793.94 Commission/682
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation67
Secretary: Hello, is that you, Wilson?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, this is Wilson talking, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: I did not get your cable until this morning at 7:30, and I have been working steadily on it ever since. Now it is very difficult for me to answer it on the situation that you put before me.
Wilson: I know it is.
Secretary: And all I want to say is that when the resolution comes in of course and after I have the text before me I will give it very careful attention. Of the alternatives which you present in regard to non-recognition, I think that the second one is the only one that even measurably approaches satisfaction.
Wilson: The second one?
Secretary: Yes, and as I have said before, I think you have to apply it to Manchukuo. Otherwise the situation is meaningless, and it would really cripple our ability to be of help because it would be taken by the world at large as a yielding on that point. I speak advisedly about that. The only chance I would have at all of getting the United States in would be if it was a clear-cut proposition of that [Page 425] applicability to Manchukuo, but even then I must reserve decision until I see the whole thing.
Wilson: It is a little clearer what is happening today. There is to be presented this afternoon to the Committee of 19 two texts. One will be entitled “Statement of Reasons”. The other will be entitled “Draft Resolution No. 1 and Draft Resolution No. 2”. In the Statement of Reasons, under the present text (unless it is changed in the Committee of 19), the final paragraph will read: “In this connection the Committee of 19 considers that a mere return to the situation previous to September 1931 would not suffice to insure a durable settlement of the conflict and that the maintenance and recognition of the regime presently existing in Manchukuo could not be regarded as a solution.” That, you understand, will be voted by the Committee of 19 and not by the parties to the dispute. The resolution itself would have to have a vote by the parties to the dispute, and the resolution in its present form has this phrase regarding recognition in the preamble: “Considering that by its resolution of March 11, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute.”
Secretary: But it does not specifically mention this principle of non-recognition?
Wilson: No, it does not in the resolution itself, but it does in the action of the Committee of 19 which accompanies the resolution.
Secretary: I don’t quite understand you. Does the statement that you read me a moment ago about the regime in Manchuria—is that in any proposed resolution of the Assembly?
Wilson: No. That is in the Statement of Reasons which takes the place of the report of the Committee of 19.
Secretary: Will the Statement of Reasons be adopted by the Assembly?
Wilson: I don’t know, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: I mean is it proposed that it shall be laid before it for adoption?
Wilson: It merely accompanies the resolution. Whether it is proposed that it be laid before the Assembly for adoption I have not found out yet.
Secretary: What I am interested in knowing is what will be the instructions to the Conciliation Committee after they are appointed. You see, what I deem important is that there should be a groundwork under the modern peace treaties of the world which is made applicable to the work of this peace commission or this peace committee. Otherwise, if they are just dangling in the air without any instructions it is open to them to recommend a solution which would make ducks and drakes of the entire matter. Now in your telegram which you sent to [Page 426] me I was rather encouraged by the fact that the proposed resolution which Drummond mentioned did seem to adopt certain principles. In the first place it said that they considered the Lytton Report, the first eight chapters, an impartial and complete statement of fact. That looked like a rather weak finding of fact. Then they said that any solution must be in conformity with the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. That seemed to lay the foundation for the treaties in the work of the conciliation commission.
Wilson: That is in the last part of the present resolution.
Secretary: You mean about the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty?
Wilson: Yes. The position of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty must be respected.
Secretary: Then finally your cable stated that the draft resolution also said that the work of the committee was to be based on the principles of chapter 9 of the Lytton Report and that due consideration would be given to chapter 10. They have taken out of the resolution all reference to the non-recognition policy?
Wilson: With the exception of that one article that I read you: [“]Considering that by its resolution of March 11, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute.”
Secretary: That will be regarded as very, very weak here.
Wilson: Yes, I think it will.
Secretary: And that may psychologically have to be a determining factor.
Wilson: There is this to consider, Mr. Secretary: that if they are embarking on the idea of conciliation they have to have something they think can be adopted by both parties; otherwise conciliation itself falls to the ground.
