793.94 Commission/438

Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson)36

General McCoy stopped in and said that he thought they would be leaving on Sunday.37 He stated that the Commission would make a unanimous report. They were agreed that Japan was not justified by the principle of self-defense in taking the action which was taken at Mukden on the night of September 18th. He said that during the last two weeks it had been feared that they might have to split because of the attitude of General Claudel, but that General Claudel had finally agreed to a formula which he (General McCoy) thought was a good one.

General McCoy stated that he thought the report as a whole would [Page 220] be found to be a good report, and one worthy of the effort which brought the Commission into being and of the personnel of the Commission itself. Of course they could have turned out a better-written report given more time, but that may be said of any report by any Commission, He thought that the Japanese would be pleased with the tone of the report. It was the first time that all of the facts had been brought together in one statement, and he thought that the way these facts had been set forth might influence the Japanese to ameliorate their attitude.

I stated that it was my hope that in these matters the people of the United States would not put too much faith in the ability of the Chinese to unite on any stand against the Japanese; that it was my earnest hope that we would not become involved in this situation, for I was convinced that the Chinese could not unite at the present time, for there is no leadership among them, and in the face of Japanese determination and nationalistic fanaticism it would be entirely possible for the Japanese to take possession and control of the whole northern part of China.

I asked General McCoy whether he was carrying away any ideas as to the future. He shrugged his shoulders and said that no one could prophesy as to what might happen. If the present fanatical leaders of the Army continued control of the situation anything was possible, for no military man could continue long in Manchuria with the constant threats about him without taking some steps to defend himself against these threats. He said that the Japanese were constantly thinking of the conditions of peace and prosperity which they had created in the leased territory and pointed out that they make a mistake in thinking that they can extend those conditions to Manchuria as a whole, as Manchuria is a large area where the nationalistic spirit of the Chinese is growing.

General McCoy agreed with my simile that the situation which faces the Japanese in Manchuria is similar to a prairie fire: the fire begins because the grass is dry, and as it spreads the fire dries the grass ahead of it, thus making possible the extension of the fire. Now that the Japanese are in Manchuria they find themselves with an extended border through which threats of all kinds penetrate; the further they go afield the wider that border becomes and the more difficult it is to control it.

General McCoy said he thought there was some danger that we did not appreciate the methods of the Japanese. He as a military man had been impressed by the fact that the records showed that in all of their conflicts with other countries, notably with China and with Russia, they had always begun their attacks at night, and as surprise attacks. He had asked the young officer at Mukden why he had taken [Page 221] the responsibility of beginning an attack upon a passive group of Chinese in barracks numbering probably 10,000 when he had only 400 men. The young Japanese officer replied that the best defense is to attack. General McCoy agreed with me that the Japanese in their present state of mind, should this state of mind continue, would be quite capable (if convinced that the United States intended to attack) of attacking us.

General McCoy stated that a copy of the League Commission’s report would be left with the British Legation to be handed to the Chinese Government, and that copies would also be left with the British Legation for the other Ministers here. He said that as for a copy for the Department of State this could be more quickly supplied by himself after he arrived at Geneva, and he would arrange to have a copy forwarded at once from Geneva upon his arrival there.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 1730, September 6, 1932; received October 10.
  2. September 4.