816.01/142: Telegram
The Chargé in El Salvador (McCafferty) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:59 p.m.]
72. Referring to my telegram No. 71, April 1, 1 p.m., I had a very long talk with General Martínez today. I told him that I had come to speak frankly with him regarding the present political situation. I said that with his express authorization four of his Cabinet Ministers had come to me and requested me to inform the United States Government that immediately after Easter steps would be taken without fail to reorganize the government so that recognition could be extended to it by the other Central American Republics and the United States and that almost a week had already passed without any evidence of any steps being taken to carry out this promise. I added that I would like to be able to inform my Government what was being done and when a reorganization might be expected.
It was evident that he did not want to give any direct reply as he insisted upon talking at great length (as he has always done previously) to the effect that a change of government at the present time would be disastrous and would certainly result in a revolutionary outbreak. He argued that the latent communism was a serious menace, that public opinion which was very favorable to his administration was strongly opposed to his resignation and that the Army was divided in opinion and an important section of the military would not accept a change.
I replied that communism had been suppressed for the time being, that experience had shown that no unrecognized government in Central America could be strong or permanent and that the present very unsettled political situation was only an invitation to seditious movements by ambitious persons. I told him that I was convinced that a change now could be easily made but that if the present uncertain state of affairs should continue there was grave danger of serious troubles in the future. I also added that I was sure if he had the complete confidence of the Army, as he maintains, he should be able to convince them that a change is necessary for the good of the country.
[Page 594]I told him furthermore that the situation had in no way changed since his government had given its solemn pledge that a reorganization would be made after Easter and that when a government gave its promise to another it is generally expected that the promise will be kept; therefore I seriously hoped that he would carry out his indicated intention of reorganizing the government to admit of recognition.
When he saw that his arguments were of no avail he stated that the younger military officers (apparently those who engineered the recent coup d’état) were not convinced that Garay would be recognized. He therefore asked if the Ministers of Guatemala and Honduras and I would speak to some of these to assure them that there would be no difficulty in this respect. I told him that if it would help him I would be glad to see these officers and inform them that I could find nothing concerning Garay which would bar him from recognition. The Ministers of Guatemala and Honduras have also consented to do so and we may meet them tomorrow.
At the close of the conversation I asked him categorically if I might advise the Department of State that he intended to reorganize the government as he had promised and he answered in the affirmative but said that he desired us to speak to the young military officers to avoid difficulties.
In the course of the conversation he expressed apprehension that if Garay assumed the Presidency there might be considerable delay before he was recognized by the United States and during this delay unrest might ensue. I told him that I believed that it would be only a matter of a few days as the United States would have to consult with the other signatory powers. I assume in this case that the Department would accord recognition at the earliest possible moment because of the special conditions existing here.