894.00/456
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 20.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: The political situation here is very quiet, except for one significant factor, which is that the powers that be, including General Araki himself, seem to think that political assassinations in Japan have gone far enough and have determined to put a stop to them by striking at the soul of the whole movement, namely, old Mitsuru Toyama himself. His house was recently raided and searched by the police and his son arrested. Hitherto Toyama has been immune, but recent rumors of plans to kill Saito, Makino, Ikki and Takahashi—after the political murder of four of the best men in the country (Hamaguchi, Inukai, Inouye and Dan)—determined the Government that it was time to take drastic measures to put an end to assassination. The fact that the Government dared to take these steps—Toyama having been looked upon by a large section of the public, including the military, as a sort of super-patriot—is significant of its growing confidence and authority. This does not mean that the Saito Cabinet will necessarily last beyond the next session of the Diet, for it very likely will not. But it does mean that the chauvinistic military hotheads and the so-called patriotic societies, who were directly or indirectly responsible for the former political terrorism, are less firmly intrenched and are, it is hoped, giving way to a more constructive statesmanship.
The anti-American press campaign has, for the present, practically ceased. I am inclined to think that Debuchi had something to do with this and I dare say that some order to that effect may have come from the Emperor himself. It is significant that the personnel of the press bureau of the Ministry of War has recently been completely changed. One of the new officers assigned to the bureau had been transferred from the Japanese Legation in Mexico, and when our Military Attaché smilingly expressed the hope that he was going to put a stop to the anti-American press campaign, he replied that this was exactly what he was going to do. General Araki has recently been unexpectedly cordial in his meetings with our Military Attaché, as he has with me. Shiratori has lost much of his influence: his intimate contacts in the Army have been transferred, and his political ally, Kaku Mori, the Seiyukai schemer, is ill and temporarily out of the picture. Shiratori has been singing on a much lower note in his press conferences. In my telegram No. 275 of November 28, 8 p.m.,39 I gave further reasons for [Page 727] the present quiescence of the anti-American feeling in the country. But of course this feeling is always present and would rapidly be fanned into flame by any untoward incident.
With regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly40 in Geneva, after talking with many diplomatic colleagues, foreign press correspondents and American residents who know Japan, I find no one who believes that Japan will make substantial concessions, certainly none that would alter or modify Japan’s recognition of “Manchukuo”. On the other hand, I think it possible that Japan may have something in reserve to bring forward at the last moment. I base my supposition on three reasons. One is the unlikelihood that Japan will be so rash as to attempt to face the moral condemnation of the whole world, in spite of all the brave talk which is now taking place. It seems possible that they may have some plan by which they hope to forestall a vote of censure. The second is that Japan is arguing its case at Geneva. If the nation is as sure of its ground as it claims, why argue? In the third place it is becoming increasingly evident that the recent drastic decline in the yen exchange and consequent further impairment of the country’s credit abroad is to be traced largely to a lack of confidence in Japan’s political relations with the world at large. Until this feeling is liquidated the danger of financial and social dislocation through the collapse of the currency is ever-present, while foreign capital markets cannot be counted on to come to her aid. It seems to me that the Japanese are trying to ameliorate the feeling aroused against their actions by the Lytton Report, and that having put the best face possible on their behavior they may possibly come forward at the last moment, before any action is taken against them, with some suggestions looking toward an eventual settlement some years hence. I do not for a moment believe, however, that any suggestions which they may make will contemplate the relinquishment of their recognition of “Manchukuo” as an “independent state”. The members of my staff and I have been endeavoring for the past week to obtain some inkling of what the suggestions, if any, will consist of, but we have had no success. It is probable that the discussions in the Assembly of the League will continue for some time, and if I succeed in obtaining any idea as to Japan’s intentions, I shall inform you immediately by cable.
In my cablegram of November 28, 8 p.m., I suggested that restraint be exercised in handling the Sino-Japanese dispute, because coercive measures would undoubtedly result in more firmly welding the Japanese nation together in opposition to the League and the United States. Any hint of force, either military or economic, I believe, would [Page 728] result in the uniting of the nation behind the military and would completely overwhelm the more moderate influences which are working beneath the surface to restore Japan to its former high place in the councils of nations. Moral pressure, however, I think can be exerted without this danger and might tend to widen the rift now beginning to be noticed between the military and the moderate elements. Eventually the force of public opinion throughout the world, coupled with the difficulty and over-burdening expense of pacifying Manchuria, might cause Japan to change its attitude toward the problem. Anyway, as I see it, it is our only chance, as the threat of material pressure would almost certainly have the opposite effect from that desired. Thus the time factor is important, and a gradual rather than an immediate solution of the problem indicated.
My speech in Osaka appears to have been helpful. Its main purpose was to correct the general belief here that the American people are not behind you in your active support of the peace treaties. The contrary was clearly brought out by the words:
“As for the American people, they are heart and soul behind this (peace) movement and behind those who have labored to bring about a situation where warfare between civilized nations will be as extinct as human slavery in civilized nations is today. This peace movement represents a fundamental, united and unanimous desire of the American people as a whole. The position of the United States in this issue is clear-cut and unambiguous. It has repeatedly been made clear.”
On the other hand, the speech was eminently friendly in tone and substance, so that the pill was administered without causing irritation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs last night expressed to me personally his appreciation of the address.
May I take this occasion to say that I think your instructions to Norman Davis and Hugh Wilson41 relating to the Manchurian issue meet the situation exactly?
Sincerely yours,
- Ante, p. 372.↩
- Of the League of Nations, to consider the report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry.↩
- See telegram No. 37, November 21, 1932, 6 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 105.↩