Office of the Historian

793.94 Commission/815

Memorandum by Mr. William R. Langdon42

[Washington,] January 9, 1933.

Alleged Use of American Naval Forces in Connection With Anti-American Boycott in China in 1905–06

At the seventh meeting of the 69th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, held on November 23, 1932,43 the Japanese representative, Mr. Matsuoka, discussed the present Chinese anti-Japanese boycott and in the course of his discussion made the following statements:

“I believe it will be useful as well as interesting for the Council to know what attitude the American Government has taken on the question.…44 I myself was Acting Consul-General for Japan at the time in Shanghai, the very port from which this boycott was directed, so I speak from personal and intimate knowledge. In fact, I would add that I cooperated very closely with the American Consul-General at Shanghai in an effort to stop it.

“We can learn something of the reaction of the American Government to the Chinese boycott if we refer to the official correspondence on the subject in Vol. 1905 of Foreign Relations in [of] the United States. In that book, it will be seen that the American Government characterized the movement as ‘an irregular and illegal prop to Chinese diplomacy’…44

“The Chinese Government were furthermore warned that they would be held accountable for all losses, and then—please note this particularly—in order to enforce their point of view, the American Government ordered the Pacific Fleet to get ready. Under direct pressure and a threat of personal accountability, the Taotai of Shanghai stopped the movement in that port within twenty-four hours. Could any word or any action have been stronger?”

(Extract from official minutes of meeting. Underscoring by FE45).

According to official documents in the archives of the State and Navy Departments and to personal papers of President Roosevelt,46 the facts and circumstances of American naval action in Chinese waters and of American policy in China during the period when the anti-American boycott was at its height are as outlined below.

When the anti-American boycott in China, conducted as a protest against certain features of a new treaty under negotiation with the [Page 32] United States for the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the United States, broke out in May 1905, there were no American warships in Chinese waters, according to the attached memoranda49 prepared by the Office of Naval Records and Library of the Navy Department. In June and July, 1905, however, according to the same authority, the following vessels of the United States Asiatic Fleet left the naval base at Cavite for Chinese waters—on their annual summer routine cruise, according to oral information furnished by the author of the memoranda:

Battleships Ohio, Wisconsin, Oregon
Cruisers Baltimore, Raleigh, Cincinnati
Gunboats Villalobos, Callao, Quiros
Destroyers Bainbridge, Barry, Chauncey, Dale, Decatur
Armed yacht General Alava

On August 5, 1905, the President directed that Minister Rockhill at Peking be instructed to notify the Chinese Government that we would hold it responsible for any loss sustained by its failure to stop the organized anti-American movement. On August 16, 1905, Mr. Rock-hill was informed that the President was puzzled about the Chinese policy vis-à-vis the boycott and the Canton-Hankow Railway concession, and that the President was inclined to think that the American Government would have to take a firm stand. On August 25, 1905, the President directed that Mr. Rockhill proceed to Shanghai to investigate the anti-American movement (At Mr. Rockhill’s suggestion this order was not carried out).

On September 15, 1905, the Consul General at Canton telegraphed that the presence of the large monitor Monadnock at Canton was advisable, as it would permit the small gunboat Callao, then at Canton, to protect American interests elsewhere. The Monadnock accordingly sailed for Canton from Cavite on October 7, 1905.

On October 2, 1905, the Department informed the Navy Department that the situation at Canton was still serious, and asked that the Navy Department obtain by cable the views of the naval commander at Canton. On October 9, 1905, the Commander of the Raleigh, then at Hong Kong, cabled that the Consulate General was not in imminent danger, but that the Viceroy was permitting the intimidation of Chinese handling American goods. (Further reports from naval commanders in Chinese waters dealing with the anti-American movement and with measures taken or deemed necessary to cope with it are quoted in Appendix II.49 These reports indicate [Page 33] that the naval commanders considered naval protection necessary.)

On October 3, 1905, Minister Rockhill sent a strong note to the Chinese Government in regard to its inefficiency in dealing with the situation in Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces and on October 30, 1905, followed it up with another note using even firmer language and stating that the American Government desired to act justly to China but that it would not tolerate injustice from China (Foreign Relations, 1905, pages 229–231).

In the meantime, anti-American agitation in the Canton area was growing more intense. Outstanding overt acts were: a threat on the person of the American Consul General, direct interference with the legitimate business and property of the Standard Oil Company, and an attempt to burn the American Presbyterian mission at Ying-tak. On October 28, an American mission station at Lienchow was attacked by a Chinese mob and five Americans slain. Although the Lienchow massacre was not directly related to the boycott, it aroused public sentiment in the United States and increased the concern of the American Government over the position of American residents and trade in China.

