Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939

861.20/390: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 13, 1937—11 p.m.
[Received June 14—12:35 p.m.]

117. Reference my 115, June 12, 1 p.m.,²⁶ relating to the Red Army.

1. This morning’s press carried the announcement that the death sentences on Tukhachevski and the other defendants were carried out yesterday.

2. Today’s Pravda published a proclamation addressed by Voroshilov to the officers, men and political workers of the Red Army concerning the executions which was of a redundant nature and contained little of interest. The editorial comment in the Pravda was also evasive. It contained, however, an interesting admonition to the population in the words: “There is no limit to the indignation of the people but there is no place for confusion or alarm”.

3. In so far as the Embassy is aware there have been no disturbances in Moscow and no signs of unusual anxiety or alarm can be noted on the faces of persons in the streets. The Embassy has no means of knowing what has been taking place in military posts and garrisons throughout the country. Thus far it has received no information which would cause it to believe that there have been disturbances.

4. It should be borne in mind that the value of the views of the Embassy regarding the extent if any of the guilt of the condemned officers is limited by the fact that it is in possession of no information regarding the nature of the evidence advanced during the investigations and the trial. The Embassy’s opinions therefore are based merely upon its observations of the events which have unrolled here during the last 6 months, its own estimation of the officers in question, some of whom were personally known to members of the staff, the reputation of these officers, the foreign observers and Soviet citizens for whose views it has respect.

5. It is the opinion of the Embassy that

(a) There is some truth in the reports which have circulated for years to the effect that the feelings toward Germany of many of the higher officers of the Red Army are friendlier than those held by those responsible for the present Soviet foreign policy.

(b) Most if not all of the condemned (except Putna who has served as Military Attaché in Berlin) were trained in the German General Staff College when German Soviet relations were in the Rapallo stage²⁷ and there acquired a respect for the efficiency and fighting power of the Reichswehr and considerable admiration for German military traditions.

(c) Most if not all of the accused would have liked to have seen better relations established between Germany and the Soviet Union under conditions which necessarily would have included certain alterations in Hitler’s own policies. They have been known to express their feelings of friendliness for Germany in public. At a farewell party given at the German Embassy 2 years ago for the departing German Counsellor,²⁸ Tukhachevski in the presence of other guests frankly stated that it was too bad that “the politicians were disturbing German-Soviet relations”. Voroshilov is reported to have made similar remarks at a farewell dinner several years ago for von Dirksen. No one has attached great significance to statements of this kind since army have been accustomed in a bluff way to bemoan the manner in which “politicians” spoil good relations between the Soviet Union and other countries. They have on occasions even made remarks of this nature with respect to Soviet-American relations, see for instance my telegram No. 227, September 22 [28], 2 p.m., 1936.²⁹

(d) It is the practice of the Kremlin to stretch into heinous crimes certain known views of persons whom it has decided to destroy. So in the present instance the Embassy believes that it distorted the known friendly feelings for Germany shared by the condemned officers into treason.

(e) The character and reputation for professional integrity of the condemned are such that it does not seem possible that all of them could have been guilty of the crimes for which they have been condemned. Their intelligence and experience made them extremely valuable and their loss is a severe blow to the efficiency and morale of the Red Army.

(f) It seems more likely that the real reason for their downfall was that Stalin had become suspicious of them; that he had been led to feel that they and other army officers were becoming too independent in their attitude and that he could not be sure of their unconditional loyalty to himself.

(g) There is reason to believe that Tukhachevski and at least most of the other condemned had acquired while in Germany a tendency to regard an army as a professional organization standing above politics and untouched by all but the most profound political changes, that they had therefore systematically endeavored to resist the penetration into the army of the agents and provocateurs of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs and had tried to prevent the officers and men of the army from taking part in party squabbles even those involving Stalin. They may even have further annoyed Stalin by showing disapproval of some of his present intemperate policies. At any rate Stalin must have decided once for all to demonstrate to the army its full dependence upon himself.

(h) Some credence should be given to the rumors prevalent in Moscow that Bleucher, Budenny, et cetera, did not pass upon the guilt of their former colleagues and friends at a formal secret trial but that they were merely shown the alleged confessions and commanded to sign the verdict.

6. There is a rumor among the Soviet population that the intelligence service of the French Army first discovered that the Red Army officers were involved in a conspiracy with agents of the German Government to overthrow Stalin and communicated their findings to the Soviet Government. The Embassy is not in a position to state whether there is any foundation for this rumor, which is ridiculed by the French Embassy here. Even though the French military intelligence service may have found cause to be concerned at friendly relations existing between certain Soviet and German officers and the prevalence of friendly feelings for Germany among the higher officers of the Red Army, the Embassy nevertheless is not convinced that the condemned men were guilty of the crimes attributed to them.³⁰

Henderson

26. Not printed.
27. Diplomatic relations were established between Germany and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic by the Treaty of Rapallo, signed April 16, 1922; for text of treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xix, p. 247.
28. Dr. Fritz von Twardowski.
29. Not printed.
30. In his despatch No. 598, September 30, 1937, the Chargé returned to this point and wrote that “neither I, nor any of the other Secretaries on duty in the Mission, have as yet been convinced that the eight generals were guilty of the crimes attributed to them.… In the meantime, [the Embassy] continues to adhere to the view that the downfall of the generals was due to the fact that Stalin did not feel sure of their unconditional loyalty to himself.” (861.20/429.)