724.3415/1922: Telegram
The Ambassador in Chile (Culbertson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:58 p.m.]
160. Zalles called on me this morning. He admitted that the purpose of his visit to Chile is, first, to ensure Chile’s neutrality, second, to obtain a favorable interpretation of the treaty of 1904 in order to permit passage of war materials through Chilean ports, and third, the purchase of aeroplanes and munitions. Regarding the purchase of aeroplanes Zalles stated that he has been negotiating with Curtiss and Merino, Chief of the Chilean air force, and that the latter has [Page 157] increased the price so much that an agreement now seems impossible. However, I know that an agreement is probable. In the meantime Paraguay is said to be taking steps to buy the same aeroplanes and to employ Chilean aviators to fly them.
Brazilian Ambassador said that the proposed note to Bolivia and Paraguay to be sent by the four neighboring countries was drafted in Buenos Aires and that Chile and Peru and Argentina agreed to sign it; that Brazil objected to point 3 but would sign if the reference to measures of emergency were omitted. I have a copy of the note but I assume you also have it.
Zalles furthermore stated that one of the chief difficulties to a settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay is Argentina because Argentina he claims desires to avoid the competition of Bolivian petroleum. He added that in the Argentine war plans Paraguay is considered an integral part; that the military influence of the Argentine over Paraguay is now seen in the attacks made upon the Bolivian forts; that previously these attacks were made by unorganized groups but that now they consist of efficient and trained units supported by artillery and aeroplanes.
… Zalles said that a possible basis for a solution of the problem would be the granting by Paraguay of a port on the Paraguay River with sufficient water to permit of navigation approximately at the level of the port Olimpo. However, he said the feeling in Paraguay at the present time is so bitter against anything Bolivian that he does not consider an amicable solution feasible. He denied emphatically that Bolivia is resolved to go to war since he considers that Paraguay for strategic and other reasons would be much stronger than Bolivia in a contest in the Chaco. On this last point the Argentine Ambassador who knows Paraguay said today that he thought that the Paraguayans would win in the long run. Zalles’ suggestion that an adequate outlet for Bolivia on the Paraguay River might form a basis of discussion led Paraguayan Minister to ask for instructions from his Government and I am informed that he now has authority to talk with Zalles, but my impression is that these discussions will not take place immediately. The Argentine Ambassador has offered his Embassy as a place for the discussions. This action of the Argentine Ambassador is regarded by the Brazilian Ambassador as an indication of undue activity in the present controversy. It would appear from this and other activities that Argentina Again aspires to be the chief arbitrator in the Chaco dispute.
[Page 158]Through its respective Legations in Lima and Buenos Aires Bolivia has asked Peru and Argentina to state whether or not they would remain neutral in case of war between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Peruvian Government replied that the request was inopportune and the Argentine Government that it was premature. Each indicated that it considered itself allied with the other neighboring countries in order to prevent war. Zalles has asked Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs about neutrality but the problem here is complicated by the treaty of 1904 and the question of Arica and no reply satisfactory to Bolivia has been submitted. Discussion yesterday between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic representatives of the other neighboring states related to the interpretation of article No. 6 of the treaty of 1904. The Minister was disposed to give to the phase [phrase?] [“]commercial transit[”] a limited interpretation and to deny that the article permitted the transportation of munitions during war time. Influences are being brought to bear in favor of a broad interpretation—undoubtedly by those who have something to sell.
Zalles’ conversations with me and others indicate an impatience with any proposals which do not include a solution of the fundamental need of Bolivia for an outlet to the sea. The old question of Arica lies in the background and takes concrete form in Bolivia’s fear of a restricted interpretation of article No. 6 of the treaty of 1904. Might it not be possible to have introduced into the present discussions with the neighboring states the suggestion that they could relieve the war pressure on the Bolivian Government if they were to give on their own initiative some special guarantees to Bolivia of freer access to the outside world? For example, Chile might grant a free zone at Arica and declare in favor of the fullest freedom of commerce over the Arica Railroad both in peace and in war. Brazil might give a similar guarantee with reference to her railroad from Esperanza to the coast. Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina might reaffirm the guarantees of complete freedom of international transit on the Paraguay River and the Rio de la Plata. Argentina and Paraguay might even concede a pipe line along the Pilcomayo River. If some affirmative contribution such as some or all of these concessions could be made by the neighboring powers at the same time that they are virtually threatening intervention in the name of peace, a final solution of the Chaco problem would seem to be more probable.