817.1051/628
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State
No. 740
Managua, April 5,
1932.
[Received April 11.]
Sir: Supplementing my telegram No. 53, of
April 2, 1932, in reply to the Department’s telegram No. 26, of March
11, 1932, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of General Matthews’ letter of April 4,
1932, concerning his plans for turning the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
over to Nicaraguan control after the November elections, as well as a
copy of his letter of November 16, 1931, referred to therein.
Following the receipt of General
Matthews’ letter of November 16, 1931, referred to, I
discussed with him the project which existed at that time of total
reform of the Nicaraguan Constitution, and pointed
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out to him the consequent inadvisability
of bringing up the matter of legislative reform at that time.
General Matthews agreed with me
that under the circumstances it would be better to let the matter rest
until after the question of Constitutional reform had been disposed
of.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure 1]
The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua (Matthews) to
the American Chargé (Beaulac)
[Managua,] 16 November, 1931.
My Dear Mr. Beaulac: Under the announced policy of the
Government of the United States to withdraw all American troops from
Nicaragua, including those now serving with the Guardia Nacional, on
January 1, 1932, there arises the question of the status of the
Guardia Nacional after that date. The Guardia agreement51 will
naturally cease to be operative once all American officers are
withdrawn and presumably the Guardia, or whatever military
organization is maintained, will fall back upon the old laws which
governed the military forces maintained prior to the establishment
of the Guardia.
Under the conditions then existing, if our experience is any
criterion, the military forces in each locality were subject to the
orders of the Jefe Politico, the Director of Police, the Commandante
de Armas, the Criminal Judge, the Local Judge, etc. One of the
greatest problems with which the Guardia has had to contend has been
the attempt on the part of the above officers to issue orders to
privates, non-commissioned officers, and officers of the Guardia,
assuming that authority to be one of the prerogatives of their
office in accordance with old customs and laws.
The former military organizations were officered by military
appointees commissioned by the government which happened to be in
power, and in accordance with the political favors which that
government desired to bestow. Consequently there was no permanent
corps of officers or any basic law providing for a continuous
military organization in which the officers and men had reasonable
protection or assurance of continuing in the service other than the
whim of the government officials in power.
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As a natural result of the above described state of affairs no
government of Nicaragua ever had a force upon which it could fully
depend to exercise its authority or to maintain it in power during
times of internal stress or attempted revolutions. Hence the
inability of all past governments to exercise authority or control
the internal conditions of the country, and as a sequence thereof
the maintenance of a legation guard since 1912, which was the
primary factor in keeping the constituted authority in power. It
would appear that for the Guardia organization to revert to the
former chaotic condition would be merely to invite disaster, and
that the only result which could be expected would be the rapid
disintegration of the Guardia organization and the resultant
inability of any future government to exert its authority whenever a
revolution is attempted.
The Guardia today, as has been the case since the day of its
inception, is engaged in combating banditry which is in effect an
attempt to overthrow the present government by means of force
exerted through guerilla warfare. Since the withdrawal of the
marines, the Guardia alone has so far been able to keep the warfare
within bounds which eliminates any doubt as to their ability to
maintain the government. This of course is because the Guardia is
based upon the Guardia agreement which makes it a federal force
responsible only to the central government, and impartial in its
attitude towards any political faction. The loyalty of the men is
obtained because they receive their pay, rations, and clothing
regularly. They are trained to maintain an impartial attitude in
regard to politics, and they are treated by their officers in a
manner which stimulates their national patriotism. They live, work
and carry on their campaign in the field and their police work in
the more peaceful sections under conditions which prohibit the
interference with their duties on the part of any officials except
their own officers, to whom they are responsible for their conduct
and for their manner of performing their duty. Under these
conditions they have been welded into a compact, loyal, and
enthusiastic body with a growing Esprit de
Corps, a consciousness of their usefulness to the nation,
and a spirit of patriotism which makes them loyal to the state.
There has been hardly a case of disloyalty among the men, and as
long as they operate under American officers, and with the
organization based on the Guardia agreement, it is firmly believed
that they could be counted upon to the last man to carry out any
orders which might be necessary to uphold and maintain the
constituted government.
It is believed that one of the important steps necessary before this
organization is put completely into the hands of the Nicaraguan
officers is to put it on a basis that will enable it to carry on its
work
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and continue its
existence without interference on the part of civilian officials of
the government, and without participating in any political
movements. Such an attitude cannot be attained unless the Nicaraguan
Government, before the Guardia passes completely into its own hands,
takes the necessary measures to enact a law which will place its
military forces upon a sound basis. It appears as a paramount
necessity that the legislative body of Nicaragua should work out a
basic law governing the establishment and maintenance of its
military forces. This law should make it possible for the officers
to choose it as their profession and to make the military service
their career. It should forbid participation in politics, take away
the right to vote in the election of national officials, and make it
responsible only to the federal authority. It should provide for a
set of Regulations for the Government and Discipline of the body
along the lines of the present Regulations for the Government and
Discipline of the Guardia, which afford protection to the individual
in the performance of his duty, while at the same time affording the
proper methods of punishing him for abuse of authority.
