793.94 Commission/286
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the people of Japan have so far shown little perturbation in regard to the investigations of the Far East Commission of the League of Nations in Manchuria. The vernacular press has kept the nation informed of the movements of the Commission, has reported the interviews, when they were not confidential, of members of the Commission with various Japanese, Chinese and Manchurian officials, and has, from time to time, published rumors of the probable recommendations of the Commission. Through it all, however, the Japanese people have remained calm and self-confident to a surprising degree. It is true that there was a small flurry of excitement in the press when it was reported that the Commission thought of recommending that Manchuria be placed under a mandate of the League of Nations, with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang as chairman of the administrative commission, but this excitement quickly subsided on Lord Lytton’s statement to the effect that the Commission had never considered such a mandate. The people are naturally keenly interested in the final report of the Commission, but appear to regard it more in the light of an academic problem than as a practical factor which will have concrete results affecting their progress in Manchuria. Likewise, the recently announced “Hoover Policy”, indicating the possibility of an indefinite refusal to recognize any “situation, treaty or agreement” which Japan may enter into as a result of the military conquest of Manchuria, has aroused considerable interest in Japan as an abstract subject of discussion but has not created any excitement as a concrete barrier to their control of Manchuria.
This calm and self-confident attitude of the Japanese people, despite their general anticipation of a more or less adverse final report [Page 77] from the Commission of the League of Nations, is due to the fact that they are entirely sure of themselves. There are two things which they may have to face—the official censure of the world (and the Japanese are unusually sensitive to adverse criticism) and concrete attempts to take from them the control of Manchuria which they have gained by military means.
The Japanese probably feel that they can ignore the censure of the world because they believe apparently that their actions in Manchuria are justified. Through constant reiteration in public speeches and in the press, the great mass of the people in Japan have become convinced that Manchuria is essential to their continued existence (although detailed facts to support this theory are never given), that the nation’s interests in Manchuria were endangered by the government of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and that military intervention was and is absolutely necessary to protect these interests. They have been told and believe that the opposition from other countries to their conquest of Manchuria is entirely based on a lack of knowledge of the actual conditions in China and Manchuria. They perhaps fail to understand or appreciate that the criticism abroad does not wholly arise from ignorance but is based largely on the belief that Japan, by its actions, obviously has disregarded certain international engagements into which the nation was supposed to have entered in good faith; that it has thereby done much to break down the peace structure over which the nations of the world have labored since the Great War. While the Japanese press has persistently expounded the alleged necessity of self-defensive measures in Manchuria, there has been almost no discussion of the harm done to the peace-preserving structure of the world by Japan’s military operations. Apparently there is no official ban on the publication of such discussions, but the subject is avoided by common consent. In commercial circles the Japanese have long had the reputation of being unable to comprehend the nature of a contract or agreement, and it may be that this national peculiarity has caused the man on the street in Japan to ignore, as of little importance, the obligations of the nation under international agreements. However, the people as a whole stand firmly convinced that the action of the Japanese Army in Manchuria was justified by conditions and that the justice of their cause will become apparent to the world in the course of time. Consequently, for the present they can afford to ignore adverse criticism.
In regard to actual, concrete attempts to take away from the Japanese the control which they have gained over Manchuria, the people are also sure of their ground. The generally accepted idea is that they have obtained virtual control over a large part of Manchuria, that they intend to maintain that control against all opposition, and [Page 78] that therefore there is no room for argument. Those of wider knowledge and more international experience realize the complications and dangers inherent in the situation, but they also apparently are sure of their ground. They realize the practical impossibility at present of compelling Japan by force of arms to relinquish its grip on Manchuria and the threat of an economic boycott does not frighten them. Contrary to the usually accepted opinion abroad that Japan could be starved into compliance within a short time, the fact is that Japan, in normal crop years, is entirely independent of imported supplies of foodstuffs. Japan is dependent upon other countries for essential industrial raw materials, such as cotton, wool, petroleum, and rubber, but there are sufficient supplies of such materials in the country to carry the nation for a considerable time, if manufacturing for exportation is stopped and if rationing within the country is adopted. While some distress would be caused by the stoppage of foreign trade, the nation as a whole can view with confidence the possibility of complete suppression of intercourse with foreign countries other than the nearby Asiatic coast for a period of years.
As a result of these factors the Japanese people, who are almost unanimously behind the Army in its Manchurian adventures, apparently feel no fear as to the eventual outcome of the investigations of the Commission of the League.
The above is a summary of Japanese public opinion as reflected in the press and represents the extreme nationalistic point of view, accentuated by what amounts at the present time to war psychology. The press has had little or nothing on the subject of the cost of the Manchuria and Shanghai campaigns and apparently the public as yet has given little thought to the question of the large funds necessary to conduct the military ventures on the mainland. Since the beginning of this year the public loans authorized to cover military expenditures in Manchuria amount to nearly Yen 330,000,000; it is probable that this sum can be raised within the country fairly easily, but the nation’s ability to absorb public loans in the present depressed condition of finances is necessarily limited, while it appears improbable that Japan will be able to float loans abroad. The public attitude therefore may change after the funds available in Japan become exhausted and no funds are available from abroad. At the same time it must be remembered that a considerable section of the Japanese people under any circumstances would not regard the cessation of intercourse with foreign nations as a calamity.
Respectfully yours,