761.00/293
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that there have recently been further and more important indications that the Soviet attitude toward its relations with other countries is moving in the direction of gradual [Page 515] departure from at least the more active aspects of Soviet participation in international affairs which were characteristic of Soviet policy in that period between 1933 and 1936, which may be termed the “Geneva Period”. Although it is too soon to state categorically that the Soviet Union is intending a radical alteration of its foreign policy, it is felt that a brief résumé of such indications in that direction will be of interest. Taken individually they are not of any great importance, but together they form an impressive array of evidence to substantiate the opinion that the Soviet Union is gradually receding from the position which it has assumed during recent years. In the belief that this trend will be more apparent when viewed against the background of previous policies, there is given below a brief résumé of certain aspects and manifestations of Soviet foreign policy in the past.
It will be recalled that one of the fundamental tenets of Bolshevik theory in regard to the relations of the Soviet State with the outside world is the doctrine of the two hostile worlds—one capitalist and the other socialist—which was written into the preamble of the first constitution of the U. S. S. R., adopted in 1923. In the practical sphere it has found its manifestation in the maneuvers of Soviet diplomats to exploit, in Europe particularly, the differences between foreign nations for the purpose of preventing the formation of any “capitalist united front”, which, in accordance with this concept, must have an anti-Soviet character. This concept, in varying degrees, may be said to be the governing principle of Soviet foreign policy in regard to its relations with European countries. Prior to the rise of Hitler in 1933, the Soviet Union was able to maintain comparatively good relations with certain countries, such as Germany and Turkey, without, however, entering into any alliances or undertaking any commitments in regard to positive military or political action. Following the advent of Hitler to power the Soviet Government, motivated apparently by fear of a rapprochement in Western Europe which would permit Germany greater freedom of action in Eastern Europe, while undoubtedly retaining its basic concepts and aim, considered it necessary to make a radical alteration in its policy in regard to international relations. The Soviet Government became reconciled, for the first time in its history, to the assumption of obligations under international agreements which would involve the use of the armed forces of the Soviet Union under certain conditions, not necessarily involving the invasion of Soviet territory. This new policy was expressed by the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations in September 1934, the conclusion of pacts of mutual assistance with France7 and Czechoslovakia8 in 1935, and, in general, with the adoption of a [Page 516] policy of collaboration with the “peace-loving nations of the world”.
This policy found its reflection in other spheres of Soviet life and activity. No effort was spared during this period to portray the Soviet Union as a progressive, “liberal and democratic” country, and particular pains were taken to soften those aspects of Soviet life which might have been repugnant to liberal bourgeois elements abroad. Certain articles in the new constitution are considered by most competent observers to have been inserted largely for foreign consumption with the same end in view.
The altered program of the Communist International as adopted at the 7th World Congress, held in Moscow in 1935,9 was undoubtedly primarily influenced by the necessity of conforming to the new orientation of Soviet foreign policy. It will be recalled that left-wing Communists and Trotskiists were particularly incensed with what was termed the betrayal of the international proletariat for the sake of illusory support of bourgeois governments.
The developments of the past year in the Soviet Union, especially in regard to the treatment of foreigners, are in sharp contrast to the attempts outlined above to gain the sympathy and confidence of liberal and democratic elements abroad. Perhaps the first important indication of a changed attitude on the part of the Soviet Government in regard to its relation to foreign countries may be found in Stalin’s speech delivered last year at the February–March Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the Party. It will be recalled that in this speech Stalin emphasized the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union without drawing any distinction between the so-called “friendly or democratic countries” and the “Fascist aggressors”, which had been so characteristic a feature of Soviet press comment and utterances on the subject of international relations. Stalin further implied that all capitalist nations were engaged in sending hordes of “spies, diversionists, and wreckers” into the Soviet Union and in effect warned Soviet citizens to beware of all foreigners. The anti-foreign campaign which ensued, and on which the Embassy has reported on several occasions, followed closely the lines laid down by Stalin in his speech, in that it was applied indiscriminately to foreigners of all nations, whether officially “friendly” or “hostile”. This anti-foreign campaign, which shows no signs of abating, was apparently based on the desire of the Soviet Government to expel from the Soviet Union all foreigners, irrespective of nationality, whose presence is not either officially necessary or directly advantageous, and to bring about, in so far as possible, the complete isolation of those who remain. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the change of the Soviet attitude [Page 517] toward foreigners in general and especially the official representatives of foreign governments has been the peremptory and arbitrary demands of the Soviet Government for the closing of a large number of foreign consulates in the Soviet Union. The principle of reciprocity, which is the ostensible reason for the Soviet demands, is somewhat obviously an excuse rather than a reason. Again it may be emphasized that no distinction has been made between friendly and unfriendly nations. For example, the newly-established Czechoslovakian Consulate in Kiev, which had hardly begun to function, was closed at the request of the Soviet Government, as was the British Consulate General in Leningrad. Even Turkey, the oldest friend of the Soviet Union, was given no more courteous treatment on this question.
