Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V

724.3415/2585: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Paraguay (Wheeler)

Washington, December 5, 1932—5 p.m.

55. Your 166, December 4, 10 a.m. Neutrals are very much surprised at position Ayala takes. Soler’s letter to the Neutral Commission of September 16,⁷⁹ transmitting textually the reply of the Paraguay Government to the Neutral suggestion of September 14, proposed that Paraguayan troops withdraw to the river and that Bolivian troops withdraw to parallel 62° 30'. Soler has led Neutrals to believe that a retirement to parallel 62½ would be acceptable. The Neutrals have so far succeeded in having Bolivia accept nearly the whole Paraguayan proposal. Ballivián is not quite at parallel 62° 30' but it is not far therefrom. After obtaining about 98 or 99 per cent of what Paraguay asked, including the very important consideration of the evacuation of Muñoz to say nothing of Forts Saavedra, Agua Rica, et cetera, it is most discouraging to have Ayala take the position he does now.

It is beside the point to speak of the Ballivián-Vitriones line as dividing the Chaco in half when there is no agreement between the parties as to what constitutes the Chaco. The withdrawal of the Bolivians behind the Ballivián-Vitriones line brings about the evacuation by them of all the territory mentioned in the Treaties of 1879,⁸⁰ 1887⁸¹ and 1894⁸² plus a good deal of territory as well and it brings about the virtual evacuation of all the territory within the line of the Pinilla–Soler line of 1907 plus considerable other territory.

If President Ayala will consider again carefully points 4 and 5 of the Department’s 53, December 2, 6 p.m., he will see that the agreement provides definitely for the arbitral division of the Chaco and as these provisions will be part of the agreement signed now there will be no possibility for Bolivia to declare the truce at an end on the ground that an agreement cannot be reached as to the bases for an arbitration. The bases for the arbitration would be agreed to now in the arrangement proposed and thereafter the settlement would be automatic as the territory would be defined by the geographers and then the Arbitral Tribunal would render its decision as to its division. This is the only way by which it appears that Paraguay can prevent the Bolivians from reorganizing their army under Kundt.

The criticism of the Neutrals is most unfair and unjust. What the Neutrals have succeeded in doing if Paraguay accepts this agreement is to have Fort Muñoz and the other strong forts which Paraguay has so far been unable to take evacuated by Bolivia. It will put an end to the war so that both sides can and must demobilize and provides for a definite settlement of the fundamental question without the possibility of either side blocking such a settlement by refusing to agree on the bases thereof.

Bolivia committed a costly error in not accepting the Neutral proposal last August to go back to the line of June 1. They have now been driven very much further back. Paraguay should learn from this lesson that when she can get her objectives by peaceful means it is much more to her advantage to do so than to trust to the uncertain hazards of war. It is not at all certain that Paraguay will be able to drive the Bolivians out of the Chaco or even take Fort Muñoz. She is a long way from that now. Under the Neutral suggestion Muñoz and other important points will be evacuated and the Bolivians will be back practically to parallel 62° 30' as suggested by Paraguay on September 16. Ayala should also remember that it was Paraguay’s own suggestion that Paraguay withdraw to the river and the Neutrals have nothing to indicate any change in this position.

One of the difficulties that the Neutrals have encountered in the past have been that one side or the other has limited itself to rejecting their proposals without saying frankly and definitely what it would accept. Inquire specifically of Ayala what point he demands the Bolivians to withdraw to. If the line 62° 30' to Fort Vitriones is what he wants the Neutrals will endeavor to get it. They have already had to exert great efforts on Paraguay’s behalf to obtain the Ballivián line. The efforts and negotiations which have brought about this enormous gain for Paraguay should merit the approval and appreciation of Paraguay rather than the carping criticism which you indicate exists. This is a retirement far greater than Paraguay is apt to obtain by force of arms. Furthermore on account of the difficulty of communication in the Chaco positions evacuated can be much more quickly and easily reoccupied by Paraguay from the river than they can be by Bolivia from back of the line suggested. Furthermore as the result of the negotiations it seems likely that if the Ballivián-Vitriones line is accepted the Bolivians will not be able to maintain the forces along that line but will have to retire considerably further. On account of internal political conditions however it will be very difficult for them to stipulate a line further back. Now is the time for Paraguay to show some statesmanship and to conclude quickly an agreement which is so eminently fair and advantageous for her.

If Ayala does not accept the line running from the Pilcomayo River at longtitude 62° 30' to Fort Vitriones get him to specify exactly and in detail what he does want. Inquire specifically whether the other terms of the proposal are acceptable. If he will now state that he accepts the arbitration provision; the determination of the Chaco as proposed, and the arrangement for the policing of the territory as proposed, and will state the minimum withdrawal of Bolivian troops that Paraguay demands, the Neutrals will endeavor to see what else they can obtain for Paraguay along those lines. Ayala must remember however that Paraguay has not asked in the past for withdrawal beyond parallel 62° 30'. It would be very difficult to persuade the Bolivians to withdraw beyond the line definitely asked by Paraguay 3 months ago. The military situation has changed since then and this probably accounts for Paraguay’s intransigence. Paraguay however should profit by Bolivia’s mistake in not accepting the June 1 line and remember that the rainy season is coming which will give Bolivia time to reorganize her troops under General Kundt and that it is therefore eminently to Paraguay’s advantage to seize the benefits which the Neutrals have obtained for her now or else she may find that conditions are turned very much in her disfavor. Cable result of your conversation.

Stimson

79. Not printed; the terms contained therein were transmitted to the Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Commission of Neutrals in telegram dated September 21, p. 91.
80. Dccoud-Quijarro Treaty, signed at Asunción, October 15, 1879; Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1893, pp. 246–250; Paraguay, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Coleccion de Tratados, vol. i, p. 239.
81. Aceval-Tamayo Treaty, signed at Asunción, February 16, 1887; Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1893, pp. 252–258; Paraguay, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Coleccion de Tratados, vol. i, pp. 248–252, 254–255.
82. Benítez-Ichazo Treaty, signed at Asunción, November 23, 1894; postponed indefinitely by Paraguayan Congress, May 19, 1896; Paraguay, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Coleccion de Tratatos, vol. i, p. 256.