On November 15, 1905, the President sent the following letter to the Secretary of the Navy (kept among President Roosevelt’s personal papers in the Library of Congress):

“Personal.

“November 15, 1905.

“My dear Mr. Secretary:

“The Chinese are not showing a good spirit. I think that we should have as strong a naval force as possible concentrated on the Chinese shore and as speedily as possible. Will you go over the matter with Secretary Root50 and meanwhile find out from Admiral Converse51 how many vessels can be sent to China and how soon? We ought to be prepared for any contingencies there.

Sincerely yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

“Honorable Charles J. Bonaparte,
Secretary of the Navy.”

On November 16, 1905, the President sent to the Department a Chinese letter, accompanied by a translation, addressed to a certain Dr. Martin52 requesting his intercession in having the Chinese exclusion provisions of our immigration laws removed, and attached the following personal note to it (Miscellaneous Letters—Department of State—November 1905, Part II): [Page 34]

“Personal.

“November 16, 1905.

“To the Secretary of State:

“The translator of this, Dr. Martin, told me confidentially that the Viceroys made no real effort whatever to stop the boycott. I think we shall have to speak pretty sharply to the Chinese Government.

(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt”

In reply to the President’s letter of November 15, 1905, the Secretary of the Navy wrote (Miscellaneous Letters—Department of State, November 1905, Part II):

“Navy Department

“November 15, 1905.

“Dear Mr. President:

“After consultation with Secretary Root and Admiral Converse, I have ordered that four or five torpedo boat destroyers be sent to Canton, where we have now the Monadnock, a double turreted monitor, and the small vessel Callao. The Baltimore is at present at Shanghai, and I have directed that the Raleigh be sent there also, and I have further instructed the Admiral to send a vessel to ‘look in’ at Chefoo. There are very few places on the Chinese coast which vessels of any considerable draft can enter, and only small vessels can reach Canton. We have the battleships Ohio and Oregon at Hongkong, and two small gunboats at Shanghai, and it does not seem practicable to do much more than what has been ordered with a view to producing a suitable moral effect.

“Believe me, as ever,
Yours most truly,

Charles J. Bonaparte,
Secretary.

“The President.”

The Navy Department evidently thought that the naval force then in Chinese waters (battleships Oregon, Ohio, ‘Wisconsin; monitor Monadnock; cruisers Baltimore, Raleigh; gunboats Callao, Elcano, Quiros, Villalobos; destroyers Bainbridge, Barry, Chauncey, Dale, Decatur; armed yacht General Alava) was more than sufficient for the American Government’s purposes, for the attached memoranda of the Navy Department show that the battleships Ohio and Oregon left China for their base at Cavite on November 18, 1905, the battleship Wisconsin on December 28, 1905, the cruiser Raleigh on December 12, 1905, and the destroyers Chauncey, Dale and Decatur at the beginning of December, 1905. The withdrawal of these ships reduced the American fleet in Chinese waters at the close of 1905 to the following force:

Monitor Monadnock
Cruiser Baltimore
Gunboats Callao, Quiros, Villalobos, Elcano
Destroyers Bainbridge, Barry
Armed yacht General Alava

[Page 35]

On February 21, 1906, the Department wrote to the Navy Department stating that Consul General Fleming D. Cheshire,53 who on November 10, 1905, had been ordered to proceed to Canton to make a special investigation of the boycott there, recommended that until conditions in China became more settled, as strong a naval force as possible be kept at Canton (see despatch of January 6, 1906, from Consulate General, Canton, to Department). To this letter the Navy Department, on February 26, 1906, replied that the four vessels already at Canton were all that could be spared for lengthy services there, but that if more were needed they could be sent from Cavite, only 700 miles distant. Contemporary reports from other American officials in China also stressed the need of greater naval protection, as the following despatches indicate:

  • December 18, 1905: Consul at Chefoo: “While situation apparently peaceful, consider presence war vessels very desirable for the protection of our interests North China.”
  • January 9, 1906: Minister Rockhill: “Unsettled conditions and agitation throughout Central China justify extra precautions (stationing warships constantly in Shanghai rather than Woosung in connection with riots over the Mixed Court at Shanghai).”
  • January 13, 1906: Consul General at Shanghai: (Referring to the protest made by the American Association of China that at the time of the “recent riot” Shanghai was left without an American cruiser): “I believe that a cruiser should be in Shanghai harbor in the immediate future nearly all the time.”
  • March 5, 1906: Minister Rockhill, giving the substance of a report made by the British Minister at Peking to his Government describing anti-foreignism in China and advising an increase in the British naval forces in China.

These reports were passed on to the Navy, and the requests of the various consuls for naval protection in all cases were met as promptly as circumstances allowed from the force then maintained in Chinese waters, which was further reduced by the withdrawal to Cavite on February 4, 1906, of the cruiser Baltimore and on February 26, 1906, of the armed yacht General Alava.

