793.94 Commission/638
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Canadian Minister (Herridge), December 6, 1932, noon
The Minister said that he had come by direction of his Prime Minister to acquaint me confidentially with the policy which Canada expected [Page 389] to adopt at the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva on the Manchurian question. He told me that they were sending Foreign Minister Cahan to Geneva, and the Minister read to me the instructions under which Mr. Cahan was to act there.
These instructions reviewed the action taken in the Manchurian matter by the League of Nations from the beginning, including particularly the Lytton Report, and up to the present situation of that report before the Assembly; they recited that the facts found by the Lytton Commission apparently had not been affected materially by the discussions thus far at Geneva, and whatever might be done with its proposed recommendations. They enumerated the principles set out by the Commission as a basis for its recommendations, apparently with approval; and they recited the possibility of the matter going to the Committee of 19 and possibly a new body of conciliation being set up with the addition of other nations for purposes of conciliation.
When he got through reading these instructions I told the Minister that as I had listened to them they seemed to me to coincide generally with my own views, although I, of course, approached the matter from the standpoint of a government outside the League and not bearing the responsibility for the action of the League. The Minister said he was very glad to hear that I approved them. I then told him of the attitude in general which I was taking. I said first that our government had absolutely not changed its position in any degree; that on the contrary, we felt our position had been vindicated by the report of the Lytton Commission, which agreed with the facts which we ourselves had determined independently. I told him that I said this because there had been so many attempts to make my silence appear as a change of policy on the part of this government. I said in the second place that I was maintaining silence because the matter now was in a situation of procedure by the League on a report made to it in which any intrusion by an outside nation would certainly be resented by Japan, and correctly; also that I was refraining from comment in order not to give any excuse for side issues based upon irritation at such an intrusion. He said he understood our position perfectly.
I then discussed with him in general the situation in the Pacific as I viewed it, pointing out first the interest which the entire world had in the maintenance of the peace treaties, as I had pointed it out in my August 7th [8th] speech. The Minister said he had read that speech and agreed with me perfectly in my attitude. I pointed out that in that interest the entire world had a share. I then pointed out secondly the special interest which several nations had in the Orient by virtue of their special situation and possessions, and I included particularly Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as France and the other countries owning colonies in that neighborhood. I said [Page 390] this interest was expressed primarily by the Nine-Power Treaty and I was particularly glad to have this communication from Canada because I regarded Canada as also deeply interested with us, as we occupied so to speak the front seats of the arena in case any real trouble arose in the Pacific.
I called to his attention the fact that Canada was also represented in the Nine-Power Treaty. I pointed out the success thus far in maintaining an alignment of the nations represented, particularly in the foremost of these interests, namely, that relating to the peace machinery of the world, and I said I felt that so long as this alignment was maintained the adventure of Japan in Manchuria was apparently foredoomed to failure even though, as was well understood, no one of the nations intended to resort to any measures of arms or force. He said he agreed with me. I pointed out the special interests of the British Empire in the situation, and he said they were recognized by Canada; that his Prime Minister had wanted to keep side by side with us in this matter because he felt in the same way that the interests of the two nations, Canada and the United States, were parallel.
I pointed out further that I had throughout taken a firm position on these interests and had not been and would not be deterred by the explosions of irritation on the part of Japan; that I did not regard those explosions, nor the representations that the people of Japan were so hysterical that they might resort to violence, at full 100% value, because I knew it had been a common policy of Japan to use such threats of violence as a part of her diplomacy to influence the nations with whom she dealt and I thought she was doing it in this case. The Minister said he thought that that was probably true.