861.00/11692: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State

116. The following is a summary of an estimate of the Soviet internal situation reported in despatch number 365 of June 10, 1937,25 which went forward yesterday.

1.
The wave of dismissals and arrests of Soviet officials which have been swelling since last July has pervaded every field of Soviet official, political, technical and cultural life. According to information received from usually reliable sources it has resulted in the dismissal, arrest or execution of no less than 5 People’s Commissars including a vice president of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, 17 vice commissars, 2 former ambassadors; dozens of general officers of the army, as well as hundreds of officers of lower rank; hundreds of high officials attached to the central apparatus of the Government; thousands of lesser officials throughout the country; scores of the more important Party officials and thousands of less important Party officials; numerous prominent officials of such Government or Party sponsored organizations as the labor unions, the Communist Union of Youth, the powerful civilian military training society called Osoaviakhim; hundreds of the so-called new intelligentsia, including professors, writers, theatrical people, physicians, musicians and so forth.
2.
The whole situation is veiled in secrecy and it is impossible therefore to state categorically the reasons for that which is transpiring. The statement made below, based upon the Embassy’s own studies and on conversations with well-informed foreign observers and Soviet citizens, may assist in gaining an understanding of the more important factors entering into the complex responsible for recent events:
(a)
Stalin has been haunted for many years by the fear that Trotsky, whose resourcefulness and intelligence he appears to overrate, will in some manner contrive to discredit him and eventually to bring about his downfall and the fear that he may be assassinated, a fear that has been growing since the murder of Kirov 3 years ago.
(b)
He is aware that many sincere Communists, particularly the so-called Leftists, are becoming increasingly more suspicious that he has entirely abandoned the principles of Communism and is betraying the world revolution and that among these Communists are fanatics who, when once convinced of betrayal, would stop at nothing in order to remove the betrayer.
(c)
He is beginning to realize that even the so-called new intelligentsia, his own creation, are becoming cynical in their attitude to the Kremlin and displeased with the increasingly severe censorship upon their activities.
(d)
Ezhov, who is now Stalin’s closest adviser, does not exercise upon him the restraining influence of previous advisers. Some believe that Ezhov by playing upon Stalin’s fears and prejudices is responsible for what seems to be the decision of the Dictator to eliminate not only all opponents, former, present, potential, or fancied together with their friends and adherents, but also all persons whose unconditional loyalty to Stalin is at all in doubt.
(e)
Stalin hoped through the two political trials to discredit Trotsky at home and abroad and at the same time to eliminate a number of personalities who in case of a coup d’état might become influential overnight.
(f)
He was infuriated when he found that the trials resulted in increasing Trotsky’s prestige abroad and were even greeted with considerable incredulity in the Soviet Union particularly on the part of the new intelligentsia. In his anger he struck wherever whispers of criticism were heard or where he imagined persons to be whispering. When he discovered that his blows tended to increase rather than to silence these whispers he became really alarmed and has set out with the aid of Ezhov to demonstrate the fury of his wrath to the whole country. No one knows how much further he will go. It is the belief of some foreign observers that his sense of balance will return before it is too late, and his past record tends to confirm that belief.
(g)
The official reasons given for most arrests are treason, Trotskyism and sabotage. Some of the persons arrested, however, have been charged with graft, sexual crimes and so forth.
3.
The effect upon the country of the purging process is believed to be somewhat as follows:
(a)
The great masses of the peasantry are in general indifferent.
(b)
Inexperienced industrial workers who comparatively recently have arrived in the factories from villages and who have not yet developed the cynicism of their more experienced co-workers are inclined to condemn those who have been arrested as traitors and saboteurs.
(c)
Seasoned industrial workers who have suffered considerable disappointment during recent years and who, for the most part, resent the growing gulf of living standards between themselves and the more highly qualified employees of the state, are said to have little sympathy for their superiors who have been arrested and now disgraced. They are taking advantage of the situation, however, to express their discontent and their jealousy of specialists and white collar workers.
(d)
The bureaucracy, engineers, and technicians, are, for the most part, in a state approaching that of panic. Most of them at some unguarded moment have made remarks which might be construed as indications of disloyalty or lack of admiration for Stalin. In their efforts to escape attention, these people are endeavoring to dodge responsibility and to avoid making decisions. Below them are workers who are showing lack of respect and discipline, and above them are officials who are trying to pass on to them blame arising from shortcomings in the work. As a result many branches of industry are falling behind in plan fulfillment.
(e)
The members of the new intelligentsia are both frightened and resentful and now fear to discuss almost anything.
(f)
The developments in the Red Army have already been reported to the Department and a further telegram is in preparation. It may be stated, however, that its prestige and self-confidence [are] greatly diminished.
(g)
Many of the activities of the Foreign Office are apparently suspended. No one there seems willing to make important decisions. Suggestions have been made by the Soviet Government that the number of German, Japanese and Polish Consulates in the Soviet Union be reduced. The campaign to rid the country of resident foreigners continues. Foreigners regardless of political complexion are being avoided more than ever.
(h)
It would be going too far to state that the disquiet and alarm resulting from the purging process is of a nature which might represent an immediate menace to the Soviet Government. There is apparently no organization other than the Red Army, which appears powerless at present, through which dissatisfaction or discontent can be expressed.

I am convinced, however, and the other Secretaries of Mission concur with me, that the prestige of Stalin at present is lower than at any time since his assumption of power 13 years ago.

Henderson
  1. Not printed.