Office of the Historian

793.94 Commission/571: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 28, 1932—8 p.m.
[Received November 28—4:04 p.m.]

275. I have returned from the Kwansai and have read Department’s 181, November 21, 7 p.m.34

  • Paragraph (a) is undoubtedly an accurate statement of the Japanese position. I find no one here who believes that Matsuoka has authority to make substantial concessions at Geneva or that the Government intends to do so.
  • Paragraph (b) represents a widespread feeling in Japan.
  • Paragraph (c). The hostility in Japan towards the United States is temporarily quiescent and not so acute as Matsuoka paints it. This noticeable amelioration of open bitterness displayed last spring and summer is due to three factors:
    (1)
    Nothing has recently been said or done to excite hostility;
    (2)
    The recognition of “Manchukuo” by Japan afforded the public a sense of complaisant satisfaction that the main issue between the United States and Japan had from the Japanese point of view been finally settled by that step;
    (3)
    Industrial conditions are improving at least temporarily and a feeling of optimism prevails which was lacking a few weeks ago. While there is open dissatisfaction with the heavy drains on the budget, social conditions are easier than they were during the spring and summer. The situation in this respect has improved even since Matsuoka left Japan and is an important psychological factor. Nevertheless latent hostility towards the United States is always present and would flare up at any provocation, although war with the United States is [Page 373] unthinkable if only because Japan’s purse is empty and her hands are full elsewhere. This is the best guarantee of peace.
  • Paragraph (d). It seems quite likely that in the event of drastic action by the League of Nations the Government may be forced by domestic public opinion to withdraw its delegation from Geneva but much less likely that Japan will resign its membership in the. League and sacrifice its place on the Council of which it is proud.

The situation seems to me to be as follows: The Japanese are outwardly self-assured but inwardly hypersensitive. They feel that the world is against them and they do not understand why, having been misled by chauvinistic propaganda. The saner thinkers in the country realize that the Manchurian venture is a serious muddle but their hands are tied by predominant public opinion. Radical concessions to foreign opinion at present would undoubtedly result in the overturn of the Government and probably in serious domestic disturbances. There is no prospect that any concessions can or will be made under pressure at Geneva which would entail withdrawal or modification of Japan’s recognition of “Manchukuo”.

This being the case, I am still of the opinion that the best and only profitable course to follow is one of restraint. The determination of the nations to uphold the sanctity of the peace treaties can for the present best be expressed by refusal to recognize “Manchukuo” since there is no obvious method of effective enforcement. The best way out of this impasse is not by attempting coercive measures, which would merely serve to weld this country more firmly together in opposition, but to acknowledge frankly to the world that the cause of peace, which is the principal issue at stake, can most effectively be served by gradual rather than by immediate attempts to solve problem. The time factor is important because, as I have frequently pointed out, the difficulty and overburdening expense of pacifying and organizing Manchuria are far more likely to modify the policy of the Government in the long run than any overt foreign opposition. Repeated to Peiping.

Grew
  1. For paraphrase of telegram, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 104; it reported substance of telegram No. 45, November 19, 8 p.m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 349.↩