There may be mentioned also the “purge” in the Soviet Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, which, whatever its motives, has resulted in the replacement of many of the most-skilled Soviet diplomatists by persons who, as far as can be ascertained, have had little or no experience in international affairs.
It is true that most if not all of the actions of the Soviet authorities indicated above were motivated by considerations of internal rather than external policy. Nevertheless, the fact of their occurrence and the manner of their application would seem to indicate clearly that the Soviet Government is becoming increasingly indifferent to the effects that such actions must inevitably have on Soviet relations with other countries.
Indications of the changed attitude on the part of the Soviet Government to its relations with the outside world have been especially noticeable recently in the Soviet press and in the utterances of the Soviet leaders on the question of Soviet foreign affairs. In this connection, mention may be made of the increasing irritation of the Soviet press at the course of French policy, of Zhdanov’s attack on France in the Supreme Soviet, and the remarks of M. Litvinov to the Moscow correspondent of Le Temps, as reported in despatch No. 910, February 2, 1938.10 It has been noticeable that, while still proclaiming the adherence of the Soviet Union to the principles of peace and collective security and the League of Nations, the Soviet press has, from time to time, thrown out guarded hints to the effect that the Soviet Union, in view of the failure of the democracies to live up to these principles and to check the aggressive policies of the fascist powers, may possibly find it necessary to reconsider its previous position.
Litvinov’s speech at the 100th Session of the League Assembly is of interest in this connection. According to the text quoted in the Soviet press, Litvinov began by absolving the Soviet Union from any [Page 518] moral guilt in connection with the weakness of the League, pointing out that the Soviet Union had no hand in its creation and for many years was not a member. He stated in the course of his speech that the Soviet Union, perhaps least of any of the nations of the world, needed the help of any international combinations or institutions for the defense of its frontiers and that it supported the League of Nations solely because of its devotion to the principle of peace. He concluded with the implied warning “the Soviet Union will support the League of Nations as long as there is the faintest hope that it will act as an impediment to the aggressors.” This last remark implies that at the moment when the Soviet Union for one reason or another considers that the League is not fulfilling the purpose desired by it, it will feel free to withdraw.
The article entitled “The Provocateurs of War”, which appeared in the Moscow Pravda on February 11 (a full translation of which was forwarded to the Department under cover of despatch No. 962, February 18, 193811), contains, particularly in its last paragraph, an interesting statement in regard to Soviet foreign policy. While from the context of the article, the statement in regard to the conditions under which the Soviet Union would wage war was presumably intended to apply only to Soviet foreign policy in the Far East, it is nevertheless noteworthy that no such qualification actually accompanied the statement. If taken to refer to Soviet foreign policy as a whole, it constitutes a further and perhaps important confirmation of the trends which form the subject of this despatch.
[Here follows a summary of and comment on Stalin’s letter of February 14 reported on at length in Embassy’s despatch No. 971, February 19, page 520.]
It must be stated in this connection that officials of the Foreign Office in discussing with me the implications of the article referred to above and Stalin’s letter have emphasized that they should not be interpreted as indicating any change in foreign policy, that Soviet policy is not determined “by articles in the press” and that the Soviet Government will, of course, faithfully fulfill its “sacred promises.”
Whatever may have been the intentions of the Soviet Government in adopting its present attitude in regard to foreigners in the Soviet Union and its apparent unconcern with reference to its foreign relations, the result has been a deterioration during the past year of its relations with every important European and Near Eastern country, not even excepting those such as France and Turkey which, in principle at least, were considered as being on close friendly terms with the Soviet Union.
Respectfully yours,