Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/671

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 593

Tokyo, November 18, 1933.
[Received December 18.]

Sir: In my despatch No. 573 of November 2, 1933,⁸⁴ on the subject of Soviet-Japanese Relations, it was stated that “the tension which recently characterized Soviet-Japanese relations has, for the moment at least, moderated.” It may now be said that events occurring within the past two weeks have renewed this state of tension for the fourth time since the commencement of 1933. The present instance, however, differs from its predecessors in that it is the first time that the friction appears essentially due to Soviet intransigeance. It seems that Soviet Russia now feels prepared to dispute any extension of Japanese ambitions which may conflict with Soviet interests.

The factual basis for the current tension appears meagre although the following three developments are principally responsible:

(1) Reports from Soviet sources alleged that on November 3 nine Japanese military planes had crossed the frontier in the vicinity of Vladivostok and had cruised about 30 miles into Soviet territory. Government authorities called the attention of the Japanese Consul General in Vladivostok to the alleged flight and, on November 6, Ambassador Yureneff in Tokyo is said to have officially protested the flight of six (not nine) planes over Soviet territory. At the request of the Foreign Minister the War Office conducted an immediate investigation and received denials of the report from the Kwantung Army and the Korean Garrison. Mr. Hirota, it is said, pointed out the discrepancy in the number of planes and emphasized the need for a revision of Soviet policy towards Japan if an amicable solution of pending problems was to be found.

(2) The above incident, true or false, provided an excellent springboard for violent anti-Japanese propaganda on the Red Anniversary Day, November 7. It was reported in Tokyo that Mr. Molotov, President of the Council of People’s Commissars, in a speech designed for the utmost publicity in Russia, envisaged war with Japan, declared that Soviet Russia was fully prepared for “the possibility of an unexpected attack by Japan” and stated further that “if such an attack occurs, our job will be a clear and simple one—complete destruction of the enemy and complete victory of the Red Army.” With this speech the Japanese people were forcefully reminded of Soviet animosity for the second time within a week.

(3) On November 12 the Soviets appeared responsible for a third incident. A United Press despatch^* from Moscow stated that six out of the nine Japanese planes which had crossed the Siberian border on November 3 had been shot down and that in addition two Japanese auxiliary naval vessels had been blown up seyeral weeks ago off the Kamchatka coast. Inasmuch as it is generally believed in Japan that the Soviet censorship of press reports is very efficient, many Japanese comments intimated that publication of this provocative report must have had the sanction of the Soviet government. At any rate, officials of the War, Navy, and Foreign Offices, characterized the story as ridiculous. There is no question of its falsity. The Soviet Foreign Office also denied the report but insisted, it is said, that nine planes had violated the frontier. Soviet authorities are also supposed to have warned the Japanese Government that henceforth any planes which invade Soviet territory will be shot down.

Besides the three principal irritants outlined above, Japanese feeling against Soviet Russia was aggravated by the following minor occurrences which were reported in Tokyo newspapers:

(1) Another Japanese fishing vessel, the Ghoei Maru, has been detained by the Soviets. The Japanese maintain that it entered Soviet waters because of engine trouble while the Soviets insist that the invasion was deliberate.

(2) On November 7 from Harbin came a report of the massacre of 200 villagers, “Manchukuo” citizens, by Red troops in the Soviet town of Petrovsky near Blagoveschensk. “Manchukuo” authorities are supposed to have started an investigation. It is also reported from Harbin that gold is being smuggled out of “Manchukuo” by means of a Soviet Consulate launch which transports it from Taheiho to Blagoveschensk across the Amur, “Manchukuo” will protest if confirmation is received.

(3) On November 11 at Manchuli “Manchukuo” officials lodged a vigorous protest against “undue rigor exercised in the discharge of duty at the expense of passengers crossing the border.” Retaliation is threatened. On November 13 the reported arrest at Manchuli of the Soviet Commercial Representative at Seoul may be so regarded. The charge was espionage based on documents found in his luggage.

The major instances of Soviet unfriendliness mentioned in this despatch could not but have an unfortunate effect on Japanese opinion. Nevertheless, in Foreign Office circles, the latest expressions of Soviet policy have only served to stimulate efforts for a restoration of normal relations. On November 8 the Foreign Office issued a summary claiming that war is a remote possibility, branding Soviet diplomacy as an ineffectual attempt to promote communism in Japan, and arguing that the Stalin regime is attempting to save a desperate internal situation by creating an artificial foreign menace. Later, in an official statement on November 12, the Foreign Office stated its belief that the Soviet Government was attempting to crystallize anti-Japanese sentiment to gain favor with America and intimated further that the Soviet Government would interpret recognition by America to its people as endorsement of its anti-Japanese program. As concrete evidence that the Foreign Minister is energetically striving to maintain peaceful relations came the report that Mr. Hirota is seriously considering proposing an extension to the Soviet-”Manchukuo” frontier of the prohibition in the Portsmouth Treaty⁸⁵ of menacing military measures on the frontier between Korea and the Maritime Provinces. Whether the Foreign Minister would ever be in a position to propose a demilitarized zone or not, this report, which was given out by the Foreign Office, indicates that Mr. Hirota will leave no stone unturned in his efforts to relieve Soviet-Japanese tension.

