893.01 Manchuria/820
The Consul General at Harbin (Hanson) to the Minister in China (Johnson) 30
Sir: I have the honor to report that on December 31, 1932, the Japanese army launched an expedition eastward from Harbin, with the objective of occupying the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin to the Russian border near Pogranichnaya, and then of operating both north and south of the railway against insurgent forces for the purpose of clearing eastern North Manchuria of bandits and military opposition to the present Manchurian regime.
The Consulate General estimates that approximately fifteen thousand Japanese troops are participating in the campaign. Departures from Harbin have been effected quietly, always at night and chiefly by rail. The campaign is under the direction of General Hirose, commander of the 10th Division. He is an able soldier and enjoys the close friendship and confidence of General Araki, Japanese minister of war. General Hirose’s division staff arrived at Mulin on January 2.
This expedition was not undertaken until after the conclusion on December 29 of an understanding between Mr. Morishima, Japanese consul general at Harbin, and Mr. Slavoutsky, Soviet consul general. Mr. Slavoutsky concurred in Mr. Morishima’s insistence that the Japanese army should be free to proceed to the Soviet border near Pogranichnaya for the purpose of bandit suppression without objection on the part of the Soviet government. Whether or not a further agreement was reached as to mutual procedure in the event that insurgents in the region should flee into Soviet territory has not been disclosed, but the Consulate General believes that no agreement yet exists to meet such a contingency.
Occupation of the entire eastern line by the Japanese proved easy. Practically no opposition was met. The advance along the line proceeded without interruption and with no fighting more serious than minor skirmishes. On the afternoon of January 5 Pogranichnaya was occupied.
Insurgent leaders in the area affected, doubtless impressed by the recent failure of General Su Ping-wen31 in his resistance to the Japanese, have shown a marked willingness to negotiate. This attitude is largely responsible for the ease with which the eastern campaign is progressing. Professions of loyalty are everywhere forth-coming. [Page 21] This causes some embarrassment to the Japanese, because it will probably bring about an indecisive result to the campaign so far as a permanent solution to the bandit question in the eastern region is concerned. Every engagement avoided means future recurrence of similar disorder after withdrawal of the Japanese expedition, for the area in question is too extensive to permit of permanent Japanese garrisoning in numbers sufficient to prevent banditry.
The Consulate General anticipates that the present campaign will fail to contribute a solution to anti-Manchoukuo activities in the eastern area, and expects that its net result will be to place the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway permanently under Japanese guard. If this is a correct appraisal it is also probable that the Soviet government, when it observes how small a part anti-bandit activities play in the expedition’s program, will regret its acquiescence.
Although designs of war against Soviet Russia are not betrayed by the conduct of the Japanese campaign in eastern North Manchuria, analysis of the situation there indicates (even more than in the case of the recent expedition to Manchuli) that the most important advantage obtained is the strengthening of Japan’s position as against the Soviets in the possible event of war. Japan, while evidently content to postpone the issue, is not overlooking preparations. The second most important advantage is that routine guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway will facilitate the effective seizure of the railway in the name of Manchoukuo, a development which is probably not far distant.
Respectfully yours,