817.1051/677
The Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna) to the Secretary of State
No. 865
Managua, August 9,
1932.
[Received August 17.]
Sir: With reference to the Department’s
telegram No. 72 of July 19, 4 p.m., regarding the question of turning
over the Guardia to Nicaraguan control, I have the honor to transmit
herewith a copy of a letter of August 8, 1932, from General Matthews in which he presents
for the Department’s consideration the plan he suggests for the
selection of the Nicaraguan officers to replace the American officers
serving with the Guardia.
The essential points of General
Matthews’ proposal are as follows:
- (1)
- To arrange with each Presidential candidate of the leading
political parties, immediately after the nomination of the
candidates, for the selection of a list of names composed
equally of members of both parties acceptable to such
candidate.
- (2)
- To request President Moncada, immediately after the Presidential
election has been decided, to appoint to the higher commands in
the Guardia the persons on the list of the successful candidate,
such appointments to be made permanent by the new President on
January 2, 1933.
It will be specially noted that the list approved by
each Presidential candidate is to be composed equally of members of both
political parties.
The officers thus appointed probably would begin their service about the
middle of November and the additional appropriation for their salaries
would be approximately $5,625 until January 1, 1933.
General Matthews has set forth
in his letter his reasons for rejecting other plans considered by him
and for recommending the proposed plan as the one best suited for an
orderly turnover of the Guardia under the conditions confronting
him.
General Matthews will proceed
to carry out this plan as soon as he learns that it has received the
Department’s approval. He has not consulted President Moncada in this connection nor have I.
I think President Moncada should
be advised of the plan adopted when it has received the Department’s
approval and I would appreciate the Department’s instruction as to the
manner in which that advice should be given to him.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua (Matthews) to
the American Minister (Hanna)
Sir: I note that in Despatch No. 72 of
July 19, 1932, from the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C, that
the State Department agrees with me that an orderly turnover of the
Guardia to Nicaraguan control is vitally important but is strongly
of the opinion that it would not be advisable to leave any marines
in Nicaragua after the date already announced for their withdrawal,
and considers it essential to adhere to the plan to withdraw the
marines immediately after the new President takes office.
This of course renders impossible the adoption of my original plan
that the new president appoint, upon his assumption of office,
Nicaraguans in the higher offices of the Guardia and that the
present incumbents, Marine Corps officers, remain for a period of
not to exceed two months in order to insure an orderly turnover.
[Page 869]
In view of the conditions of political unrest and financial
instability existing in Nicaragua and the fact that there is no
immediate prospect of the cessation of the armed resistance to the
government, led by Sandino
who has announced that he will continue his resistance against any
president elected under American supervision, it is inconceivable to
me that any president will accept or continue in office Nicaraguan
officers, of high rank in key positions in the Guardia, of whose
personal loyalty to himself and to his party there is the slightest
doubt. His Excellency, the present Chief Executive, has shown
conclusively that party and personal loyalty are large
considerations in the appointment of even the present junior
Nicaraguan officers of the Guardia and of the cadets of the Military
Academy, who because of their youth have not become seriously
involved in politics. He has passed personally on each applicant for
appointment and rejected many who appeared in every way eligible for
appointment except for their political or family affiliations. In
certain cases I have even been required to investigate the
enlistments of members of the Conservative Party as privates in the
Guardia.
In view of these conditions, the existence of which I believe
everyone familiar with the situation here will admit, it is
obviously impossible to select for the higher commands of the
Guardia, Nicaraguans who will be acceptable to the new president
until it is known who the new president will be. Hence my alternate
plan is: Immediately upon the nomination of the candidates of the
leading political parties, to arrange with each candidate for the
selection of a list of names, composed equally of members of both
parties acceptable to him; and immediately after the election has
been decided, request the present Chief Executive to appoint to the
higher commands the persons on the list of the successful candidate,
to work alongside the American personnel until January 2nd when
their appointments will be made permanent by the new president. This
plan overcomes the objection to leaving any marines in Nicaragua
after January 2nd, and is one which I hope can be put into effect
without serious difficulties.
It will be necessary to give the additional officers appointed under
this plan the rank and pay of at least Captains, and for this
purpose an additional appropriation will be required. The number of
this class of officers should be thirty (30) and the additional
appropriation should therefore be three thousand seven hundred and
fifty cordobas ($3,750.00) per month.
I have considered and rejected as impracticable the plan of
requesting the President to appoint Nicaraguans whom I believe to be
qualified for the higher ranks before the candidates of the leading
parties are known; both because I am certain that the present Chief
Executive [Page 870] will refuse to
make the necessary appointments because of the expense involved, and
because no one would accept an appointment without assurance that it
would be made permanent by the new president, an assurance which it
is of course impossible to give at the present time.
There is another plan that suggests itself which has much in its
favor but in addition to the expense involved presents so many
difficulties, due to the uncertainty of the political situation,
that I have also rejected it as impracticable at this time. It is to
have the leading candidates agree upon a list of names and request
President Moncada to make the
necessary appointments from this list, both candidates pledging
themselves to continue these appointees in office. This also rests
upon the uncertainty as to the identity of the leading candidates,
and its success depends upon the possibility of obtaining an
agreement between them.
Very truly yours,
