793.94 Commission/517
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit what I feel may be regarded as a general analysis of certain official opinion in Geneva, insofar as I have been able to observe it, respecting the broader aspects of the Sino-Japanese situation as it appears at this time, with reference also to possible developments when a consideration of the dispute is resumed by League bodies in November.
The opinions which I am citing may be said to be more or less in the atmosphere of various circles in Geneva and are also in a number of instances the substance of views voiced by officials whose position or competence normally lend some weight to their expressions.
1. I gather the impression that in the light of certain new elements which have been introduced into the Sino-Japanese question since the consideration of this matter by the League last February, chiefly a conception here of the direction American policy is tending, a number of Foreign Ministers and other high officials of European governments are arriving at a conclusion that the affair has developed from one mainly between China and Japan in which they did not feel a vital interest to one in a definite degree between the United States and Japan in which they consider their interests to be most vital.
Based on the foregoing, the problem in a way takes on the aspect [Page 318] in the minds of these officials of a question between the European states (explicit in concerted action within the League) and the United States. The whole matter is moreover regarded as having reached a place on the plane of what is described as higher politics. I have heard in this connection expressions of opinion to the effect that this general situation might easily enter the realm of “bargaining” between the United States and Europe in which certain elements of the disarmament problem would be drawn into the picture. On the other hand, I have never heard such questions as international debts or financial or economic problems introduced into such discussions.
2. The recent visit of General MacArthur to certain Eastern European states has not passed without comment here, and I learn that deductions regarding the possible purposes underlying his visit are frequently ventured in political centers in Eastern European capitals. The opinion has been advanced that General MacArthur’s visit to Warsaw in particular was with a view to learning if possible what attitude Poland might adopt in the event of a war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.
It does not appear to be felt in any way that the United States is preparing for war with Japan but rather that the United States is “surveying the situation” with an eye to possible eventualities.
I believe I may add that an entertaining of views of this character is symptomatic of a type of continental psychology during any period of tenseness in the European situation, a psychology which I have observed frequently leads to a misinterpretation of the policy of the United States.
3. What is regarded as a shift of attitude on the part of France toward the Sino-Japanese situation is widely commented on here as are the possible results which may flow from what is seen as a new French policy. This new French policy is roughly described as “a support of the American position”, and not much weight is given to the pro-Japanese tone of the Paris press.
This change in French attitude is attributed to two factors. First, it is regarded as in line with Herriot’s general policy respecting what is termed “world organization and cooperation” in political affairs; and, second, it is held to be in response to a more impelling reason—a move on the part of France to align herself more closely with the United States, not solely because of the German situation but also as a development of a broader concept of the essential orientation of French political and economic interests.
4. As a corollary of the foregoing, while Great Britain is not viewed as precisely isolated, she is nevertheless seen somewhat alone vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese question.
Looking at the British situation from an internal point of view, [Page 319] MacDonald is seen as favoring a closer rapprochement with the United States in this matter, while the Tories are considered for the large part as frankly pro-Japanese. Sir John Simon is portrayed as torn between two conflicting policies—Ms desire not to give offence to Japan which would endanger British interests in the Far East and which also might impel Japan to leave the League, and a desire equally strong not to antagonize the United States. It is believed here that Sir John will endeavor to steer a tortuous course between the two alternatives presented by this dilemma, hoping for a turn of affairs which will not necessitate his taking a definite position. Thus British policy is estimated as hard to forecast and likely to shift from time to time. It is strongly believed, however, that fundamental British policy, in a choice between the United States and Japan, is inescapably oriented toward the United States. The only question is when and how soon it will become explicit in unequivocal expression.
5. The present German situation is also viewed as naturally having a bearing on this matter. When the Sino-Japanese question was before the League in February the German problem in its present form had not arisen, and, while Germany did not play a particularly positive role, her policy was in general in line with the other great powers. It is felt that at present no one can foresee what turn the German situation may take during the winter—whether Germany will follow an independent policy or lend its support to the League.
It is generally understood that the German position is being closely watched by Japan.
6. In general with regard to Japanese policy in November it is held that, unless the unexpected happens and Japan immediately presents what would be in effect an ultimatum to the League, she will do all she can to protract the proceedings, meanwhile consolidating her position in Manchuria and at the same time retaining her seat on the Council.
Although perhaps the atmosphere of Geneva tends to an exaggeration of this view, Japan’s seat on the Council and the position which it gives her in world affairs is seen as regarded by Japan as a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is believed that while Japan may threaten to withdraw from the League that threat will be aimed at the British Government with a view to retaining British support. It is held, however, that such threats, if they occur, will be in a large measure bluff and that in their hearts the Japanese are fearful of being expelled from the League.
7. It appears exceedingly difficult to forecast what the trend of events may be in November, as they appear to be so largely governed [Page 320] by the strategy of Japan. It is felt that developments must await a disclosure of Japan’s policy of which little appears now to be known.
