793.94/6466
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
The suggestion has been made that, in view of an expression of concern with regard to the Far Eastern situation made by the Italian Premier as reported by the American Ambassador at Rome,43 the American Government should suggest to the Italian Government that the Italian Government suggest to the French and the British Governments cooperative action on the part of those Governments and the American Government, such action to be taken presumably immediately after the anticipated occupation of Peiping by Japanese armed forces is consummated.
Comment:
It is the estimate and opinion of this Division that action in the sense of this proposal would not be advisable. In the absence of an indication of the end which it is believed might be served by such a concerted move, at such time, by the powers, we do not perceive that any purpose would best be served thereby. We would welcome suggestions with regard to that point from the source from which the suggestion of the action under reference has come.
As we see it, cooperative action by the major powers directed toward preventing the hostilities which are now taking place in the area north of Peiping and Tientsin, had it been possible to take such action before this movement began, might have served a useful purpose. The Ministers of the powers in Peiping have for weeks had under consideration the question of the possibilities, as a practical political matter, of taking such action. The American and the British Ministers in particular are known to have been in frequent conference and constant communication with their governments on that subject. Some time ago, the British Minister (who has had much experience and shown much skill in such matters), after carefully exploring the possibilities and having some conversations both with Chinese and with Japanese representatives, informed the American Minister that he felt it necessary to desist from any activity along that line. The simple fact is there is no firm ground for a would-be “go-between” to stand upon at either end of the pathway on which, as a go-between, he must travel between the two contending parties.
The material interests most menaced by the Japanese advance in the area now under attention are British interests. Next, French. The initiative toward concerted action, if to be taken by any of the major powers without reference to the League of Nations, might best [Page 328] be taken by the British Government. Next best, by either the French or the Italians. To least advantage, by us. The British Government has as yet said nothing directly to us since the inquiry which they made shortly after the Japanese entered Shanhaikwan at the beginning of January; they have, however, talked with us on this subject through their Minister in Peiping, and we instructed our Minister that he should receive with favorable predisposition any definite proposals which the British or any other of his colleagues there might make—and we told him that he might inform the British Minister of that instruction. The French Government has told us that it was apprehensive with regard to the situation. The Italian Government has now done the same. It may be assumed with reasonable confidence that those Governments have expressed the same views to one another and to the British Government. Even if they have not done so, there is no reason why they should not without prompting from us do so.
We have repeatedly since October 5, 1931, told the Secretary of the League and representatives of the principal governments members of the League that we feel that a greater measure of responsibility in connection with the question of preventing, minimizing or restricting hostilities in the Far East rests upon the League and upon states members of the League than rests upon the United States,—this by virtue of the fact that the members of the League, among whom are the disputant countries, are committed to one another and have a certain special group of rights and obligations inter se as the United States is not committed and which the United States does not have. Also, we have repeatedly stated that initiative should come from them rather than from us. In addition, we are in a position of jeopardy in relations with Japan more delicate than is theirs. We have communicated those views to them not only under the late Administration but under the present Administration. Mr. Hugh Wilson and Mr. Norman Davis, on the spot and in contact with their representatives, share our view in that connection and have communicated it faithfully. Our Minister in China and our Ambassador in Japan are of the same view.
From time to time since September 18, 1931, we have offered suggestions and on some occasions we have taken the initiative toward inducing action. Practically without exception the fact of our having done these things has promptly been made known and has evoked unfavorable reactions from Japan. Furthermore, very seldom have we had favorable responses from the other major powers concerned. It has been our experience that where we have waited for and there has come initially from the British or the French Government a suggestion [Page 329] such as we have considered making but have withheld, the chance that the idea be adopted has been greatly increased.
The views of this Division advancing and in support of the thesis that a maximum of caution must be exercised by the powers in connection with any question of becoming involved in a project for inducing the Chinese and the Japanese to negotiate an agreement have already been expressed in a previous memorandum.
There is much more that might be said on this subject, and we would welcome an opportunity to discuss it with any proponent of the suggestion which has occasioned the writing of this memorandum.