It is suggested as a means of making permanent the benefits derived
from a long American occupation and the money and services expended
in the establishment and maintenance of the Guardia, that the
Department of State of the United States use its good offices in
bringing to the attention of the Nicaraguan Government the necessity
for a law along the lines indicated above, because it is believed
that the moment the Guardia reverts to the control of the old laws
governing military bodies which existed prior to the establishment
of the Guardia, a rapid disintegration will begin and Nicaragua
within a short time will again be without an efficient, well
disciplined force with which to maintain the authority of the
central government.
I have refrained from presenting this matter to the President of the
Republic because of the fact that it is of a nature which appears to
me to be beyond the attributes of the Jefe Director of the Guardia.
It more or less concerns an international political situation in
that it would be an attempt on the part of an officer of the United
States Government to initiate legislation in the Nicaraguan
Congress. Also it would be likely to create the impression that the
Jefe Director of the Guardia was interesting himself in the
political aspects of the situation, which would be contrary to the
intent of the proposed law. It is believed however that the
Department of State of the United States could logically present
this matter in its proper light to the Nicaraguan Government, and
that as a sequence the Jefe Director of
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the Guardia, when called upon by the
Nicaraguan Government, could present the draft of a proposed law,
for which purpose the necessary data could be obtained from the War
and Navy Departments of the United States.
I am, my dear Mr. Beaulac,
Very truly yours,
[Enclosure 2]
The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua (Matthews) to
the American Chargé (Beaulac)
Sir: In reply to your letter of April 1,
1932,52 in regard to the measures being taken for carrying
out the policy set forth in the memorandum of February 5, 1931,53 I have
the honor to furnish you herewith the following detailed information
as to what has already been accomplished, and the plans for the
future turning-over of the Guardia Nacional to control of native
Nicaraguan officers.
At the present writing the following officers of Nicaraguan
nationality have been commissioned and are in active service:
| Lieutenants (line) |
35 |
| Lieutenants (Medical Corps) |
3 |
| Total |
38 |
The present class of the Military Academy will graduate, and the
students will receive their commissions as Second Lieutenants, on
the 7th of the present month of April, and the total of Nicaraguan
officers will be as follows on and after April 7, 1932:
| From above |
38 |
| Non-commissioned officers—to be commissioned April
6th |
4 |
| Students to be commissioned April 7th |
59 |
| Total |
101 |
Examinations have already been held and a class of students selected
for the next class at the Military Academy, with a total of eighty.
These students will graduate from the Military Academy on or about
December 15, 1932, and on that date the total number of
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Nicaraguan officers,
without making any calculations for natural attrition will be as
follows:
| From above |
101 |
| Graduates on December 15th |
80 |
| Medical officers—to be appointed |
3 |
| Total |
184 |
On that date it is contemplated that any vacancies in the above total
which may be created by the failure of some students to graduate,
and from other causes, can easily be filled by the commissioning of
outstanding non-commissioned officers who have had sufficient
training and experience to warrant promoting them to commissioned
rank, in continuation of the policy now in effect.
It will be noted from the above figures that it is contemplated
commissioning only six medical officers. This is because it has been
demonstrated by experience that it is impracticable to obtain
trained men of the medical profession for the salary paid a Guardia
officer. It is consequently believed that better results will be
obtained by the system of contract surgeons. This system is
applicable to the Guardia because of the large number of widely
scattered posts where ordinary first aid and routine treatments are
administered by the enlisted personnel of the Medical Corps, while
cases necessitating the services of a medical officer are
transported to the larger centers.
It goes without saying that the young officers in service and those
yet to pass through the Military Academy have not the age or
experience to assume command in the higher ranks of the Guardia. To
meet this situation our present plans contemplate the appointment of
Nicaraguans of mature age and with previous military experience as
Jefe Director, Area Commanders, and the Staff. It is believed that
these appointments should be made about two months prior to the
final turn-over of the Guardia, that they may work side by side with
the present Command and Staff for that period of time, in order to
familiarize themselves with the situation and the duties which will
devolve upon them.
It is recommended that commands below that of Department Commander be
turned over to the Nicaraguan officers on December 15th of this
year, and that General Headquarters with the Command and Staff and
Department Commanders make the final turn-over on January 2, 1933,
to the officers designated by the newly elected President of the
Republic.
In closing, I again wish to invite attention to my letter of 16
November, 1931, recommending basic legislation for the maintenance
and control of the future army of Nicaragua; and I cannot reiterate
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too strongly that this
matter is of outstanding importance if the ground work already laid
by our government in the establishment of the present comparatively
non-partisan Guardia Nacional, is to endure and furnish any
guarantee for the future stability of the Nicaraguan Federal
Government.
Very truly yours,
