793.94 Commission/625: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:50 p.m.]
356. The following is a résumé of the general discussion on the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Assembly yesterday afternoon participated in by Boncour, Simon, Aloisi, Von Neurath, Buero (Uruguay), Moresco (Netherlands), Borgbjerg (Denmark).
1. The French position as stated by Boncour seems more definite than that of any of the other great powers. After calling attention to the very special nature of the problem due to the unusual conditions in [Page 400] the Far East and the peculiar character of the Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria, Boncour cited Briand’s statement before the Council on December 10, 1931, immediately after the approval of resolution appointing the Commission of Inquiry and declared that this statement represented the unbroken line of French policy in this conflict (Official Journal, December 1931, page 2378).
Boncour did not mention specifically the question of the recognition of Manchukuo but his general statements imply that France is opposed to recognition. The first duty of the Assembly he said is to attempt to find a solution through conciliation and if that fails a second duty devolves from the terms paragraph 4 of article XV. In either case the Lytton report should be taken as the basis of action.
He laid particular emphasis on method and expressed the opinion that efforts at conciliation would be wasted if certain rules and principles were not first established as a basis of possible equitable negotiations. These rules should not be based primarily on the first part of the Lytton report but rather on its conclusions which are derived from the facts stated in the first chapters. The conclusions of the Lytton report should be used as a guide for drafting an outline for suggested negotiations. He felt that the recommendations of the report had not been sufficiently discussed and that they should be carefully studied, according to a procedure to be determined later, in order that a decision might be reached as to how far each of these recommendations should be adopted by the Assembly.
2. It is difficult to deduce any positive line of policy from the very general and guarded statement made by Simon and the impression left by his attitude was that he was attempting to apply vast brakes. He dwelt on complicated nature of the problem and in discussing the Lytton report stressed the view that the report was not, as many believed, “one-sided”. In support of this he cited at length those passages of the report which deal with the unsettled conditions in China and Manchuria and the antiforeign trend of Chinese policy.
His only positive statement was to the effect that the serious fact in this matter for the League was that when the dispute reached a climax the methods of the League were not employed and that it was the duty of the members of the League to defend the principles of the Covenant.
With reference to the settlement, he laid great stress on the need for conciliation, bearing practical realities in mind, to aid the parties through direct negotiation to come to an agreement. He thought that the Lytton report, particularly the first eight chapters, should form the basis of the consideration of this problem.
He concluded by suggesting that Russia and the United States be invited to participate in the work of conciliation.
3. Aloisi laid stress on solution which, while adhering to the flexible [Page 401] provisions of the Covenant, should be practical. He considered that nothing had happened since the submission of the Lytton report which would indicate that the solutions proposed in the report were not practicable and thought that these proposals offered a useful though not necessarily rigid basis for a solution through direct negotiations between China and Japan with the aid of the Assembly. In his opinion the future international situation of Manchuria could not be considered until after a Sino-Japanese agreement had been reached.
He would be adverse to any solution which was not acceptable to China and he looked with disfavor upon any partial solution of the Chinese problem and consequently thought that the suggestions of the Lytton report as to the general cooperation of the powers with China should be carefully considered.
4. The German representative made a statement couched in general terms and profit[ed] by the opportunity to associate the Sino-Japanese problem with Germany’s special position in international affairs, particularly with respect to disarmament, adducing the contention that military equality between states is requisite to the authority of the League.
5. Buero was chiefly concerned with drawing a parallel between the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Chaco dispute, comparing particularly the Assembly’s resolution of March 11th54 with the declaration of the neutrals of August 3 in regard to nonrecognition.55
6. Moresco took in general the same position as that taken by the other small powers especially with reference to the nonrecognition of Manchukuo, but he definitely asserted that no final decisions should be made on the question of guilt or blame of the parties until after an attempt at conciliation had been made under paragraph 3 of article XV.
Borgbjerg’s statement was very brief and showed no definite position on any point except that the fundamental principles of the League should be supported.