Army circles have shown considerable restraint in the face of Soviet intransigeance. Nevertheless, the younger officers together with reactionary elements in Japan are said to be fast losing patience with Soviet Russia and to favor immediate war. This is probably the most serious single element of danger in the situation at the present time, but there is as yet no indication that the responsible heads of the army cannot control the situation. General Araki was recently quoted as follows:

“It is beyond my conjecture what Russia is thinking about. It seems that the Soviet is strengthening its military forces on Far East Frontiers, but we are entirely in the dark regarding what their intention may be in doing this. At any rate I do not think that Russia is doing anything worthy of our consideration.”

While the hypocrisy of General Araki’s last remark was probably patent to everyone, it is indicative of a certain attitude sometimes heard in Japan that Soviet Russia is not an antagonist who would severely try Japan’s strength. Nevertheless the weight of evidence indicates that the Japanese Army is not yet prepared to fight and that it will continue to take a negative attitude in the face of Soviet hostility until Japan is fully prepared.

The general public and the press have been slow to react to the surprising idea that the Russian bear no longer seems afraid of Japan. The most usual comment is that Soviet Russia must show “more sincerity” which, being interpreted, generally signifies to comply with Japan’s wishes. Japan’s wishes in this case seem to be a unilateral demilitarization of the “Manchukuo”-Soviet border with Soviet Russia doing the disarming. There follow representative extracts from recent editorials on this subject:

Hochi Shimbun, November 8:

“If the Soviet Government is really sincere enough to aspire to friendly intercourse between the two nations and the establishment of peace in the Far East, the first thing it ought to do at this moment is to restrict its own military policy in the Orient.”

“The bad faith and the unrestricted military demonstrations for which Soviet policy in the Far East is ever so conspicuous are twin setbacks preventing the peaceful development of Soviet-Japanese relations.”

Miyako Shimbun, November 8:

“For the sake of Soviet-Japanese relations and of Far Eastern peace, the inconsistency so disgustingly marking the Soviet policy should be put to an end at once.”

Nichi Nichi, November 9:

“If there is to be friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union, there must be a change in the policy of the Soviet in the Far East. It is incumbent on the Soviet to reduce the forces it maintains in the Far East to the strength necessary for defense purposes.”

Yomiuri, November 9:

“The Soviet-Japanese situation has never been under greater necessity than at the present time for efforts towards improvement, and diplomatic operations, judicious and sincere on either side, are the most practical measures, we believe, to ensure the happiest attainment of the aim in view.”

In evaluating the seriousness of this latest threat to the peace of the Far East it may be remembered that observers have from time to time maintained that the trouble between Soviet Russia and Japan has been exaggerated by the army to facilitate acceptance of its demands for appropriations and that when the army budget was accepted, the Soviet-Japanese crisis would disappear. While the present tension has developed from Soviet activity, and while it is probable that army leaders do not now wish to involve Japan in a critical war, it is perhaps significant from another point of view that the Japanese army has neglected to capitalize on the present situation and has apparently done nothing to aggravate the crisis for purposes of propaganda. Either the army feels confident of realizing whatever demands it may make on the nation or else it is seriously impressed with the threat offered by Soviet military force in the Far East. In this connection it is often noted that the Japanese are openly worried by the existence of the formidable Soviet airplane base at Vladivostok.

In conclusion the outstanding fact in the events of the last few weeks is the exchange of roles between Soviet Russia and Japan. Soviet Russia is now the source of irritating incidents while Japan appears to temporize. The outstanding question, however, is the motive behind the new Soviet policy, a departure which was forecast by the fulminations of Ambassador Yureneff at a press dinner last August.^† Some observers note that recent incidents have coincided with the Soviet-American negotiations in Washington which will further strengthen the international position of Soviet Russia. Other experienced observers point to the previous mistakes of Soviet policy in the Far East and claim that the incidents which commenced with the publication of the so-called “Hishikari documents”^‡ are additional proofs of the aimlessness, irresponsibility, and stupidity of those who conduct the Soviet’s foreign relations. These observers lay great stress on the belief that the latest chain of incidents is primarily designed for domestic consumption. On the other hand, there are those who believe that there is now a logical and consistent policy in the minds of the Soviet leaders and that the recent incidents are the express indications of such a policy. According to their theory Soviet Russia realizes that Japanese ambition has never been thwarted nor her interests limited by any other agency than superior force. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union has concentrated a formidable army in the Far East although the primary purpose of her diplomacy is to avoid war. Furthermore, fearing that Japanese imperialism is insatiable and that only force will thwart its ambitions, Soviet Russia has now embarked on a campaign to make Japan fully aware that the Soviet is willing and able to employ that force. Viewed in this manner the incidents outlined in this despatch become the logical and consistent expressions of a policy of self-defence, a policy which depends not only on the “big stick” but on “talking big” as well.

For the immediate future at least, the situation does not appear to threaten war, barring always the possibility of a chance conflagration. If it is true that the policy of Soviet Russia is concerned only with self-defence, the question of war or peace devolves upon imperialist Japan. Within Japan it is apparently largely a matter of internal politics. If militaristic elements prevail, war may in time be unavoidable. If moderate elements under the energetic leadership of the present Foreign Minister should regain control, there would be small likelihood of armed conflict. It is encouraging to note at the present that the press has expressed frequent and hearty approval of Mr. Hirota’s efforts to restore friendly relations between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph G. Grew

84. Not printed.
85. Telegram No. 175, Nov. 12, 6 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]
85. Signed September 5, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 824.
86. Despatch No. 536, Sept. 29, 1933. [Footnote in the original.]
87. Despatch 560, Oct. 20, 1933. [Footnote in the original.]