893.01 Manchuria/442
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that so much importance was attached to its content, that the full text of the speech delivered by Count Uchida on August 24 [25] was circulated through the League Secretariat. It naturally has given rise to much comment [Page 216] and to speculation as to what may be the results of this Japanese policy on the Sino-Japanese situation in general and in particular on the status of the question vis-à-vis the League of Nations. I am giving below the substance of the opinion of various officials of the Secretariat who have discussed this matter. While, of course, these statements cannot be taken in any respect as official pronouncements on the part of the League, I nevertheless feel that they represent a fair reflection of League sentiment and may be regarded in a measure as forecasting possible League policy and action.
A. League Reaction
a. The Speech of Count Uchida.
The speech is considered first as a reply to that of the American Secretary of State, and second as a pronouncement intended to prepare Japanese public opinion as well as opinion in foreign countries for the maintenance of the Japanese position before the League on the presentation of the Lytton report. It is believed in the Secretariat that both the speech of the American Secretary of State and that of the Japanese Foreign Minister were based on a knowledge of the nature of the Lytton report. It is thought that the Secretary has been informed through General McCoy of the tenor of the report (just as it is thought that the British Government has no doubt been informed through Lord Lytton) and that the Secretary’s speech was intended to serve as a preliminary reinforcement of the probable conclusions of the report and was particularly designed to remind the states members of the League in advance of their engagements taken in League resolutions regarding non-recognition of territories or advantages obtained through force.
The Uchida speech is considered as “cutting straight across” in several points the Secretary’s speech. Like the latter’s, but for opposite reasons, this speech is considered as being anticipatory of the submission of the Lytton report and as being directed against its probable conclusions.
From information obtained through Japanese sources here, it is understood that the Lytton Commission had two interviews with Uchida and that efforts were made to find a basis of understanding or of compromise. It is understood, of course, that the Lytton Commission was not empowered to negotiate with the Japanese Government for any final settlement, but it was thought that these interviews might serve to assist the Commission in making its recommendations which might take into consideration the Japanese position for a practical settlement without sacrificing the principles which the Commission believed to be involved. It is understood that after these two meetings the views of the Commission and of the Japanese Government [Page 217] were as widely divergent as before and that the Commission left in an atmosphere which denoted none too cordial feelings on both sides.
b. Forecast of possible trends in the next meeting of the Council with respect to the Lytton Commission Report.
It has been generally understood in the Secretariat that it was the intention of the members of the Council, on the presentation of the Commission’s report, simply to transmit the report formally to the Assembly without discussion. It now seems doubtful, however, whether this will be possible. Members of the Secretariat are now beginning to believe that it is highly probable that the Japanese will insist on discussing both questions of substance and of procedure before the Council. In regard to substance, they would support the position which has been maintained by the Japanese in the past and of which the main lines were set forth in Count Uchida’s speech, namely, that Japan has not violated her international engagements but has only acted in self-defence, such action for the protection of Japanese lives and property being necessary as a result of chaotic conditions in China.
In regard to procedure, it is thought that the Japanese will maintain their previous position that the Assembly is not the competent body to handle this question and that Japan’s engagements have been taken before the Council only. To the plea of Council members that the submission of the report to the Assembly is a matter of “procedure and not of principle,” it is anticipated that the Japanese will reply, just as in the case of the question of American participation in the Council meeting relative to the discussion on the Kellogg Pact, that the question is one of “principle and not of procedure.” They may contend, therefore, that the Council, lacking a unanimous vote, cannot submit the report to the Assembly. If such a situation arises, it is believed that a long discussion will ensue concerning the juridical question involved. In other words, it is thought that Japan will do everything possible to block the consideration of the report by the Assembly.
Should the Council, contrary to the wishes of Japan, decide to turn over the consideration of the report to the Assembly, it is considered quite possible that the Japanese representatives may withdraw from the Council and the Assembly. It is not anticipated that Japan would formally withdraw from the League at the present moment. Japanese representatives would probably simply refrain from being present at meetings of the Council and the Assembly.
B. Conversation With Dr. Yen
In an informal conversation with Dr. Yen on a recent social occasion, he made certain remarks concerning the Japanese announcement of August 24 [25] respecting the prospective recognition by Japan of Manchukuo. What he had to say was in substance as follows.
[Page 218]Japan’s rather frequent reiterations of her intention to recognize the Manchukuo Government seemed to puzzle him somewhat. In other words, unless some internal political reasons were at the root of this policy, he did not perceive the purpose of mere announcements of intention. If the matter was so arranged by Japan that she could obtain all she desired by recognition, why should she withhold recognition until some future date? Of course, it was possible that Japan was still hesitant in the face of present world opinion and that thus these announcements were in the nature of trial balloons to test the character and strength of that opinion and to note reactions. He stated that Japan naturally would not recognize Manchukuo until a treaty had been obtained from the Manchukuo regime embodying a satisfactory quid pro quo. There might be some difficulty about Japan’s obtaining a treaty which would satisfy all of her desires. Although he regarded the Manchukuo Government as a puppet organization, there were, he had reason to know, men in it, or supporting it, who took that position simply because they desired some kind of an orderly government in their territory. These men, nevertheless, he felt might easily balk at a treaty which would give Japan a virtual protectorate over their country.
With respect to Japan’s receiving private, and perhaps later open, support from various powers for the project of the recognition of Manchukuo, Dr. Yen said that he entertained some suspicions of France. He stated that in the new treaty between Japan and France concerning trade with Indo-China, Japan had made certain concessions which she had long refused to accord. He thus suspected that France may have made some return for these concessions and that these returns might easily have something to do with the question of recognition. It was pointed out in our conversations, however, that the Indo-Chinese treaty was arranged before Herriot came into power.
Dr. Yen felt, nevertheless, that Great Britain was really in the “key” position, inasmuch as, particularly since the recent Franco-British accord,35 he believed Great Britain could influence France in a matter of this sort and that France would be adverse to taking a position which differed from that of Great Britain. He was certain that if the British took a firm attitude with Japan respecting recognition, France, while perhaps not following suit, would at least not follow a contrary policy.
Dr. Yen further told me that he had received recent news which made him feel that Moscow might be considering recognizing the Manchukuo regime. He stated that he saw the conclusion of the [Page 219] fisheries treaty between Moscow and Tokio as clearing the way for such action on the part of the Soviets.
Although I am aware that the Department has many sources from which to judge the present Manchurian situation from which much more direct information can be obtained than is possible in Geneva, I am nevertheless submitting Dr. Yen’s views as of interest.
I also gleaned from my conversation with Dr. Yen that the Chinese will not advance any policy or make any new démarches at present, but will await such action as the League may take upon the submission of the Lytton report.
Respectfully yours,
- Anglo-French declaration of July 13, 1932, vol. i, p. 694.↩