793.94 Commission/257

The Consul General at Harbin (Hanson) to the Minister in China (Johnson)27

No. 2386

Sir: I have the honor to quote below a copy of a memorandum which I drafted at the request of General McCoy of the League of Nations’ Commission, who desired me to give him my personal opinion in regard to how the Manchurian question might be settled.

In the first place, it must be recognized that the Japanese military are in Manchuria to stay until they have made conditions here satisfactory to them. Nothing but financial disaster in Japan or perhaps great military force or economic pressure exerted upon Japan, can stop their forward policy in this country. They are determined that the old military regime of Chang Hsueh Liang, Chang Tso Hsiang (former Kirin military governor) and Wan Fu Lin (former Heilungchiang military governor) shall not be re-established. It would appear that they do not desire, at least for the present, the annexation of Manchuria to Japan, so have established an independent state, Manchoukuo, to cut Manchuria off from the direct influence of the old Chinese rulers and Nanking. By this fiction, they thus apparently avoid the responsibility of having separated Manchuria from China, whose sovereign rights over Manchuria Japan has by treaty stated she would respect.

It also can be concluded that the majority of the population of Manchuria, although desirous of peace and order and of the elimination of the Chang Hsueh Liang regime, do not desire to be separated as an independent nation, supported by Japanese bayonets, from China proper. In time, the more ignorant portion of the population, which is the large majority, might become reconciled to Japanese control if prosperity were brought to them, but there would always be a small body of local Chinese intelligentsia who would agitate for union with China proper. They would be supported in this agitation by the intelligent Chinese in China proper.

Some plan should be suggested whereby the determination of the Japanese military to control, directly or indirectly, Manchuria and to [Page 34] preserve and increase Japan’s economic interests in Manchuria and the desire of the intelligent Chinese people in Manchuria and China to have Manchuria remain a part of China could be reconciled and whereby the territorial integrity of China, including Manchuria, would remain intact. The political sovereignty of any so-called Central Government in China over Manchuria is not mentioned because since the advent to power as master of Manchuria by Chang Tso Lin ten years ago, Manchuria to all intents and purposes has been an independent state.

Outer Mongolia is theoretically a part of the territory of China, and is so recognized by the foreign powers, including Soviet Russia, which maintains indirectly political control over this territory and which even recognizes theoretically China’s sovereignty over Outer Mongolia.

In order to satisfy the wishes of Japan and the hopes of the majority of the local inhabitants, to save the “face” of whatever so-called Central Government is in existence in China proper and to maintain, theoretically at least, the treaties in regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, including Manchuria, a plan should be evolved that would give Manchuria a status similar to that of Outer Mongolia. In other words, Manchuria should become an autonomous state (it already was when under the control of Chang Tso Lin), which would acknowledge itself as under China’s sovereignty and as a territorial part of China.

Japan could continue to make directly or indirectly the principal appointments in the autonomous state, such appointments to be approved automatically by whatever Central Government China happened to possess. There should be a advisers or executive officials of foreign nationality, besides Japanese, attached to the Manchuria government, in order that other than Japanese talent could be used in operating the same and to see that the policy of the “open door” was maintained.

In the course of twenty years or so, a plebiscite might be taken in Manchuria to decide whether or not the inhabitants desired Manchuria to remain autonomous or to become a real part of China.

Owing to the limited time at the writer’s disposal, it is impossible to elaborate on this scheme, which is set down roughly as a suggestion of a possible way out of the present dilemma.

It might be remarked that Outer Mongolia, which was only lightly bound to China, was separated from China proper, first, by the driving away of Chinese troops at Urga by the “white” forces of Baron Ungern, who in turn was driven out by Soviet Russian troops and, second, by an internal communistic revolution brought about by Soviet Russian intrigues. The Mongols intensely dislike the Chinese. On [Page 35] the other hand, Manchuria has been separated from China proper by Japanese force and the vast majority of the inhabitants of Manchuria are Chinese who are united by clan or family ties with the Chinese of North China. The Chinese of Manchuria do not consider themselves different from the Chinese of North China, or of South China for that matter, except in a provincial sense and vice versa. By a provincial sense is meant that a Chinese calls himself a Shantung man, a Chihli man, a Kirin man or a Heilungchiang man, etc. The ancestors or the existing members of the vast bulk of the Manchurian Chinese population came from North China. Near Tsitsihar are descendants of Yunnanese, who were exiled into North Manchuria years ago for political reasons.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Harbin in his despatch No. 5430, May 23, 1932; received June 18.