Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V

832.00 Revolutions/298: Telegram

The Chargé in Brazil (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1932—3 p.m.
[Received August 4—1:05 p.m.²]

79. The following is a résumé of the São Paulo petition for recognition of belligerency.

1. Such recognition is desired not only for the sake of São Paulo but for the nation, and also on behalf of the foreign interests in that State and to prevent further injury to world commerce through the blockade.

2. São Paulo fulfills all the requirements of Brazilian doctrine and of international law for recognition of belligerency. It possesses an organized and established government in authority and control over a very large territory embracing a population of 8,000,000 persons. That government is affording protection to the persons and property of nationals and foreigners, and with its armed forces is waging war according to the rules of warfare. It possesses in abundance the necessary economic, material and moral equipment to prolong the war indefinitely until final victory is achieved.

3. The intrinsic importance of São Paulo is emphasized by pointing out that it contributes 70 percent of the total national revenues.

4. The Federal Government is charged with opposing the establishment of a constitutional régime and desiring to remain indefinitely in power, whereas São Paulo is fighting for the reestablishment of a legal government throughout the nation; and it is asserted that the Federal Government has no stronger legal status than the present São Paulo government both having gone into power by force of arms.

5. It is stated that Matto Grosso is administratively controlled by São Paulo.

6. Several authors of text books on international law are cited to show that the situation of São Paulo, as described in paragraph 2 coincides with the conditions upon which they predicate recognition of belligerency.

7. An ambiguously worded paragraph states that it is not necessary for São Paulo to appeal for the assistance of the “modern North American doctrine, creator of recognition of insurrection” since although it is important armed revolution does not present the three essential requisites of belligerency.

8. An appendix to the petition cites the opinions of writers on international law to show that the Federal blockade of the São Paulo ports is not effective, and alleges that it is notorious that the naval force of the Government is deficient and moreover if not favorable is at least neutral in its attitude toward São Paulo.

The situation is estimated as follows:

1. Military position. The Army and Navy while said to display little enthusiasm continue actively to support the Government. São Paulo is blocked by sea and virtually surrounded by land. No decisive engagement has occurred but Federal forces have penetrated São Paulo from Paraná, have advanced on the Minas Geraes and Rio lines, and are reported to be preparing attacks on new fronts. Troops continue to arrive from the northern States.

Consul General Cameron’s reports reiterate that São Paulo is increasing its formidable military organization and is determined not to yield.

2. Political conditions. Seventeen of the twenty States support the Government, Minas Geraes and Matto Grosso lack control over sectors of their territory contiguous to São Paulo. In the former the Government is paramount although doubt as to the degree of actual combat support it is rendering has been expressed. A significant occurrence was the failure of a revolt in Rio Grande do Sul where the political parties cooperated with the Interventor in bringing about the surrender of the revolutionists. The passage of time is producing popular aversion to civil war. As the earlier apathy disappears more São Paulo sentiment becomes apparent. A street gathering of students and some men and women of good position was forcibly dispersed 2 days ago during which pro-São Paulo and anti-Government sentiments were voiced. Neither this nor the other similar incidents are considered especially important and little doubt exists as to the Government’s present readiness and ability to maintain order.

3. Economic conditions. Curtailment of coffee exports has greatly restricted the volume of exchange. Dollars unofficially quoted 20 milreis. The Government is said to be encountering difficulties in obtaining credits for the acquisition of military supplies.

By them [these?] measures restriction of gasoline purchases and lowering of the flour content of bread by São Paulo would imply that the blockade is beginning to cause inconvenience.

4. Peace moves. A widespread desire for peace is reflected in numerous petitions, church parades and prayers.

Mauricio Cardoso has just visited São Paulo and, while information is still lacking, it is understood that he has been discussing peace measures with the Government and São Paulo, as well as with the political leaders in Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Geraes.

[5.] General. In the absence of ulterior developments such as the collapse of São Paulo through discouragement or economic failure, or the disappearance of the Government through a coup d’état here or in Rio Grande do Sul or Minas Geraes, the present inconclusive situation might be prolonged indefinitely. It is the opinion of some who are familiar with Brazil, however, that the termination of the struggle will soon be brought about by a compromise arrangement. Such an arrangement presumably would result in the reorganization of the Government and early elections.

6. Recognition of belligerency. I concur fully in the Department’s opinion with respect to immediate policy as stated in its telegram dated August 2, 6 p.m., to the Consul General at São Paulo. Recognition of belligerency at this time undoubtedly would be strongly resented by the Government and might furthermore, so impair its prestige as to place it in jeopardy; at the same time while the uncertainties of the situation of course preclude any formulation of future policy, it is respectfully pointed out that the intrinsic importance of São Paulo will insure its position regardless of the outcome of the present struggle. Inasmuch as the request for recognition of belligerency was addressed to all governments represented at São Paulo perhaps in order to avoid resentment the definitive announcement of our attitude may be withheld until similar announcements are to be made (presumably they will be in the same tenor) by other important governments.

With respect to the blockade, I am advised by the Naval Attaché that there is no doubt as to the ability of the Government to make it effective.

Thurston

2. Telegram in three sections.