Thus far the initiative is viewed as lying with Japan. I have been given to understand that the hope of Beneš and other League leaders is that the League and the United States may wrest this initiative from Japan by launching an initiative of their own based on League fundamental policy and the “new” American position. It is felt that a successful prosecution of the matter from the League and American viewpoint can only be achieved along such lines.
8. Looking at the Lytton Report in its broader political aspects, it is felt that during the last few weeks its role has definitely changed. In view of what is felt to be the American position vis-à-vis Japan, which is also seen as having French backing, the Lytton Report has taken on a different significance. It is still regarded as an important, indeed an absolutely essential, body of evidence. On the other hand, the conclusions and recommendations are viewed as out of date. It is held that they were written as not envisaging strong action on the part of the Great Powers. Such action, which perhaps might better be described as the maintenance of a definite position, now seems insured by what is regarded as a stronger policy adopted by the United States.
9. As may have been noted from the record of League procedures which I have transmitted to the Department, Yen and formerly Sze in representing China have frequently appeared intransigeant in respect to what might be regarded as unimportant factors in the discussions. From the viewpoint of spectators this action on the part of the Chinese representatives was irritating and the opinion was frequently expressed that the Chinese cause was more injured than advanced by such a policy. The opposition of Yen to the Japanese request for six weeks to study the Lytton Report is cited as a case in point. From those who should be acquainted with the situation in China it appears, however, that the Chinese representatives at Geneva are forced to take certain positions (in addition to those taken on grounds to safeguard their future juridical status) in order to save themselves at home. Public opinion in China follows developments in Geneva very closely and thus China’s representatives are compelled to adopt, in public at least, an uncompromising attitude. The attacks on Sze by Chinese students observed during the Paris sessions of the Council are regarded as illustrative of the pressure of Chinese opinion in these respects.
10. I feel it incumbent on me to report that in connection with our relations with the League in this matter the circumstance of Sir John Simon’s expressing American policy at the Council table [Page 321] has been widely discussed. It is freely expressed that a presentation of American policy in that manner loses much of the force it would have were it made in the form of a direct communication. It is furthermore felt that a possibility of misunderstanding may lie in that it affords the representative of another power by his mode of expression or by his manner to intimate that there is a relationship between the policy of his Government and that of the United States, or an understanding between the two capitals concerned, to a degree greater than the facts warrant.
11. Not a few officials here voice the theory that a way might be devised to render support to the Chinese Government without antagonizing Japan or at least without taking a technical position against Japan. It is felt that this might be accomplished through the adoption of a policy against communism in China which would be lending at least moral support to the Chinese National Government and would have thus an indirect bearing on the Manchurian situation. On the other hand, the possible reaction of the U.S.S.R. to such a move might still further complicate the situation.
Another motive for supporting the Chinese National Government is seen in the economic field. The National Government being the only tangible instrument for bringing about a greater degree of order in China, a strengthening of that Government would serve the interests of world trade and international well-being.
12. Officials of the League who are notably interested in the maintenance of the League’s position frequently point out the advantages which may be derived by having careful regard to certain juridical factors in the League Covenant or in League instruments with a view to their employment to serve practical ends. These officials still on occasion refer to a possible analogy between the recent change in the status of Iraq and also changes in the Syrian-Iraq frontier, and developments which might take place respecting Japan’s mandates. As I pointed out at some length in my despatch No. 336 Political dated September 3, 1932,4 it is felt to be important that League precedents, and by the same token precedents set by the United States, in regard to any mandated area should be considered in connection with a position which it might be desired at some future date to adopt respecting Japan’s mandated areas.
13. League officials holding the views described above are also given to discuss the relationship between the Sino-Japanese situation and the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute. They point out a likeness between the two problems and, looking at the question almost solely from the League’s viewpoint, they feel that it would greatly support the [Page 322] League’s position vis-à-vis Japan could the Bolivia-Paraguay affair also come before League bodies. In this connection a position which Japan took in Geneva in October of last year is frequently recalled, this position being roughly to the effect that Japan would feel less objection to the participation of the United States in League proceedings in the Sino-Japanese matter could she be assured that this would not be an exceptional case and thus in a way aimed particularly against her, but that the United States would take a like position in any world occurrence of a similar nature.
I desire the Department to understand that I do not regard the opinions which I have outlined as in any way conclusive; nor can I estimate how widely they are held by officials responsible for the policy of their respective governments, although in some instances they undoubtedly reflect the latter. Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that such opinions are chiefly voiced at least by representatives of the smaller powers and that they assume a certain exaggeration due to the atmosphere peculiar to Geneva and thus do not necessarily correspond to realistic politics. I feel also that through all this may be seen a conscious, or undoubtedly sometimes unconscious, attempt to define the position of the United States in a manner which also does not necessarily correspond to reality. I consider, however, these expressions to be of interest as indicative of certain trends of thought.
Respectfully yours,
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