793.94 Commission/778: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:53 p.m.]
95. My 93, February 4, 9 p.m. Following is resume of meeting of Committee of Nineteen today as given me confidentially by Sweetser.
The Committee of Nineteen completed preliminary discussion of recommendations to accompany report. The drafting committee was requested to prepare an actual text to be based broadly on the three treaties and chapter 9 of the Lytton Report including specifically nonrecognition of and noncooperation with Manchukuo. After Committee of Nineteen had gone over the text embracing points already agreed upon it would be decided whether still further recommendations would be added as to the policy of states not directly parties to the conflict.
Here follows résumé of discussion during the meeting this morning as given me confidentially by Sweetser:
Drummond reported his interview with Matsuoka Saturday73 afternoon when latter was given Committee’s communiqué. Matsuoka observed that Committee had seemed practically to be presenting an ultimatum. Drummond had not thought this to be the case since the Committee had already made two modifications to meet the Japanese views. It could go no farther except of course for slight changes. Matsuoka asked whether the Japanese proposals had been made clear in the last meeting; that it is to say that the question of Manchukuo should remain open with neither Japan nor the other powers forced to withdraw from their positions. Drummond replied affirmatively stating, however, that this suggestion was not acceptable to the Committee. On the other hand this was felt to be contrary to the Lytton Report and on the other hand if accepted would at once lead to confusion in the conciliation which would fail within the first week. Matsuoka had still expressed some hope for conciliation but Drummond had not shared it, pointing out that there was still the widest difference of principle on the cardinal point, namely, nonrecognition. Matsuoka then said he had heard the view expressed that Japan was playing for time. He wished to deny this allegation. Drummond stated that unfortunately every time there had been a delay the situation had only become more serious. Matsuoka said that this was not Japan’s fault but was due to events in the East. Matsuoka concluded by observing that if the Committee insisted that conciliation had failed Japan would be forced to withdraw from the League which he personally would much regret. Drummond stated that on Saturday evening Sugimura speaking on behalf of the Japanese delegation had stated that it was asking for new instructions and was endeavoring to see if it [Page 150] could not get something very close to the original proposals by the Committee. Biancheri of Italy said that Matsuoka’s reply did not change the situation at all. Therefore the Committee should not alter its program but should proceed as if the communication had not been received.
Drummond then summarized the situation before the Committee as follows:
Saturday’s discussion regarding recommendations had seemed to indicate that they should include, in substance, the 10 principles of the Lytton Report, the 3 treaties and the March 11th resolution. Emphasis would be put upon 2 points, namely, the sovereignty of China and the withdrawal of Japanese troops to points permitted. The question had then arisen, however, once these recommendations were made, how were they to be applied? What would be the position under article 15 if one party complied and the other refused? Drummond had understood Motta to believe that sanctions under article 16 might then be involved. Now Drummond understood that Motta meant that they would only apply in case of recourse to war. Strangely enough, war did not yet exist since diplomatic relations were still continuing. Keller of Germany in a prepared statement said that the Committee had taken over in its expose the Lytton Commission’s recommendation that neither the recognition of Manchukuo nor the return to the status quo ante would be an acceptable solution. The Committee had accepted the 10 principles in chapter 9 as the heart of its recommendation. He doubted if it would be possible or wise to attempt a detailed procedure in addition. The Lytton Commission had done so in chapter 10 of its report but both parties had rejected the suggestion. Keller thought the chief duty of the League was to lay down fundamental principles of settlement and ask parties concerned to reconstruct the Manchurian situation on this basis. It was very doubtful if the negotiations would succeed and the Committee might, therefore, eventually find itself back where it had started. This had led to the idea of guarantees against such an eventuality but such guarantees were not made necessary by the Covenant which required only the facts and recommendations. The League should indicate the direction of the solution but should not overload the recommendations with anxiety as to what should be done if they failed. Such action would give the impression that the League was not convinced of its own effectiveness. Similarly the parties to the dispute could not but be affected in their attitude if coercive measures were mentioned.
Agreed [Eden agreed] that attention should be concentrated on recommendations to the parties which, however, would involve as a matter of course indications of policy for other states. These recommendations should be based on the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty with a practical solution on the basis of chapter 9 of the Lytton Report. As this latter includes nonrecognition the League must make it clear that states members should not stultify themselves by any action contrary to this policy. Non-recognition should be a cardinal policy for all states members and he hoped also for states nonmembers. It should be clear that the existing regime would not afford any basis of permanent settlement. [Page 151] The question, however, would still arise as to what would happen if the recommendations were not carried into effect. It might indeed be claimed that the League had not passed to paragraph 4. He agreed with Keller that no solution was possible without the two parties and there was no alternative but to recommend a solution which would bring peace to the East. The responsibility for not taking advantage of the solution would fall on the parties and not on the Committee. The best course seemed to him to go ahead at once with the draft.
Massigli said that after very serious reflection on Saturday’s meeting the Committee must obviously be guided by paragraph 4 which called for just and equitable recommendations. If the resolution urged nonrecognition any state recognizing Manchukuo would obviously act contrary to the resolution. De facto recognition, however, would be almost equally bad. States should neither recognize nor cooperate with Manchukuo. Should the Committee then go farther he wondered and try to make its resolution effective even if against the will of one of the parties? If the Covenant so ruled he thought the Committee would go farther. But he doubted whether the Covenant did so rule especially given the fact that war does not actually exist strange as this may seam to the Occidental mind. When it came to action by the powers other than the parties to the dispute there was one indispensable point, namely, American cooperation. Any action by these powers could only be based on the hypothesis of American help. Massigli wondered accordingly what could be done in the line of positive action without contact with the United States. Supposing that the Committee adopted a series of recommendations to other states and for one reason or another the United States failed to agree would it be possible to insist on states members of the League carrying out these recommendations? Until the Committee was assured on this point it did not seem to him wise to go very far with such recommendations. He therefore proposed the following program:
- 1.
- Suggestions for the settlement of the dispute itself.
- 2.
- Recommendations for nonrecognition and noncooperation and,
- 3.
- Sounding out the United States and Russia to see what course they were willing to pursue. Explaining this further Massigli stated that his suggestion meant that the League should make its report under article 15 and only then approach non-member states regarding further action this to include Russia although as Massigli observed a negative reply from Russia would not be so important as one from the United States.
Beneš considered that the declarations by the British, French and German representatives had considerably advanced the discussion. First, there was agreement that the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty and the March 11th resolution should be the best settlement, second, that the resolution would include nonrecognition and an invitation to nonmember states to associate themselves therewith. Massigli had added the suggestion of noncooperation. Eden had contributed the suggestion that individual states should not act subsequently in contradiction to the recommendation, The [Page 152] question still remained, however, whether the Committee should go farther and recommend to the Assembly to enforce respect for the resolution by arms embargo and other measures. Massigli had appeared to agree in principle to this but to urge delay in order to see what the American attitude would be. Beneš himself thought that there was already a very large area of unanimity. While not renouncing his views on points still at issue he would suggest that a text be prepared on the points already agreed upon. The drafting committee meets tomorrow, Tuesday.
- February 4.↩