[Enclosure]
Suggestions for a Solution of the Manchurian
Question
The antecedents of the present Manchurian question go back to 1895
and 1905, in which years the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
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wars terminated and Japan
gained valuable concessions in this territory. Japanese rights were
further extended by the treaty and exchanges of notes relating to
Manchuria dated May 25, 1915.39 Psychological and
physical factors gradually augmented an already complicated
situation and naturally the Japanese occupation of Manchuria since
September 18, 1931, and the establishment of the so-called
independent government of Manchoukuo have well-nigh rendered
impossible a practical solution or adjustment of this highly
explosive and extremely complex question. However, extraneous
factors may carry sufficient weight to permit of a solution or
“liquidation”, however temporary, being effected. The basis of any
practical solution must be recognition of Chinese sovereignty and of
extensive Japanese economic rights.
An agreement on general principles to be entered into directly by
China and Japan would seem to be the primary and basic step in the
attainment of this object. Such an agreement should be comprehensive
but general in character in order to preclude as far as possible a
breakdown of subsequent negotiations and a failure in the execution
of the measures outlined herein. As is evident, the general
stipulations of this agreement would be contained in the
recommendations of the League Commission. As its main provisions the
following are suggested:
- (1)
- A declaration by Japan recognizing the territorial
integrity of China and the principles of the “open door” and
equal opportunity and by China recognizing the treaties and
agreements which have been entered into between China and
Japan and the special rights and interests in Manchuria
accruing to Japan from these treaties and agreements.
- (2)
- A declaration that Japan will withdraw its support from
the Manchoukuo régime and use its influence to secure the
functions of this régime being taken over within a
stipulated period by a temporary Chinese administration
headed by a Governor General, appointed by Nanking who is
persona grata to Japan. The
Governor General should have the assistance of six or seven
prominent Chinese, preferably some of the leading officials
of the existing régime, and foreign advisers whose
appointments, if not recommended by the League of Nations,
should be notified to it.
- An amnesty should be granted all persons connected with
the, existing régime.
- (3)
- The establishment, to be proceeded with immediately after
the accomplishment of the above step, of a permanent Chinese
administration headed by a Governor General and assisted by
a Chinese staff and foreign advisers who shall organize and
supervise the provincial and municipal governments. This
administration shall also organize and maintain provincial
and municipal police and constabulary, for the training and
supervision of which qualified foreign advisers shall be
used. It shall control Chinese financial and other economic
institutions
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and
supervise the fiscal system of Manchuria, from which agreed
upon contributions for the support of the Central Government
and the servicing of Chinese government obligations shall be
made. It shall be provided that the Chinese Customs, salt
and postal services shall not be interfered with.
- (4)
- The Japanese government agrees to the withdrawal of its
military forces to the South Manchuria Railway zone as soon
as adequate Chinese forces, police and constabulary, are
available for the maintenance of peace and order and the
protection of Japanese life and property, the completion of
which withdrawal to be notified by both governments to the
League of Nations for its information.
- (5)
- The organization of two permanent joint commissions,
namely Commission of Communications and Commission of
Review. The former, consisting of ten members, four Chinese,
four Japanese and two foreign (non-Japanese) advisers, would
be charged with the duties of investigating and devising
ways and means for the improvement, extension, and
coordination of the communication facilities (railways,
telegraphs, telephones, radio and motor roads) of Manchuria
and make recommendations in regard to all matters relating
thereto including rates which may be necessary and
appropriate. The Commission of Review, consisting of five
members, two Chinese, two Japanese and one foreign adviser,
should be charged with the investigation of incidents and
disagreements in regard to matters of fact which
investigation is needed for the settlement of any
controversy. Both commissions should have the right to call
for the opinion or testimony of experts.
- (6)
- An agreement to institute negotiations within a stated
period of a comprehensive treaty in regard to Manchuria on
the basis of the general principles and stipulations
contained herein and to negotiate simultaneously a general
treaty of commerce in which organized boycotting is declared
illegal and a criminal offense (this treaty would
necessarily include a settlement of the Shanghai
affair).
It is suggested that the treaty relating to Manchuria provide that
the Manchurian Administration in consultation with Japan create a
joint commission composed of four Chinese, four Japanese and two
foreign (non-Japanese) advisers—a larger commission may be
advisable—for the purpose of preparing and recommending suitable
regulations for implementing the rights and privileges granted to
Japan by treaty or agreement, the preparation of which has not
elsewhere been provided for, and of preparing special regulations
for the development of the mineral, timber and other resources of
Manchuria.
The advisers to be engaged by the Manchurian Administration shall
either be recommended by the League of Nations or their names and
qualifications shall be reported annually to that body.
Copies of all treaties and agreements entered into between Japan and
China in regard to Manchuria shall be supplied to the League of
Nations.
Note: At this time it seems expedient to
treat the military problem by an exchange of notes rather than by
stipulations in the treaty
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itself. China’s note might appropriately be to the effect that China
has no intention of stationing part of the army or other branches of
its regular military forces in Manchuria but shall maintain peace
and order by well-trained police and constabulary forces under the
direction and control of the Manchurian Administration. The Japanese
reply should contain a commitment to the effect that the Japanese
forces in Manchuria will be withdrawn to the Railway zone and
reduced to normal strength as soon as peace and order have been
restored and adequate protection is afforded to Japanese life and
property by the forces of the local Administration and that when
conditions warrant all Japanese regular army units will be withdrawn
from the Railway zone. Russia’s understanding and adherence should
be obtained.