Secretary: I have just received from Davis a cable giving an account of a conversation that he has had with a gentleman that you might recognize. I think probably you were present at this conversation with the representative of one of the other governments.
Wilson: That gentleman has already left town, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: I mean that I have just read that cable. That is why I delayed this telephone talk. Because it has just come in and I have just read it and got that gentleman’s views as to the relation of conciliation to the later procedure of the covenant. Now the thing I have to consider is this: On the one hand I don’t want to discourage at all the idea of cooperation with the League, which I have deemed important and which they undoubtedly are doing their best to make easy for us. Then on the other hand it is a little hard, as I explained in my long telegram of a few days ago which I personally dictated, it is a [Page 427] little dangerous for us to take part in intermediary proceedings of the League of Nations while they are leaving unfinished and pending more clear-cut action for later. Do you see?
Wilson: I see your point exactly.
Secretary: And that I will have to consider very carefully as to whether that makes it advisable for us to go in at this stage. It is evidently in the light of the letter of this other representative that I have had from Davis. It is evidently his idea and I don’t want to debate the wisdom of it. It is his idea that conciliation must take place now.
Wilson: Yes, it is, and Mr. Secretary, that seems to be the swing that the whole thing is taking here.
Secretary: On the other hand I have to remember that beginning with September 1931 the entire League, with our efforts, has been engaged with attempts at conciliation, and not until we had been doing that for four or five months and the results had proved to be entirely nugatory did we take these more drastic methods of principle, and I don’t propose to abandon those to go back and begin over again on conciliation. I don’t propose to give up the steps which have already been taken as a result of the acts of Japan last year, and I don’t think the League will gain anything by doing it. It is a mere occasion of cowardice and an abandonment of the steps which the world has accepted since the War. It is bound to be regarded as so by public opinion of this country. In other words, we have to consolidate the gains already made and then make the next steps in advance. Otherwise you give up those gains and you will not get them again. It will give the impression of defeat. That is what I am troubled by in this proposal. It disregards the fact of all the work from September 30 last year, on.
Wilson: There is only this to be said: There are signs in the Japanese delegation and some from Tokyo that the ice is breaking a bit and that they are more disposed to conciliation than they were before. That may or may not be based on true fact. I am not really certain.
Secretary: We are watching that pretty carefully, and it is the view of the Far Eastern Division and myself here that you will not help that breaking of the ice by any sign of weakness. Not a bit. Just the reverse. And a good deal of the output that has been coming from Tokyo is, in our opinion, an effort to dominate the diplomacy of the other nations by a display of what might be called diplomatic terrorism.
Wilson: One further thing seems to stand out rather clearly. That is that while the delegation here would be disposed to have us participate, the Foreign Office, under the influence of public opinion, is pretty firm still not to give their consent to such participation.
[Page 428]Secretary: We have no idea whatever of giving the impression that we are seeking the job. Not the least. And I don’t want anybody to run any risk of giving that impression. We are sitting very pretty in our off-side position, and I am inclined to think that our influence there may be stronger than in any other form. I have only considered the question of conciliation because it was brought up to me by the League. I am not at all anxious to take it. Now you get my position, don’t you?
Wilson: Yes, I think it is clear, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: All right. You send me a copy of that resolution as fast as you can.
Wilson: The meeting will be over at live o’clock and I will get what comes out of that.
Secretary: I think, as you reported, their present movement has been in the direction of weakness. I mean in the report you sent me before.
Wilson: There is no doubt about it.
Secretary: That would be very serious. Wait a minute. Hornbeck wants me to listen to something. Just hold the wire.
Wilson: Yes.
Secretary: I say again, as I said in the beginning, that I must reserve my final judgment about what we will do until I see the text of the resolution. I can’t say a thing, and this is entirely just by way of guidance to you and to such other persons as you can in safety and in confidence think it will help.
- Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. Wilson in Geneva, December 15, 1932, 10:30 a.m.↩