Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94 Commission/634: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, December 9, 1932—3 p.m.
[Received 8:44 p.m.]

359. In the Assembly yesterday afternoon after a brief statement by Colombia merely emphasizing the application of League principles the general discussion was closed with the rejoinders of China and Japan.

1. The opening portion of the Chinese delegate’s speech was largely a reiteration of former arguments attacking the Japanese position in Manchuria and interpreting the speeches made by other powers at the Assembly in support of these arguments. The League was urged to present the united front and determination which had led to success at Shanghai. After these introductory remarks the Chinese delegate divided the remainder of his speech into two main headings:

(1) An attempt was made to refute certain arguments previously advanced by Matsuoka as follows:

(a) British action in Shanghai in 1927 had nothing in common with that of Japan in Manchuria.

(b) The “realities” of the situation as recognized by Stimson and Commission of Inquiry must be faced. The “realities” are three in number:

• First. Every nation must prevent aggressive warfare in accordance with its obligations under the “new peace system” so thoroughly hated by the military caste now controlling Japan.
• Second. There is the “solid resistance of the Chinese people”; China will never accept Manchukuo and the boycott and armed resistance will not diminish.
• Third. China has greater staying power than Japanese; Japan’s financial and economic structure is already showing marked weakness; China is growing stronger, its foreign exchange rate has risen and the authority of the Central Government has increased.

(c) The boycott was used as a measure of self-defense less cruel than war. China has always been ready to arbitrate before the Permanent Court or the League both the question of the boycott and the question of antiforeign propaganda. Japan refused these offers thereby rejecting the “methods of the League” referred to by Simon.

(2) The Chinese attitude in respect of the settlement of the dispute was expressed as follows:

(a) China finally rejects the idea of direct negotiation.

(b?) It is, however, fully in favor of collective negotiation through the League and approves the suggestion that this be carried out by the Committee of Nineteen with the addition of representatives of the United States and Russia.

(c) The Assembly must lay down the basis and the framework which the negotiations must follow.

(d) The Chinese Government is ready to negotiate on the basis of the League resolution of March 11 and of 10 principles laid down in chapter 9 of the Lytton report. China interprets the statement in the report that the status quo cannot be reestablished to mean the de facto but not the de jure status quo. In other words the principle of the territorial and administrative integrity of China must be maintained, all Japanese troops must be withdrawn and recognition of the present regime be denied.

China is ready to accept the principles in chapter 9 of the report provided that the resolutions of September 30 and December 10, 1931, are enforced, provided that the principles of the report are taken as a whole and provided that they are all interpreted in the light of the third principle.

2. The Japanese rejoinder was a running commentary on various phases of the debate apparently designed as an effort to enlist sympathy for Japan and attributed here as probably encouraged by the British statement of the previous day. Although couched in forceful language the tone was conciliatory. The statement is commented on as being the strongest appeal yet made by a Japanese delegate. Most of the arguments were however those usually put forth but in more vivid terms. It is therefore difficult to adduce any definite trend of what may be Japan’s final policy. The following is brief résumé of the long statement.

(a) A bid for fairness in the interpretation of documentary evidence deprecating the practice of quoting passages from the report without regard to context.

(b) Japan was suffering financially and economically but this is hardly attributed to the general depression.

(c) He denied the charge that Japan is ruled by a military caste and made a democratic appeal by stating that some of Japan’s greatest generals came from the poorer classes.

(d) He reaffirmed the analogy between Japanese action in this conflict and British action in China in 1927, referring also in this connection to the relatively large number of troops sent by the United States to Nicaragua.

(e) In regard to the unanimous character of the Lytton report he maintained that it contained contradictions and characterized the report as “disagreement in unanimity”, a condition which he considered natural due to the nature of the problem and the numbers and different nationalities of the Commissioners.

(f) Japan was depicted as a loyal supporter of the League of Nations. In accepting membership in the League in spite of the absence the United States and Russia and in the face of a vast disorganized country like China, he implied that Japan was confronted with great risks and that this was proof of the essential loyalty of her attitude.

(g) In view of this situation Japan should not be judged under the Covenant without some elasticity and flexibility of interpretation of its terms.

(h) Certain states referred to the League as the “life line” of their existence which was an admission that they were primarily concerned with the League as an agency for the promotion of the self-interest of its individual members. Manchuria is the life line [of] Japan and her self-interest must likewise be given consideration.

(i) Conditions in Manchuria are improving and the healthy development of Manchukuo will eventually contribute to the League objects and form the cornerstone of peace in the Far East.

(j) The belief that the operations in Manchuria and at Shanghai were the action of militarism is unfounded. The whole Japanese people support this policy because Japan regards Manchuria as vital to its existence. He asserted that the Japanese people without exception were and are still ready to suffer the most severe sanctions, even those prescribed under the Covenant, rather than abandon their rights.

(k) His statement did not define in detail Japan’s attitude towards the recommendations of the Lytton report, but he did call attention to the difficulty of their application and characterized for instance as “an absurdity” the proposal to establish a gendarmerie for policing the vast territory of Manchuria.

(l) He stated that the strong central government in China which was considered by the Commission as essential for carrying out government recommendations could not be possible of attainment for many years to come and in the meantime the interests of other powers had to be protected.

(m) He illustrated the response of Japan to sympathy and understanding by pointing out the possibility now of the conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Russia which he affirmed would have been impossible a few months ago. This change of spirit in Japan was due to the acts of kindness of the Soviets towards the Japanese in distress on the Russian frontier of Manchuria. In this he of course endeavored to imply the existence of an understanding between Russia and Japan.

(n) He then made an appeal to the League to strengthen the position of Japan in the Far East since Japanese policy was one of peace and order in common with the other great powers and with the League of Nations itself. The League had rendered a signal service in this conflict by preventing the powers from taking sides but nevertheless the League had given the appearance of taking sides with China against Japan and had thus encouraged China to refuse direct negotiations. There could be no real peace in the Far East as long as false hopes were held out to China that others would come to her assistance.

Gilbert