793.94/5643
The Consul General at Nanking (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that I received on the morning of November 18, 1932, a call from Mr. Yakichiro Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation. On the same day I called on Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Department may be interested in a comparison of their respective observations regarding the Sino-Japanese controversy.
In the course of our extended conversation, Mr. Suma asked me a number of questions and expressed, informally, certain views. What follows is a short résumé of the conversation which took place with Mr. Suma:
Mr. Suma asked me what I knew about the report which had appeared repeatedly in the papers recently to the effect that there was a plan for the appointment by the League of Nations of an International Commission to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy. I said that I knew nothing about it except what I had read in the newspapers; from press statements, it would appear that this plan was opposed by both Japan and China. Mr. Suma observed that the press reported that the Chinese Government would consent to an attempt along these lines to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy, if Soviet Russia and the United States were represented on the Commission and if the ultimate settlement did not infringe upon China’s sovereignty. I observed that I had seen it stated that China would not consent to having Manchukuo represented on the Commission. I asked Mr. Suma whether he thought the Japanese Government would consent to the appointment of such a Commission and he replied that he thought the Japanese Government would consent if the duty assigned to the Commission were to be merely that of mediating and of bringing about direct negotiations between China and Japan, but that it would not consent if the Commission were to be empowered actually to dictate the terms of settlement. He remarked that his Government had repeatedly stated that it would not permit any third party to “meddle” in the controversy between Japan and China. I said that I had seen published statements of Count Uchida, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to that effect. Mr. Suma said that, so far as he knew, neither the Japanese nor Chinese Governments had received news regarding the proposed Commission from any official source and he asked me what I supposed was the origin of the report. I said I thought I had seen it stated in the newspapers that the report emanated from the League Secretariat, and that perhaps it was a ballon d’essai on the part of the Secretariat, in an effort [Page 356] to prepare some concrete proposal for discussion by the League Council at its forthcoming meeting on November 21. Mr. Suma said that he thought this was the probable explanation.
Mr. Suma observed that there were among the officials of the Chinese Government some who advocated an attempt by China to recover Manchuria through force of arms. He thought there was one member of this faction in the immediate entourage of General Chiang Kai-shek himself. Mr. Suma said that, of course, General Chiang Kai-shek knew that hostilities between China and Japan would be impossible, from China’s standpoint, and that on this account General Chiang was endeavoring to devise some other method of bringing to an end the controversy between China and Japan, without war, a method which he could present to the Chinese people with some prospect of uniting the country behind the plan and behind himself. I said that it would be very interesting to know what this plan was, but Mr. Suma had no idea of what it might be.
Mr. Suma asked me whether I thought the policy of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese controversy would change, now that the Democratic Party had replaced the Republican Party in the control of the Government. I said that I knew nothing about this, but I should imagine that there would be little change, if any. I said that in any matter of public policy involving treaties, or likely to eventuate in the concluding of a new treaty, the President and Secretary of State, who were in charge of the foreign relations of the United States, generally kept in close contact with the Senate, which had extensive power in the matter of treaties. I observed that the personnel of the Senate changed very slowly, one third being replaced every two years, and the Senate, therefore, did not rapidly or suddenly change its policies. For this reason it seemed unlikely that there would be any abrupt change in the policy of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese controversy.
Mr. Suma said that General Chiang Kai-shek and some other Chinese representatives knew that the policy of refusing to hold direct negotiations with Japan was disastrous for China. This refusal to negotiate had already resulted in “two incidents”, viz., “the Shanghai incident” and the creation of Manchukuo, and might result in further “incidents” of the same sort, which General Chiang and some other Chinese leaders realized.