The Navy Department, on May 2, 1906, referring to Minister Rock-hill’s despatch of March 5, 1906 (see preceding paragraph), wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:

“While the U. S. naval force in Chinese waters has been reduced by the detachment of the battleship Oregon, it has been augmented within the past four months by the Concord, Chattanooga, Galveston, [Page 36] and Wilmington* and is expecting further to be increased by the addition of the Helena this month, all suitable vessels for Chinese waters.”

From the references cited above, it appears that during the period of the anti-American boycott in China there was no unusual concentration of American naval forces in Chinese waters. In July 1905 a fleet of three battleships, three cruisers, three gunboats, five destroyers, and the Admiral’s yacht sailed from Cavite for Chinese ports not to cope with the situation arising from the anti-American boycott but to escape the heat of the Philippines, as then was and still is the custom of the Asiatic Fleet. In spite of the ominous situation then existing, which even evoked the alarm of the President, this naval force was not augmented, but on the contrary was steadily reduced until by the end of the following February it consisted of

  • One monitor
  • Four gunboats
  • Two destroyers.

Owing to the requests of American representatives in China for greater naval protection, this small fleet of small vessels was in March, 1906, increased by one gunboat and in June, 1906, by two cruisers.

Although it would appear that there was no unusual concentration of American war vessels during the period under discussion, the disposition of the vessels gave rise to the rumor not only that drastic naval action was contemplated, but also that American troops from the Philippines were to be despatched to China. Numerous letters were received by the Department from persons in the United States expressing concern over Americans in China, and the Department in general terms admitted that it was watching the situation closely. In the United States the public questioned the advisability of naval and military action in China; in China such action was generally hoped for by foreigners. (See Annex III54 for representative contemporary views on the use of American forces in China.)

In view of the facts as recorded above, Mr. Matsuoka’s assertion that the American Government ordered its Pacific fleet to be in readiness to proceed to China to enforce its viewpoint in the matter of the anti-American boycott is incorrect. To begin with, it may be advanced there was no opposing viewpoint to combat, inasmuch as the Chinese Government, officially at least, did not fail to respond to our representations to suppress the boycott. The reason for Mr. Roosevelt’s [Page 37] opinion (he issued no orders) that we should have as strong a naval force in China as possible was the wrong “spirit” of the Chinese, which may or may not have related particularly to the boycott. The President may very well have had in mind, in addition to the boycott, the ugly mood of the Chinese population toward American residents, reflected in the attempt to burn the Presbyterian Mission at Yingtak and in the massacre of American missionaries at Lienchow, and the Chinese Government’s effort arbitrarily to annul the concession to build the Hankow-Canton Railway held by an American company. In any event, no orders to get ready to proceed to China were issued to the Pacific Fleet, and with the exception of two gunboats belonging to other fleets, every naval vessel used in China throughout the boycott was drawn from the Asiatic Fleet, with base headquarters at Cavite, P. I. It may be added parenthetically that the maintenance of strong naval forces in Chinese waters by foreign powers in periods of actual or anticipated trouble has not been unusual.†

The evidence furnished by American Government papers tends to show that the primary purpose of the unusual disposition and prolonged sojourn‡ in Chinese waters of American naval vessels [Page 38] which in July, 1905, had come to China on a routine summer cruise was the protection of seriously menaced American life and property. The annual report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1905–06 makes no mention whatever of the anti-American boycott in China and the only suggestion in it of any naval activity in China is found in the following paragraph dealing with the Asiatic Fleet (page 399):

“This fleet has been engaged in the regular routine fleet work in addition to the duties of looking out for American interests.”

Mr. Matsuoka’s statement that under direct pressure and threat of personal accountability, the Taotai of Shanghai stopped the anti-American boycott in that port within twenty-four hours has no basis in fact. The correspondence of the American Consul General at Shanghai with the Department of that period contains no record of direct dealings between American representatives and the Taotai. It is true that the Legation at Peking made complaint to the Chinese Foreign Office concerning the conduct of the Taotai and demanded his degradation, but such pressure as may have been brought to bear on the Taotai—this pressure was quite ineffectual according to recorded facts—came from the Foreign Office, not directly from the American Government as alleged by Mr. Matsuoka. As for the instrumentality of the Taotai in stopping the boycott within twenty-four hours, contemporary despatches from the Consul General at Shanghai indicate that, as a result of natural causes and of Imperial edicts condemning it, the anti-American boycott in the Shanghai district gradually expired in spite of the Taotai’s efforts to keep it alive.

