893.01 Manchuria/502
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Former Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lee)
(Note: From various evidences, I have the impression that Mr. Lee is functioning in the capacity of an undesignated and unaccredited chief of mission, in the absence of the Chinese Minister here. Mr. Lee apparently has constant cable communication with and instruction from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lo Wen-kan; and what he said this morning indicated clearly that he had come in, under instruction, on an errand which ordinarily would be performed by a member of the Legation staff. The principal officer of that staff now in Washington is Mr. Kung, a comparatively junior and inexperienced officer.)
Mr. Lee referred to the note from the Chinese Government which Mr. Kung had delivered late yesterday evening.66 He said that the Chinese Government was very anxious to receive some indication of our reaction to that note and of what action we might take. He said that there was a critical situation in Chinese internal politics and that the reception accorded this note—similar or identic notes having been sent to the other powers party to the Nine-Power Treaty—would have an important effect in connection with that situation. He said that the present administration at Nanking is and has been under heavy attack; that the administration has been trying to hold the situation steady—and so far has succeeded; but the opposition condemn it for not taking “strong action”; they say that its passiveness has “lost Manchuria”, they say that its policy of relying upon the peace machinery has been and is a futile policy, and they demand active and forceful measures to prevent further Japanese encroachments and destroy Japan’s present grip on Manchuria. Mr. Lee said that he hoped that we could give them something which would be encouraging and strengthen the administration’s position. He suggested that we might at least indicate that we would give the note consideration and would expect to make it a basis of consultation among the powers.
[Page 260]I said that I of course could not at this moment say anything with regard to the Department’s reaction or future possibilities or probabilities. As yet, the note had not even reached the Secretary. When it reaches him, he will of course give the whole question most careful thought. The note contributes no new information. The sending of it constitutes a new diplomatic step, and the powers, in the position or action which they may take, will have to be guided by diplomatic considerations. The tendency has been (as is well known) on the part of the powers other than Japan, to refrain from new steps pending receipt and consideration of the report of the League Commission. That does not mean that any power is definitely committed to inaction but it suggests a desire on the part of the powers to defer action until they have the benefit of the report.
Mr. Lee referred to our conversation of some days ago (September 8) and, pointing out that China had not in the note under reference expressly requested the calling of a conference, said that he felt that China’s restraint in that connection was in consequence of what he had cabled them after that conversation. He said that they do not want to make things difficult, that they want to be reasonable, that they have tried for a year to exercise patience and that they want still to do so; but that the administration is very hard pressed. I asked what would happen if the administration were pushed to the wall. Mr. Lee said that probably Lo Wen-kan would be forced to resign, no one else would wish to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, a “paralysis” comparable to that which prevailed in January last would result, and chaos might ensue. In January last there had been a period of several days when the only functioning high official had been Sun Fo. Unfortunately, the Chinese temperament is such, and the difficulties of maintaining order internally while pursuing a policy of reliance on the peace machinery externally are so extraordinary that it is extremely difficult to form and maintain an administration. Anything that the American and/or other foreign Governments can say which will contribute to the existing administration’s defense, against opposition, of the foreign policy which it has pursued and is pursuing, will contribute by just that much to strengthening the hand of the administration and averting the chaos which may ensue if it collapses.
Mr. Lee then referred to the request which Japan has made for delaying in considering the League Commission’s report. He said that he personally hoped that the League would not assent. I asked him what he thought was Japan’s motive in asking for this delay. He said that it seemed to him that the Japanese not only wanted to compel the League to deal with a fait accompli, but that they wished to have the situation as completely as possible consolidated before consideration is given to it as a fact: just now the Chinese are greatly agitated [Page 261] and the powers are annoyed over Japanese recognition of Manchoukuo; in the course of several weeks the heat and the sense of annoyance will have diminished; during that period, also, the Japanese Government will have had time to “smooth down” the various foreign offices, to have made perhaps some diplomatic bargains, to have injected new factors—not taken into consideration by the Commission—into the situation, and in general to have turned the delay to Japan’s profit. He was reasonably sure that they would extend their military operations into Jehol. If, in the interval, the powers and the peace machinery gave no evidence of solicitude and the internal situation in China took a turn to the worse, these developments, having occurred before the (delayed) consideration of the problem, would enable Japan, at the time when the consideration is finally given, to make a stronger case than she could make at an earlier date.
I told Mr. Lee that I would make note of all that had been said, but that, for the moment, I could make no comment and could say nothing on behalf of the Department. Mr. Lee asked that if and as soon as it might be possible for the Department to say anything he would appreciate having word; and he reiterated that the administration at Nanking is facing a very critical situation.