Office of the Historian

793.94 Commission/354: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, September 7, 1932—9 p.m.
[Received September 8—4:04 a.m.42]

1078. I was in the process of preparing following message when I received Tokyo’s 224, September 3, noon, to the Department.43

1.
The Commission of the League completed its investigation and signed its report at 8 o’clock September 4th.44 Lytton, Aldrovandi and McCoy left immediately by plane for Shanghai and sailed for Europe via Suez on Monday, September 5. Schnee and Claudel left same date for Europe via Siberia. Report will be forwarded by special messenger via Siberia to Geneva where it is expected to arrive on or about 23rd and be printed and ready for distribution by the 5th of October. A copy is being left at British Legation here for the Chinese Government. In my 1037, August 31, 2 p.m., I informed the Department of my understanding of the purport of the findings of the report.
2.
As was to have been expected report disapproves Japan’s actions in Manchuria.
3.
Evidence is already at hand of a tendency of the now dominate [dominant] military leaders of Japan to turn away from the West and America and alone find a solution of Japan’s problems in the Orient.
4.
Tokyo’s 223, September 2, 5 p.m. to the Department indicates that some time about the 15th of September probably intentionally near the first anniversary of Mukden incident of September 18, 1931, the Japanese Government will sign with the government of Manchukuo a protocol or agreement recognizing that government and guaranteeing integrity of its territory. Thus when the League begins consideration of the report of its Commission (referred to in my 1037, August 31, 2 p.m.) it will find Japan committed to defending Manchukuo by a military force against infringement of its independence or territory from whatever quarter.
5.
It seems to me that an opportunity may arise at Geneva for the United States to propose an international discussion of the Far Eastern situation. Recognition at that time of Japan’s deep and special concern with the situation might in my opinion help allay growing hostility which now characterizes attitude of Japanese towards the United States and the West in general.
6.
I feel that we can ill afford to permit the present trend of events in the Pacific area to keep on, unguided by ourselves. Our position and interests in this area demand that we do what we can to prevent the adoption by Japan of an Ishmaelite attitude towards us and the West.
7.
Historically, because of our long relations with the East and now through our possession of the Philippines, we occupy a position which demands that we take the lead in doing what we may to prevent either the withdrawal of Japan into a hostile and suspicious Orient or her destruction by the forces which now seem to be carrying her on. We must sooner or later deal with the situation which those forces have created. It is better that we deal with it now by the methods of peace than later by the methods of war which I believe otherwise to be inevitable.
8.
If the opportunity referred to in paragraph 5 above presents itself the United States could come forward with a plan for an international conference to take up and consider the question of the situation in the East linked with such questions as the limitation of armaments and the modification of international law under the Kellogg Pact, adumbrated in the Secretary’s address of August 8th.
9.
A suggestion that such a conference be held in Tokyo might help to win Japanese consent as giving recognition to the importance of the interests of the Japanese involved in any settlement of the question included in the agenda of the conference.
10.
I am sure that the Chinese would welcome such a suggestion. [Page 231] We must, however, be under no illusions as to the part that China will play either at the conference table or later in the carrying out of any of the commitments arrived at [at?] the conference. China is at present a disorganized country unable to meet the obligations of statehood whose officials have no manner of authority other than that of military usurpation and are unable to commit the country to any course with power afterwards to maintain it. Nevertheless such a conference must include China although we may have to consider a Japanese demand for a collective guarantee for Chinese performance in lieu of conditions enabling China herself to take care herself of giving guarantee.
11.
Nor can the discussions and commitments of such a conference in my opinion be considered final without participation by Soviet Eussia for the attitude of Soviet Eussia upon Far Eastern questions must be a matter of continued and growing concern to all nations living in and having to do with the Pacific area.

Repeated to Tokyo.

Johnson
  1. Telegram in two sections.↩
  2. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 102.↩
  3. For text, see League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Geneva, October 1, 1932).↩