894.00/444½
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: Since my last letter to you of September 1032 the two outstanding events in Japan have been the recognition of Manchukuo and the publication of the Lytton Report. The hastiness of the Government’s action in recognizing Manchukuo had a two-fold purpose: to confront the League of Nations and the United States with an accomplished fact before the Lytton Report could be acted upon, and to afford a sop to the Army to prevent their wrecking the present Saito Government and perhaps setting up a military dictatorship. The net result has been the internal pacification of the country which is a great deal less restive than before the step was taken.
The Japanese were apparently surprised when no action was taken by the United States at the moment of recognition and that the step caused so comparatively little repercussion in the world at large. This feeling may have been one of relief, but I am inclined to believe that the relief was tinged with a measure of disappointment, because in the present temper of the country the last thing the Japanese really want is to be ignored by the nations. They prefer dramatics.
The reaction to the Lytton Report here has been just what was expected—a general condemnation of the findings and an outburst of self-righteous indignation, but without any serious attempt to refute the findings save by blunt denials of their accuracy. This public bluster is however not shared by the saner and more moderate thinkers of whom one, Baron Hayashi, Master of the Emperor’s Household and a thoroughly outspoken man, recently observed to a group of friends that he considered the Report an admirable and well-balanced document, especially Chapter 6 indicating that the Manchukuo regime had been set up by the Japanese military. There are plenty of people in Japan who have serious misgivings as to where the Manchurian venture is going to lead the country, but the press does not dare to publish their views. The military are still completely in control.
In explaining the present psychology of the Japanese, two recent conversations are significant. Recently Prince Chichibu invited to dinner Frederick Moore, who has just come from the United States and is to act as a counselor to the Japanese Delegation at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and questioned him for over an hour as to public opinion in America, finally asking him point blank whether it is true that the United States is [Page 718] actively preparing for war with Japan. Such a question from the Emperor’s brother is highly significant of the present nervousness of the country. The other conversation was with the Secretary of the America-Japan Society, Mr. Takeda, whose comments seem to me to size up the situation as well as anything I have heard, and I therefore append a brief résumé of them.33 The kernel of Mr. Takeda’s remarks lies in the statement that the Army undertook the Manchurian venture because it felt that it would lose all influence if it did not do something “for the good of the country”. Whatever developments may occur in future, there will therefore enter into the problem the important element of “saving face”, so essential in oriental countries. Here, I think, is the most dangerous factor in the whole situation. If the fanatical military clique finds that its program is being impeded and is likely to fail, whether from internal or external influences, it is quite capable of plunging the country into any kind of disaster rather than give in to the saner and more moderate elements in the country and acknowledging the defeat of their plans.
The affair of the National City Bank has closed with the publication in at least two prominent Japanese newspapers of the Department’s press release conveying the statement of the Foreign Office holding the Bank blameless and its motives free from suspicion. Mr. Curtis, the General Manager of the Bank, expresses himself as fully satisfied with the result of the Embassy’s assistance and tells me that the published statement had an excellent effect, especially in calming their Japanese employees. The spy scare continues and instances of innocent American travelers taking photographs or “counting troops” are frequently published, but my impression is that the campaign has overreached itself and that its absurdity is becoming patent to all. At least one reputable Japanese newspaper has said so.
The anti-American press campaign is subsiding, although the military will probably not permit it to cease altogether. Several rather friendly articles have recently appeared and the President’s message of sympathy in the apparent loss of the Hochi flyers34 will have an excellent effect. A prominent American journalist told me the other day that he had spoken to Shiratori of the absurdity of the fear of the Japanese that the United States was preparing for war with Japan, to which Shiratori replied: “Of course it’s absurd; do you think we would have dared to attack Mr. Stimson the way we have done if we thought there was any real danger of war?”.
The new Manchukuo envoy, Pao, is truculently asserting to all and sundry that Manchukuo proposes to escape from Japanese tutelage [Page 719] at the earliest possible moment, that most of the Chinese ministers in Changchun are in the pay of the Japanese but that he himself is “fairly independent”, etcetera, but I am inclined to doubt his sincerity. He has also expressed his opinion that Henry Pu-Yi will soon become Emperor of a North China State, embracing Manchuria, with his capital in Peiping. Some of my diplomatic colleagues and foreign press correspondents seem to attach importance to his remarks, but neither Lindley nor I are impressed. The diminutive Pao, who looks like a child, will probably continue to “talk big”.
As for our own future policy, it seems to me more than ever wise, while firmly maintaining our position with regard to the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door, to avoid any unessential steps which might tend to re-enflame public opinion and give the military further strength. Friendly gestures such as the comments about Japan in your recent speech in Philadelphia, the friendly nature of which was finally acknowledged even by Shiratori, and the President’s message of sympathy concerning the Hochi flyers, tend to help the hand of the moderate elements in the country. This, I gather, is your own feeling. It seems to me that the more the League’s action on the Lytton Report can be tempered with friendly and constructive suggestions, the more we shall gain rather than lose in the long run. Our only hope of the eventual enforcement of the peace treaties in the Far East lies in encouraging the moderate elements in Japan.
In this connection, a remark made to the Military Attaché by a Japanese member of the General Staff is significant. The officer said: “We are working over-time nowadays from 8 till 6 because we have to run two seperate departments, the War Ministry and the Foreign Office”.
Debuchi came in for an hour’s talk with me last evening. He has been very active making speeches almost daily to all kinds of people, including the military, but taking care that they should not be reported in the press. I gather that he has set forth the position of our Government clearly and fairly. He talked with the Emperor for over two hours day before yesterday in the presence of Count Makino and others; he says that the Emperor understands our position perfectly and is anxious to stop the anti-American press campaign and the chauvinistic war talk. Debuchi said to me that if Chang Hsueh Liang will only keep quiet, there will be no question of Japanese troops going to Peiping and that it all depends on Chang’s movements. He expressed the hope that after the manoeuvres of our Atlantic fleet in the Pacific it will return to the Atlantic next winter, because its presence on the west coast furnishes an excuse for much of the chauvinistic war talk and military and naval preparations here. This thought I hear on all sides. I think Debuchi wanted to get this to your attention, since he came to me directly after seeing the Emperor. He continually [Page 720] repeated to me that the domestic political situation is now well in hand and that the more chauvinistic military people are being compelled to moderate their views. Of the truth of the latter assertion I have yet to be convinced. I dare say that Debuchi will be decidedly helpful in painting a true picture of the United States and the attitude of our Government—that we do not possess horns and a tail. He can do what I cannot do. This is a time when, on the part of the American Ambassador, silence on political matters in public speeches is golden.
Respectfully yours,