793.94 Commission/498
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to state that on a recent social occasion in a private conversation with me Dr. Yen, head of the Chinese Delegation in Geneva, outlined the policy which the Delegation was thinking of following in relation to the consideration of the Lytton Report by the Council and by the Extraordinary Assembly of the League in the [Page 309] meetings scheduled to begin in November. While the Chinese policy in this respect has apparently not yet crystallized, what Dr. Yen had to say to me may, I believe, be regarded as the basis of a plan which is tentatively being evolved.
It will be recalled (Consulate’s telegram No. 267, September 24, 4 p.m., paragraph 5) that the convening of the Council to consider the Lytton Report is set for November 14. In this connection I may add that there exists a possibility that this meeting will not take place until November 21 inasmuch as the Council’s decision of September 24 provided for a maximum further delay of one week, “if by any chance it should be more convenient to the Council to discuss the Japanese Government’s observations”. This leeway was allowed, I understand, on account of a Japanese contention that the document containing the Japanese observations might not arrive in time for a meeting on the 14th.
As I reported in my despatch No. 341 Political dated September 13, 1932,99 Sir Eric Drummond envisaged the Council, in entering upon its consideration of the Lytton Report, as taking note of statements which will be presented at that time by the Chinese and Japanese representatives and then transmitting the Report together with these statements to the Committee of Nineteen, which would in turn submit a pertinent report to the Extraordinary Assembly. With respect to these procedures Dr. Yen felt uncertain whether they would necessarily be followed as described. He saw a possibility that the representatives of other powers on the Council might also bring forward statements or present the respective positions of their governments in the Council meeting. In other words, a discussion might be precipitated in the Council which would carry the proceedings beyond the mere presentation of the Report and the submission of statements by the two interested governments. Just what might develop along these lines Dr. Yen was, however, at a loss to forecast. His position in this is that in view of the status of the dispute under Article 15 of the Covenant, the Council is not competent to enter into a “debate” over this matter, a right which is reserved for the Assembly. He holds that the duty of the Council is to pass the question on as quickly as possible to the Assembly. I may add that aside from the juridical aspect of this question, the obvious Chinese strategy would be to have the consideration of the entire question rest as largely as possible with the Assembly in view of the more favorable attitude of the smaller powers to the Chinese position which I have discussed in previous despatches.
Incidentally Dr. Yen informed me that Dr. Wellington Koo would [Page 310] represent China in the Council while he himself would be the Chinese representative in the Assembly.
Respecting the Lytton Report itself, Dr. Yen stated that he regarded the “findings” set forth in the first eight chapters as an excellent presentation of the facts in the case. While there might be some points on which a further illumination might be thrown, he did not at present expect to bring forward any material embodied in the first eight chapters as matters of controversy. He did feel, however, that the deductions drawn in the two final chapters when regarded not abstractly, but in the light of important international instruments bearing on this problem, were open to question. In other words, in the light of such instruments the conclusions of the last two chapters did not flow from the premises of the first eight.
With respect to the foregoing he first referred to what he described as two cardinal principles implied in the League Covenant: the invalidity of rights acquired by aggression; and the position taken against negotiations conducted under pressure. With respect to this latter his reference is evidently to the suggested direct negotiations between China and Japan. In the second place, Dr. Yen referred to the principles embodied in the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty.
As to how he might bring forward these contentions in the Assembly, Dr. Yen stated that he would not present them as “reservations” to an acceptance of the Report but rather as subjects for discussion.
I venture to point out here that the Lytton Report is, of course, not technically a report of the Assembly but rather a part, undoubtedly the most important part, of the material upon which a final report may be based. It thus appears evident that if the Chinese follow the policy which they now appear to have in mind they will accept the premises of the first part of the Report and then endeavor to obtain a modification of the conclusions and recommendations of the Report which they consider as not in harmony with their interpretation of the international instruments which I have cited, such modifications to be reflected in the “Assembly Report”.
Presenting the Chinese position vis-à-vis the Lytton Report in another way, Dr. Yen explained that he regarded the ends sought by the recommendations as entirely good, but that his efforts in the Assembly would be directed toward obtaining a change in the procedures which had been set forth to attain these ends, i. e., to bring what may be described as the relationship between Chapters IX and X of the Report and the preceding Chapters and the relationship between Chapter IX and Chapter X themselves, into harmony with certain principles stated or implied in the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty.
[Page 311]As perhaps an example of the foregoing Dr. Yen asserted with respect to the proposal for an autonomous Manchuria that the Chinese had no objection whatsoever to Manchurian autonomy but that such a regime must be granted unilaterally by China and not set up by an international agreement.
I desire to add at this point that what Dr. Yen had to say may probably be regarded as not particularly conclusive. The policy of the Chinese Delegation is still obviously in a formative state respecting the points discussed. I have given the substance of the thoughts he expressed quite uncritically. I think, however, that it may be of interest to the Department to know in a general way how, so to speak, the minds of the Chinese Delegation here are working at present.
Dr. Yen also expressed concern over the possible position of the United States vis-à-vis the developments which might take place in the forthcoming League meetings, in particular the attitude of the United States toward the Chinese position. He declared, as was to be expected, that it would be of great assistance to him to be informed of American policy in these respects. He stated that China was most anxious not to take a position or to present any statements contrary to American policy or inconsistent with pertinent declarations of American policy which had already been enunciated. He explained that China felt very strongly about this, especially as she had agreed to the American note of January 7 addressed to the two governments. He felt that Washington could best interpret its own pronouncements in respect to a possible inconsistent position taken by China.
In stating that it would be helpful to the Chinese Government could it know how Washington felt regarding the Lytton Report—whether or not it “approved” of it—he said that the Commissioners had perhaps naturally taken what might be described as a realistic view of the situation in distinction to one based upon principles accepted by the powers in existing undertakings. The final view must, of course, be that of the governments.
As to Japan’s position in this matter, Dr. Yen volunteered the opinion that Japan would eventually accept the Lytton Report. Indeed, he expected that after demonstrations of protest that Japan would accept the Report during the forthcoming meetings. He felt that Japan’s evident self-interest lay in so doing. He illustrated his point by saying that previous to September 1931 Japan controlled what might be described as 25% of Manchuria and China 75%. At present Japan’s control may be regarded as 100%; this, however, she cannot hold and her proportionate control may be expected steadily to decrease. He saw the settlement envisaged in the Lytton Report as giving Japan an assured 50% control in Manchuria. To be sure, this would be according an aggressor the fruits of aggression; but looking [Page 312] at it realistically it is quite inescapable that Japan will enjoy certain of those fruits. Under the terms of the Lytton settlement, Japan cannot, of course, annex Manchuria and to envisage foregoing her ambitions for a continental empire will doubtless give her temporary pause; but he held that Japan would eventually find in the Lytton settlement a relatively easy way to acquire great advantages.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