It was immediately after my conversation with Mr. Suma that I had occasion to call upon Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on matters of business. I took the opportunity to ask Dr. Lo whether he had seen Mr. Suma, with whom, as I knew, Dr. Lo was well acquainted, beginning with their association in Canton. Dr. Lo said that he had seen Mr. Suma and that Mr. Suma had asked him [Page 357] whether there was not some way in which the controversy between Japan and China could be brought to a friendly conclusion. Dr. Lo said that he replied that certainly there was a way, namely, for Japan to cease oppressing China. Dr. Lo said that he told Mr. Suma that the first thing for Japan to do was to withdraw its army from Manchuria. To this Mr. Suma replied that the Manchukuo Government had been created by the spontaneous action and will of the people of Manchuria and that China ought to accept the situation in Manchuria as a fait accompli. Dr. Lo said he told Mr. Suma not to come to him with any such nonsense. Dr. Lo assumed full responsibility for assuring Mr. Suma that if the Japanese army were to withdraw from Manchuria one morning, on the same day Mr. Pu Yi, Mr. Hsieh Chieh-shih, and the other officials of the Manchukuo Government would leave Manchuria by airplane, for trains would be too slow, in order to escape from the people of Manchuria. Dr. Lo said that he had admitted to Mr. Suma that the Chinese could not, at the present time, successfully wage war against Japan. He said that he had asked Mr. Suma why the Japanese Government did not continue to send warships and airplanes to bombard and bomb the Chinese people, since they could easily kill thousands, and there were plenty of Chinese who were willing to be bombed while fighting the Japanese. At the same time, Dr. Lo said to me, he had warned Mr. Suma that Japan could not continue to slaughter the Chinese indefinitely and that this policy of continuing to stir up and keep alive enmity of Japan’s neighbor, China, would prove fatal to Japan. I asked Dr. Lo whether Mr. Suma had suggested any plan for bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and Dr. Lo replied that Mr. Suma had not suggested any plan, but he had declared that the present militarist spirit in Japan was the reason for the trouble and that this spirit could not be opposed or altered. Dr. Lo told me that several Japanese, in conversation with him, had placed on Japanese militarists the blame for Japan’s present policy towards China and the estrangement between the two countries and had expressed regret for the policy and the estrangement.
Dr. Lo said that Mr. Suma had asked his opinion concerning the plan, mooted in the newspapers, for appointment by the League of Nations of an International Commission to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy. Dr. Lo said that he had replied that he had no official information regarding this plan and he had no comments to make regarding it.
Japan is widely proclaiming in the press that China is not an organized state, but merely a “geographical area”. In this connection Mr. Suma’s observations regarding recent Chinese political developments may be of interest.
Mr. Suma said he had read in the Chinese press of the last day or two that the Government was to be brought back from Loyang to Nanking [Page 358] on December 1. I said that I had been told that the Central Political Council had passed a resolution to this effect on November 17. Mr. Suma asked me what I thought was the meaning of this. I said I thought that it was a mere formality, but probably the move was taken in preparation for the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party, which was scheduled to take place at Nanking on December 15, 1932. Mr. Suma said that there was a report in Chinese circles in Shanghai that General Chiang Kai-shek intended at the Plenary Session to bring about an apparent unification of all factions, especially of Canton with Nanking, in order to present a united China to the world. I asked Mr. Suma whether he thought that Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, would return to office after his trip to Europe. Mr. Suma said that it was his impression that Mr. Wang Ching-wei had definitely broken with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and with General Chiang Kai-shek and that it would be impossible for him to return to a post in the Government. He said that he understood that Mr. Wang, before he left for Europe, had threatened to expose many political secrets, which would have been disadvantageous for a number of leading Chinese statesmen, but that he had been persuaded not to do so. I observed that there was a Chinese report current to the effect that the “Left Wing” i.e., Wang Ching-wei’s faction, was to be eliminated in the reorganization of the Government which would take place during the Plenary Session. Mr. Suma said he had heard this and that, presumably, this would mean the departure of Mr. Ku Meng-yu, Minister of Railways, and of Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industries. On the other hand, Mr. Suma said, he understood that in addition to the two Ministers just named, there were in the neighborhood of one hundred followers of Mr. Wang Ching-wei who now held posts in the Government and that having been deprived of Mr. Wang Ching-wei’s direct protection, through his departure for Europe, Mr. Wang had arranged that his followers should retain their posts, because this would contribute to the apparent unity of the country, and also because it would be useful for Mr. Wang and his party to have the two Ministers and the other office holders as their representatives in the Government.
Respectfully yours,