761.94/664
Memorandum by Mr. Eugene H. Dooman of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
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The Japanese line of advance on the Asiatic Continent is primarily to the west and to the south. The Russian line of advance was originally to the east, and having reached the Pacific it turned southward until it met the Japanese line of advance, where it was checked. The possibility of war between the two countries becomes imminent as soon as Japan advances northward through Manchuria and/or Mongolia or Russia southward from Siberia.
In view of the strategic and economic factors above outlined, it is doubtful whether Russia would today initiate any movement which would lead to war with Japan. If this assumption is correct war between the two countries could arise only upon Japan initiating a movement northward into Siberia.
However insecure Japan’s position may be today, she will in 1935 enter an even more critical period. The question of making effective [Page 442] her notice of withdrawal from the League will arise and she may perhaps face an attempt by the League to cancel the Japanese Mandate over the South Sea Islands and possibly an attempt on the part of the League to transfer the Islands to the jurisdiction of some other power. In the following year, Japan will presumably withdraw from the agreements covering naval limitation, as it is not to be supposed that her demands for parity or even for an increased ratio will be acceptable to the other powers; and she will accordingly be confronted with the possibility of engaging in a naval competition with other powers.
If Japan were successful in seizing the maritime provinces in Siberia, the benefits derived therefrom, such as the fisheries, lumber and mineral resources, although considerable, would not, it is believed, be sufficient to compensate Japan for the weakening of her resources by a war with Russia, particularly in view of the critical period facing her some years hence.
There is no certain way of gauging Japanese national policies at the present time, as they are being formulated by a small group of leading figures and then handed down to the people for adoption. Nor is there any way of foreseeing incidents, whether arising spontaneously or artificially created, which may lead to war (and there is today a grave risk of war being brought about by some incident of small intrinsic importance). An objective appraisal of facts and of certain assumptions which may fairly be considered to have the force and effect of facts leads to the conclusion that the political strategy of Japan, as well as that of Russia, does not call for a war between the two powers at the present time and perhaps not before 1936.