time, not only in defensive measures but in conducting vigorous offensive operations, on the ground that offense is the best method of defense. He stated that the Russian air force in Siberia is thoroughly strong and includes not only a powerful concentration in Vladivostok but other groups stationed at various points along the Manchurian border. The double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway, he said, is expected to be completed within a few months, but that in case of emergency the “co-operative” labor system which exists in Russia, and in no other country, would enable the Soviet Government to concentrate such a mass of workmen on the railroad as to complete the double-tracking with insignificant delay. The impression made upon me by the substance and tone of the Ambassador’s comments was one of complete confidence as to the favorable outcome of a Russo-Japanese conflict, and the not inconsiderable possibility of its occurrence.
[Page 484]In the course of conversation between members of my staff and the staff of the Soviet Embassy, it was clearly brought out that the Soviets fully intend to retain their Far Eastern provinces and to continue to develop their intimate relations with Outer Mongolia; that Russia is quite prepared to maintain her position in the Far East by force if necessary; that the Russians believe that the Soviet position is actually unassailable and that Japan, in the event of a conflict, would have to reckon with a far stronger and better organized force than she had ever met before.
The hypothesis was advanced both by the Ambassador and members of his staff that the Japanese were behind the recent so-called independence movement in Fukien, that Japan intends to keep China weak and divided and that the Fukien movement was merely another step in that direction. In reply, it was suggested that all the evils and disorder in China could hardly be laid at the door of the Japanese and that, if reports were true, Soviet activities had likewise played their part, notably in Mongolia which is nominally, at any rate, part of China. This was not denied. In reply to a point raised by Mr. Neville,12 Mr. Rayvid, the Soviet Counselor, admitted that it was an essential and necessary policy of the central authorities in Moscow to insist upon conformity with their plans by the so-called independent Soviet republics on the borders of Russia proper.
In the course of a separate conversation Mr. Askoff, First Secretary, informed Mr. Lyon13 that he believed that the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway would be renewed and would eventually be settled, but that the Soviets absolutely refused to renew the conversations until the Japanese had released some seven or eight of the Soviet railway officials now held under arrest.
With regard to the recent United Press despatch reporting that Japanese airplanes had been shot down in Soviet Russia, Mr. Askoff observed that “somebody lied” and that the report had originated with troublemakers in Riga. Mr. Askoff is in charge of the press information bureau of the Embassy.
Throughout the evening the Ambassador and the members of his staff showed no reticence about talking and conveyed an impression that they were telling the truth as they saw it. It was perhaps significant that Mr. Yureneff, in his separate talk with me, continually harped upon the very difficult relations of the United States with Japan, Great Britain and other countries.
Respectfully yours,