Mr. Matsuoka’s statements regarding American action in connection with the anti-American boycott in China are based in all likelihood on contemporary newspaper reports and on his surmises as to what took place. It is quite possible that Mr. Matsuoka associated the prolonged presence and disposition in Chinese waters of the American naval force which had come as usual to spend the summer there with local rumors and press reports of a strong American diplomatic policy vis-à-vis the boycott. And his allusion to capitulation in twenty-four hours may rest upon his recollection of distorted accounts of the Peking Government’s reaction to President Roosevelt’s final and strongest message to the Chinese Government in regard to the anti-American movement in China.

In a telegram sent on February 26, 1906, Minister Rockhill was instructed to deliver to the Chinese Government the President’s message referred to in the preceding paragraph. The message began by saying that it appeared “imperatively necessary” for the American Government to understand the true attitude of the Chinese Government [Page 39] toward the American Government, and, after recounting the American Government’s grievances, stated that the American Government felt that it had “a perfect right to demand” (1) that efficient measures be taken to prevent a renewal of the outrages of 1900; (2) that all sympathizers with the anti-foreign movement be dealt with sternly; (3) that ample indemnity be given for the murder or injury of American citizens and that officials who failed to protect them be punished; and (4) that effective steps be taken to suppress inflammatory combinations in restraint of lawful trade and that responsible officials derelict in this duty be punished. On March 2 Mr. Rockhill handed the text of the President’s message to Prince Ch’ing, the Foreign Minister, who orally agreed to meet the American Government’s demands. On March 7 Prince Ch’ing sent a note to Mr. Rockhill referring to the President’s message and explaining in conciliatory language the friendly policy of the Chinese Government toward the American Government and toward American interests in China.

In a note to the Secretary of State, dated October 12, 1906, the Chinese Minister at Washington quoted Mr. Denby, of the State Department,55 as testifying on April 17, 1906, before the Senate Committee (Senate hearings, page 7) as follows: “As to the present conditions of the boycott, I think it is very nearly dead.”

  1. Foreign Service Officer on temporary detail in the Department; formerly Consul at Dairen.↩
  2. See telegram No. 334, November 23, 1932, 11 p.m., from the Consul at Geneva, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iv, p. 362.↩
  3. Omission indicated in the original memorandum.↩
  4. Omission indicated in the original memorandum.↩
  5. Division of Far Eastern Affairs.↩
  6. Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, 1901–1909.↩
  7. Not printed.↩
  8. Not printed.↩
  9. Elihu Root, Secretary of State, July 1905–January 1909.↩
  10. Rear Admiral George A. Converse, Chief, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department.↩
  11. Dr. William A. P. Martin, U. S. missionary, sinologist, educator, and author in China, 1850–1916.↩
  12. Stationed at Mukden.↩
  13. The cruiser Wilmington relieved the Monadnock as station ship at Canton (letter from Navy to State Department, May 2, 1906). The gunboat Concord arrived at Woosung on March 29, 1906, and the cruisers Chattanooga and Galveston at Chefoo on June 24, 1906. The gunboat Helena did not proceed to China. [Footnote in the original memorandum.]↩
  14. Not printed.↩

  15. There are indications that other governments also felt alarm over the safety of their nationals in China at this period, when a strong anti-foreign spirit seemed to possess the Chinese people, and that they maintained sizable fleets in Chinese waters at that time. For instance, on October 25, 1905, there were at Canton the German gunboat Tsin Tau and the French gunboats Argus and Vigilante, the British gunboat Sandpiper having just left for Hankow (Letter from Navy Department to Secretary of State, December 2, 1905). Again on December 29, 1905, eleven days after the rioting in Shanghai over the Mixed Court there, the following foreign war vessels were moored opposite Shanghai (letter from Navy Department to State Department, February 1, 1906):

    American Baltimore 4500 tons
    “ Villalobos 400
    Austrian Kaizer Franz Josef 4060
    British Andromeda 11000
    “ Astraea 4360
    “ Bonaventure 4360
    “ Clio 1070
    French Descartes 4000
    German Tiger 977
    “ Jaguar 900
    “ Vaterland 168
    Italian Marco Polo 4583
    Japanese Tsushima 3420

    And in his despatch to the Department of March 5, 1906, the Consul General at Shanghai mentions the despatch of the British gunboats Teal and Clio and of the French gunboat Olry to Nanchang. [Footnote in the original memorandum.]

    ↩

  16. According to oral information furnished by the Office of Naval Records and Library of the Navy Department, the duration of the annual summer cruise in Chinese waters of the larger vessels of the Asiatic Fleet in that period was as follows:

    1904 July–November
    1905 July–December
    1906 July–September

    [Footnote in the original memorandum.]

    ↩
  17. Charles Denby, Jr., Chief Clerk.↩