893.01 Manchuria/911
Memorandum by the Consul at Mukden (Chase) of a Conversation With the “Manchoukuo Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs” (Ohashi)34
Mr. Ohashi’s manner was very amiable and he seemed more than ready to talk at length to me. While he spoke in a direct, businesslike way with apparent conviction, I saw no evidence of his reputed brusqueness.
Starting in with the remark that he had a permanent deep seated regard for America in spite of some rather trying years of consular service on the west coast of the United States, he stated that it had always been his opinion that war with America would be disastrous for Japan as well as quite unnecessary and that one of his greatest desires was to see war with America and with Russia averted. I may insert here that a member of the Japanese Embassy had that same day informed me that Mr. Ohashi, in opposition to government leaders in Japan, had been enthusiastically working for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Russia.
Mr. Ohashi then went on to say that he thought America completely misunderstood Japan’s position and believed that Japan intended to annex Manchuria. He said that only Japanese jingoists wanted this, that sane Japanese all knew it was impracticable in this day and age. The very fact that Japan had devoted so much energy to bolstering and improving the “Manchukuo” Government and that Japanese were employed in the Government in such numbers was, [Page 313] strange as it might seem, the best possible guaranty against annexation. In the case of Korea, Prince Ito had failed to reform the Government with Japanese blood, leaving the old corrupt organization to function, with the result that conditions grew worse rather than better and Japan’s only recourse was annexation. On the day that Japanese are withdrawn from the “Manchukuo” Government, then indeed one might begin to be apprehensive of annexation—not before.
Mr. Ohashi felt sure that in time America and other countries would change their opinion as they came to see the results of Japan’s good work. He admitted there were tremendous problems ahead of “Manchukuo” but was convinced they could be solved. “Manchukuo” was in no hurry to secure foreign recognition. In fact, from a selfish point of view, it would prefer to delay such action, since it would thereby have a freer hand in reorganizing the country’s development unbound by treaty privileges which would accrue to countries according recognition. There would, however, he stated, be no discrimination against nations withholding their recognition. At the same time such countries would suffer in that their privileges would remain as accorded by existing treaties, while those countries granting recognition would be able to obtain additional rights and benefits. For example, Japanese were getting the right to lease land on a thirty year basis in any part of the interior, and “Manchukuo” would be prepared to offer the same privilege to other nationals whose governments were ready to enter into formal treaty relations. Asked if the privilege to reside and lease land in the interior would mean relinquishment of extraterritoriality, he said there was an unfortunate difference of opinion between the “Manchukuo” and Japanese Governments on this point, that the latter had been adopting an unreasonable attitude and was holding out for non-abandonment of any extraterritorial rights. He intimated that he was confident the Japanese Government would abandon somewhat its extreme position, and added a rather vague assurance to the effect that in any event foreign countries need fear no precipitate and unreasonable action by “Manchukuo” with respect to extraterritoriality.
Referring to the “Open Door” principle, Mr. Ohashi said that “Manchukuo” was quite ready to buy from any country, the only consideration being quality and price, and that it would welcome foreign enterprise in any field except where the matter of national defence was involved. He remarked that in the beginning there had been some complaints from foreign sources concerning discrimination in the field of insurance; that investigation had proved the allegations unjustified; and that having heard of no more complaints since, he inferred that foreigners found no further grounds for grievance, [Page 314] Mr. Ohashi thought that the extreme care exercised by American consular offices to avoid any act which might possibly be interpreted as evidence of recognition was somewhat unnecessary. “Manchukuo”, he said, was not so puerile as to seek to compromise us on some minor point of etiquette. He spoke with good natured amusement regarding our practice of communicating by personal letter and the quotation marks which he understood were always employed in official correspondence to enclose the word “Manchukuo.” He thought Russia’s very realistic policy much more practicable, allowing as it did for such things as the establishment of “Manchukuo” consulates in Siberia. He referred to the necessity of getting away from hidebound conventions and the letter of “rotten old diplomacy.”
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Mukden in his unnumbered despatch of May 29, 1933; received June 24.↩