793.94/5774
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
At his request, I called on the Japanese Ambassador. The conversation lasted for nearly two hours.
The Ambassador went over various points that had been discussed in previous conversations. He said that he now had “good news” from North Manchuria: at Suifen (on the eastern frontier) 2,000 Chinese had surrendered to the Japanese, and now the Japanese have the railway running from Harbin eastward to that point. Also, the Japanese are getting things in order between Harbin and Manchuli, so that soon the whole railway line of the Chinese Eastern will be peacefully in operation.
The Ambassador said that he was confident that the Japanese military would not make moves that would involve Tientsin and Peiping.
The Ambassador said that he greatly appreciated having these frank discussions and he would welcome any criticism of Japan’s activities or constructive suggestions with regard to settlement. Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt it would not be appropriate for him to undertake to make criticisms, but that he could say that he felt very great regret that Japan had chosen to follow and was continuing to follow a course which her military leaders have mapped out. With regard to constructive suggestions, the one great thing which the world has been suggesting ever since September 18, 1931, was that pacific measures rather than forceful measures be employed for the [Page 46] achieving of a settlement. At that point the Ambassador said that the situation had developed beyond any original expectation on Japan’s part; and Mr. Hornbeck then added the comment that at each step the Japanese military had assisted in the development of the situation. The Ambassador said that that was true.
The Ambassador then referred to the date set for the resumption of discussions at Geneva. He said that he would like very much to know what was going to be the attitude of the American Government. Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt that the American Government had at an early stage made known its attitude and that at no time during the past twelve months had there been any change in its position; what seemed to him more important for the moment was the question what is to be Japan’s attitude and position. The Ambassador said that Japan could not in any respect recede from the position which she has acquired in Manchuria and the policy which she has announced in regard thereto: Japan has recognized “Manchoukuo” and it is necessary that she support and maintain that state. If the world would take adequate cognizance of that fact and leave it to Japan to work out the situation in Manchuria, Japan would be perfectly ready to be conciliatory about other matters. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether that would not amount to saying that if the world would assent to Japan’s having all that she wants, Japan would be ready to be conciliatory about things with regard to which there remains nothing to be discussed. The Ambassador laughed and said that that was about what it amounted to.
The Ambassador then referred to the non-recognition doctrine and said that it had been an irritant to the Japanese people and was regarded by them as an evidence of the desire of the American Government to align the powers in opposition to Japan’s efforts. Mr. Hornbeck said that the American Government had no desire at any time gratuitously to give Japan occasion or cause for irritation, but that it must be remembered that Japan had given the whole world a great deal of provocation. Throughout this whole matter there had been a contest in which there had been on one side Japan and on the other not the United States but the rest of the world, including the United States. It must be remembered that the other great powers had been carrying on their part of the contest for the most part through the League of which they are members; while the acts of the United States had had to be its own acts. It must be taken into account that the United States had at no time officially or expressly condemned Japan, that we had made no threats, that we had as a matter of fact at some points exercised a restraining influence against hastily considered positive action; and that what the non-recognition doctrine amounts to is that we declare that if and where situations [Page 47] and agreements are brought about by unlawful means we do not intend to give them by any acts of ours the seal of legality.
At that point the Ambassador said again that he would like to know what was going to be the attitude of the American Government when the League resumes its discussions. Mr. Hornbeck said that he believed that the Ambassador fully understood what has been and what must be the American Government’s view and that he saw no reason for any conjecture that its view might have changed, but, the American Government is not a party to the discussions at Geneva and the Japanese Government is a party to those discussions: the important question is that of the attitude in which the Japanese Government may approach the renewal thereof. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government could make no change—because public opinion in Japan would not permit it. Mr. Hornbeck said that, without desiring to press the point too hard, he thought that the Ambassador must realize that the impression in the United States is that the people in authority in Japan have created the problem as it now stands in connection with Manchuria and have also created the public opinion which now exists in Japan in support of it. If such is the case, and if the Japanese Government now rests a plea of non possumus on the basis of public opinion in Japan, the whole thing simply means that the Japanese Government is saying “cannot” when it means “will not”. The Ambassador said that, however the matter may be looked at, the Japanese Government cannot make any change in the position which it has taken. He then went on to say that he wished that the world would close its eyes and turn its back and keep still, give Japan a chance to work the thing out in her own way, let her demonstrate the wisdom and success of her policy of restoring order in Manchuria and developing that area; Japan would make Manchuria prosperous; trade with Manchuria would increase; the United States would profit by it; in particular, there would be an increase in demand for American cotton and probably a demand for machinery and industrial supplies: the population of Manchuria would increase rapidly; the world would have reason to be pleased. Mr. Hornbeck said that the suggestion that the world close its eyes and turn its back amounted to asking the League of Nations to forget the Covenant, the whole world to forget the multilateral treaties; everybody to forget the efforts which have been made during recent years to substitute new methods for old in connection with the settling of international disputes; and for all the nations to leave it to one nation to set the standards, according to its own lights, of conduct in the family of nations. He said that he regretted, as he believed would all friends of Japan in this country, that Japanese thought should be traveling along that line; and that he still hoped, as do [Page 48] many observers in many parts of the world, that Japan would yet approach this problem, perhaps in the forthcoming meeting of the League, in an attitude considerate at least of the views, the desires and the interests of the other nations of the world.