793.94 Commission/647a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference (Gibson)
51. To Davis and Wilson. The reference of Manchurian matters, including the Lytton Report, to the Committee of Nineteen (a) without any substantive action in advance by the Assembly, and (b) without any instruction to the Committee as to the order in which the various subjects which have been referred to the Committee, including the question of extending an invitation to the American Government to participate, shall be considered, makes it essential that I should make clear to you our views before action is taken by the Committee of Nineteen and before an invitation to join the Committee may be extended to us.
[Page 416]Let me remind you of the sequence of events under which these various questions have been suggested to us from Geneva for our information and comment:
First: Before the meeting of the Council was convened, you were advised informally by Drummond that in all probability the minimum action which would be taken at the meeting of the League would be an adoption of the Lytton Report and also an adoption of a resolution stating that it was the duty of the members of the League to apply the principle of non-recognition to the situation in Manchukuo. Reference your 31, November 1st.64 We were confirmed in our impression that this course would be followed by numerous other communications which have since come from Geneva, e.g., your 50, November 25, your 52, November 30.
Second. Therefore, when you put the question to us as to whether or not we would consider an invitation to join any agency of conciliation in respect to the dispute between China and Japan, we assumed that these prior steps of adopting the Lytton Report and the resolution of non-recognition would first be taken. Throughout we have regarded those steps as essential to any effective conciliation, for the reasons which we set forth in our 48 of December 9.
By its present action of referring all of these matters to the Committee of Nineteen without prior action by itself or at least a direction to the Committee of Nineteen to report first its recommendations as to the Lytton Report and non-recognition, the matter has been left in such a situation as to invite the possibility of grave embarrassment to us in case any invitation should be extended to us to take part. First, without such action there would not be provided in advance any foundations or backgrounds or findings of principles agreed upon by the Powers upon which a Committee of Conciliation could act intelligently. In my opinion, participation by us in the work of a Committee of Conciliation would be unlikely to be useful unless that committee were given in advance a foundation by the affirmation of principles. Second, the difficulty of our acting with any group of nations constituted by the League would be immeasurably increased by the fact that there were still pending undecided matters which are purely within the jurisdiction of the League, such as these two matters of action on the Lytton Report and the proposal of non-recognition. For example, if they were brought up in the Committee of Nineteen after we had accepted an invitation to sit with that Committee, we would be open to the double criticism that we were intruding into matters strictly belonging to the League for action and also that any vigorous action that might thereafter be taken was influenced by an animus on our part against Japan. Both of these objections would make it practically impossible for us to associate ourselves with any such group organized by the League. As I see it, no Committee of Conciliation would be able to act effectively until these matters have first been disposed of. The disposition of those two matters calls for a decision on the part of the League of Nations irrespective of the consent of the disputants. The work of a conciliation commission is conciliation in a situation brought before it by the consent of both [Page 417] disputants as I pointed out in my No. 43, December 4, 11 P.M. These two functions are quite incompatible and the attempt to join them in one body before the first of them has been separately disposed of will only lead to confusion and future trouble.
I have personally dictated this summary of events because of the impression made on our minds here by the developments in Geneva as they have been reported to us partly through your telegrams and partly through the press that there is danger of councils [counsels?] of weakness and vacillation prevailing among the various powers. Simon’s and Cahan’s speeches were particularly disconcerting to me.
Having said this to you, I leave it entirely to your discretion as to how it may be used in the light of your better knowledge of the actual need which exists. You know without my repeating it that I deem the events which are taking place in Geneva of commanding importance to the future of the peace movement in the world and that I am anxious and ready to lend all the assistance in my power and in the power of this Government to their solution.
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