793.94 Commission/536: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
45. From Davis and Wilson. Matsuoka called on us this morning. He is a graduate of the University of Oregon, former manager of the [Page 350] South Manchuria Railroad, a member of Parliament and formerly in the Foreign Office. His English is fluent and he will be a much more effective attorney, I believe, for Japan’s interests than any who have yet defended those interests at Geneva.
He initiated the discussion by saying that he was going to speak with the utmost frankness as he realized that the situation was serious and must not be passed over with diplomatic phraseology.
Matsuoka then stated vigorously that whereas in many questions the policy of a nation might be altered by a change of government, in its relations with Manchuria every man, woman and child in Japan was determined to carry through the present policy. Nothing would divert Japan from this purpose. The fact that they had shed Japanese blood in this area, the fact that incontestable treaty rights in the area were not respected by the Chinese, had tried their patience to such an extent through the years succeeding the Russian war that they were now convinced that they must put an end to the situation and that the path on which they have embarked was the only one leading to this end.
Matsuoka first discussed the Russian side of the problem. He had just come through Russia and had talked to people in the government there, including Karakhan and Radek. He had made no secret to the Russians that one of the mainsprings of Japanese activity in Manchuria was fear of Russia. For his part a change of government in Russia had not meant a change of people and the same instincts that had governed Russia before 1904 were doubtless still existent in the Russian mind. He told them that Japan desired peace but that they must have security in this area. He pointed out to the Russians that the development of heavy industry under the Five-Year Plan was the development of the exact type of industry for warlike purposes and the fact that Russia was willing to keep its people in misery to promote such development was in itself a contributing reason for Japan’s demand for security in the Manchurian area.
As to the American side of the problem his remarks were strikingly confirmatory of McCoy’s views (reported in my 401, October 5, 8 p.m.). Public opinion in Japan was persuaded that there had been a series of endeavors on the part of the United States to get its fingers on the railroad situation in Manchuria and to check Japanese development in this area. They were conversant with the attempt of Harriman, the policy of Knox, the activities of Stevens20 in the Chinese Eastern Railroad and, lastly, the American attitude on this present problem directed personally by the Secretary of State. That large body of influential [Page 351] opinion which had formerly been friendly to the United States and made every endeavor to promote good relations was diminishing rapidly and publications of all kinds were appearing daily talking about war with the United States, arguing their case vis-à-vis America and pointing out greater “indiscretions” that the United States had performed in Panama and the Caribbean region. Public opinion is really inflamed against the United States. Matsuoka realizes as does sober opinion in Japan that public opinion in America has no thought of war and recognizes its absurdity. Nevertheless, he fears some incident similar to the blowing up of the Maine in Havana harbor which would cause a tempest of wrath on which the Government would have to side.
As to what Matsuoka foresees in the League meetings: any attempt at a solution which did not take into consideration the existence of the Manchukuo government and its recognition by Japan would have to be rejected. Matsuoka said that he was a parliamentarian and was accustomed to many personal attacks upon his nation but that if there was a concerted attempt to do anything derogatory to the dignity of Japan, Japan would have no recourse but to leave the League. This they would dislike to do and would make every effort to make the states of the League of Nations understand their position and to work harmoniously with them. He saw, however, grave difficulties in reaching any solution but reiterated that Japan must carry on along the lines which they have initiated.
Davis told him that he was not quite sure that he had clearly understood the attitude of Japan but if it were to be an irreconcilable one, then it did not look very hopeful for a constructive settlement. He also said that far from any thought of war American public opinion recognized that Japan had vital interests in Manchuria with an historic background; that they had had much provocation locally; that the Secretary of State was animated by no feeling of hostility to Japan but on the contrary by his conviction of what was in the best interests of Japan as well as American rights and duties under certain treaties and in the interests of the peace of the world. He had felt it essential that the progress which the nations of the world had made towards a better order of things should not be jeopardized. The very fact that he had frankly stated the attitude of the United States had been one of the best means of preventing the growth of hostile sentiment in the United States which might well lead to real trouble, and had gone a long way towards staving off a movement in Geneva towards vigorous action under article 16. Davis continued by stating that Japan had a wonderful opportunity in front of her to solve this problem in concert with, and with the moral support of the nations of the world, that they must enter the discussion not in a defensive attitude but in a constructive [Page 352] attitude with a determination to work out a solution. He pointed out that the Lytton report, if it had been presented to Japan 2 years ago would have offered a basis at which Japan would have jumped with enthusiasm. Japan instead of opposing efforts by powers with treaty rights and obligations to compose this controversy should embrace the opportunity of enlisting the good offices of the other powers in working out a constructive solution that would remove the menace of Russia which she feared and gain the good will of China which would be her best security in case of trouble with Russia.
Matsuoka remained dubious as to the possibility of achieving this but agreed that he must make the endeavor. Again he reverted to the danger which lay in the hostility towards America among the Japanese. He stated that the Japanese were a race which accepted for a long period things disagreeable to them and irritating to them. This they accepted with smiles but a point arrived at which the repressed irritation broke bounds with great suddenness and great violence and the very fact of repression probably made this anger more uncontrollable when released.
In substance the strategy of Japan seems to be to take a combative attitude against any “undue” interference and to claim in effect that the safeguarding of her national existence is superior to any treaty obligations even assuming that she may have violated certain international treaties which she does not admit [but claims?] she was justified in doing so by an overwhelming necessity. Her effort therefore will be first to persuade the powers that she was justified in her action, then to brush aside the consideration of the technical aspects such as the treaty provisions, then to prevent at all costs anything derogatory to Japan’s dignity and what they would consider undue interference with her course of action. Whether this involves a determination to maintain such a position at all costs or whether such a policy is being adopted for strategical reasons and with the belief that they may frighten the other nations from pressing their point of view and their alleged rights we cannot tell at this stage. We can add, however, that the same point of view has been stated consistently in previous conversations with their representatives in a less vigorous form. We impressed upon Matsuoka and in a subsequent conversation upon Matsudaira the necessity for both of them to exercise the utmost ingenuity and the utmost good will in finding positive solutions for the problem and the disadvantage of standing purely on the defensive and refusing to admit the interest of other nations in this problem.21
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- Col. John F. Stevens, American chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia, 1918, and president, Inter-Allied Technical Board operating Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways, 1919.↩
- For the Department’s reply, see telegram No. 37, November 21, 6 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 105.↩