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Memorandum by the Counselor of Legation in China (Peck) of a Conversation Between the American Minister in China (Johnson) and the Chinese Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tang)81
Mr. Johnson called on Mr. Tang at the Foreign Office, accompanied by Mr. Peck. The conversation was interpreted by the latter.
Mr. Johnson inquired whether Mr. Tang would be willing to summarize briefly the present situation of the National Government with reference to its internal and external problems. What follows is the gist of remarks made by Mr. Tang in reference to Sino-Japanese relations. In general, Mr. Tang was not prompted by questions from [Page 453] Mr. Johnson, but proceeded from point to point in a systematic survey.
Referring to the Sino-Japanese controversy, Mr. Tang recalled that just before the Tangku Truce was negotiated (May 31, 1933) the larger part of the Government’s forces were in Kiangsi, to oppose the Communists. It is true that there were some 70,000 or 80,000 troops in North China but only four or five divisions, a small portion, could have been counted on to fight against the Japanese, if that course had been decided upon. Under these circumstances, to have fought with the Japanese would have been merely to invite the occupation of North China down to the Yangtze by Japanese troops, who would have come over in ever increasing numbers. It was impossible, therefore, for China to fight Japan and the truce was unavoidable.
The Government has been brought to a change in its manner of handling the Sino-Japanese controversy. It adheres stedfastly, however, to the principles it has followed from the beginning. That is, under no circumstances will the Government perform any act which could be construed as recognizing the existence of “Manchukuo” or as admitting that Manchuria has been alienated from China. At the same time, the Chinese Government is willing to negotiate with Japan on small matters not involving fundamental principles. The Government will avoid a contentious attitude in such small matters.
Among the fundamental principles to which the Government stedfastly adheres is that of continuing its free intercourse with Great Britain and the United States. It will not consent to confine its relations to Japan. One reason for the Government’s resolute determination in regard to this is the fact that it regards the question of Manchuria as a world question, and not as a Sino-Japanese question. The world must decide the fate of Manchuria, not China and Japan.
Mr. Tang alluded to the fact that he was commonly spoken of as being “pro-Japanese”. He said that whatever might be the truth or falsity of that designation, he was on such terms with Japanese civil, naval and military authorities that he could converse with them, and he had pointed out to them unequivocally that nothing whatever would be gained if Japan by force majeure compelled China to cede Manchuria to Japan. The United States and Great Britain would never acquiesce in such a transaction, nor would the Soviet Government. The fate of Manchuria involved dangers for Japan, but not because China would in the near future be able to wreak vengeance on Japan. The danger lay in the fact that Great Britain and the United States and especially the Soviet Union would never acquiesce in such a settlement.
With special reference to this phase of the subject, Mr. Tang [Page 454] expressed the hope that the United States would maintain unchanged its announced policy of justice in regard to Manchuria. In saying that China must rely on the United States to safeguard its rights in Manchuria, he did not mean that China had any desire that the United States should fight Japan. It was his opinion, he said, that if the United States maintained its announced policy, Japan would ultimately come to a realization of the mistakes it had committed and would, itself, revise its Manchurian policy.
Replying to the implied question, Mr. Johnson answered that so far as he was aware the American Government had not altered its announced stand in regard to the Manchurian question.
Referring to negotiations between General Huang Fu and General Okamura in Peiping recently, Mr. Tang made substantially the same statements which he had made to Mr. Peck in an interview on November 6 (see despatch No. 4–566, November 7, 193382). The point he emphasized was that the National Government would under no circumstances concede anything in principle to Japan in reference to Manchuria. In this connection, Mr. Tang made a statement the accuracy of which may be questioned. He said that the discussions regarding the “passes” in the Great Wall related only to their military occupation and not to “Customs stations”. (In Chinese, ambiguity is possible. Press despatch indicate[s] that Huang Fu and Okamura discussed branch Customs stations at these passes in the Great Wall and that “Customs authorities are reported to have drawn up a list of 36 categories of Chinese goods produced in Manchuria which will be exempt from payment of import duty when entering the Great Wall”.) Mr. Tang’s statement is somewhat explained by the Reuter message just quoted. What he said was that, however, the establishing of the proposed Customs stations would mean free entry into China for goods from Manchuria and no free entry for Chinese goods into Manchuria, through the Great Wall, a situation which the National Government would not tolerate.
Mr. Tang observed that he was not by profession a diplomat and might be allowed, therefore, to say an undiplomatic thing. This was that, to his regret, Chinese leaders were often classified as “pro-British and pro-American” or “pro-Japanese”. These parties, unfortunately, seem to give their attention to schemes for the benefit of the countries to which they are supposed to be partial, instead of to schemes for the benefit of China. What Mr. Tang hoped for, he said, was an ever increasing number of Chinese who would devote their energies to the welfare of China. After all, China must extricate itself from its difficulties by the use of its own resources.
[Page 455]Mr. Johnson thanked Mr. Tang for his lucid and frank exposition of the political situation in China today. He said that he hoped that Mr. Tang would find time to have a conversation with Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, when Mr. Hamilton should come to Nanking in the course of the next two or three weeks and that Mr. Tang would talk with equal frankness to him. Mr. Tang said that he would be glad to talk with Mr. Hamilton.