793.94 Commission/351

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

No. 314

Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith a memorandum of conversation with Sir Victor Wellesley on the question of the Lytton Report and the Manchukuo Government. I made occasion to have this talk with this Assistant Secretary of State who, during these vacation days, is in charge of the Foreign Office, partly in view of the fact that I have been informed by various newspaper correspondents during the last five days that the Publicity Department of the Foreign [Page 207] Office had laid stress on the difficulty of the Japanese position in Manchuria, adding that her special interests there had in reality been recognized by the world since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, although this fact seems to have been overlooked by many critics of Japan in the train of events since September 18 of last year.

I may add, as of interest, that in a conversation with the French Ambassador this evening he told me that he also had discussed the Manchurian situation today with Sir Victor Wellesley and shared his opinion that Japan had “bitten off a far larger venture in Manchuria than she could chew”, and that her army of 100,000 men there would be unable to cope with the situation. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that he felt economic forces would eventually determine the settlement of the Manchurian situation far more than political pressure beyond the stand of non-recognition which has been taken by various governments.

Respectfully yours,

Ray Atherton
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton)

In a conversation with Sir Victor Wellesley today I referred to the fact that in mid-July several apparently semi-official statements had been made in Japan indicating to the Lytton Commission that if the findings of the League Commission did not press for an immediate solution of the Manchurian situation unfavorable to Japan the Japanese Government would be willing to withhold recognition. I then referred to recent press comment that the findings of the League Commission Report had been completed and that they were generally understood to be unfavorable to Japan. This fact, I added, in my opinion, had probably caused Viscount Uchida to make his statement before the Diet, which statement had been handed to the press textually by the Japanese Embassy here, and which appeared in this morning’s news.

Sir Victor Wellesley said he quite followed what I said and informed me that the London Times had received from America a purported digest of the findings of the League Commission, which was indeed exceedingly unfavorable to Japan, so much so that Sir Victor had taken upon himself to urge the press here not to print any unofficial survey of the Lytton findings until they were made public at Geneva, especially since, if the findings of the Lytton Report were unfavorable to Japan, there was no use in stirring up the trouble before the necessary moment had actually arrived. In this connection I may add that I have seen no remarks on the findings of the Lytton [Page 208] Report in the English press beyond the fact that the findings of the Lytton Commission had been completed.

Sir Victor then went on to say that the British position, first and foremost, was that they would take no attitude until the report of the Lytton Commission had been discussed at Geneva. By that time Sir Victor was of the opinion that Viscount Uchida’s statement before the Diet indicated that Japan would have recognized the new Manchukuo Government and the League be faced with a fait accompli, which would make the situation indeed more difficult than formerly.

Having in mind the statement ma de by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on March 22, reported in my telegram No. 115, March 23, 1 p.m.,30 and my despatch No. 2703, March 29, 1932,31 I asked Sir Victor what would be his position relative to Viscount Uchida’s statement that no treaty obligations prevented Manchuria from seceding from China if it were the will of the Manchurian people. Sir Victor did not entirely answer the question but pointed out that for a period of years past Manchuria, under Chang-Tso-lin, had in fact been a separate entity in all but name from China, and that the Chinese Government had made no attempt to maintain order there, and it would be difficult to disprove that the Manchukuo Government was set up in conformity with the wishes of the Manchurian people, as alleged by Tokyo.

Sir Victor then stressed the fact that Sir John Simon was absent from London and that everything he had said was his own personal opinion, but that he had frequently given his views to the Foreign Office, that an attempt to solve the Manchurian problem along economic lines would be far more successful than the League method of viewing the question from a purely juridical basis. I then stated that the Japanese people should not be led to believe they had successfully completed their Manchurian venture without recognition of the “open door” policy of the United States since any such idea would give them confidence in the belief that they could further continue their ventures into China. Wellesley then stated that, in his opinion, long before any such moment had been reached Japan would have found that she had bitten off far more than she could chew in Manchuria, and that she could not economically develop the country independently. I pointed out that possibly Japan was conscious of this fact already, and that by an early recognition of the Manchukuo Government might attempt to entrench herself in Manchuria to such an extent that the benefit derived might prove impossible wholly to eliminate in further negotiations. On the other hand, Wellesley said that an early recognition of the Manchukuo Government by Japan might also precipitate recognition of the Manchukuo Government by any nations other than [Page 209] the Great Powers who felt they would like to share any advantages accruing from recognition. I stated that in my opinion early recognition of the Manchukuo Government would carry no more economic advantages than in the past when, although foreign goods had been sold in Manchuria, to my knowledge the only successful method of distribution had been through Japanese commission houses.

I then said to Wellesley that I realized that he and I were talking entirely personally but from our conversation I gathered that his forecast of the British position was something as follows:

1)
That Britain would take no action vis-à-vis the Japanese-Manchurian situation until the Lytton Report reached the League of Nations.
2)
That the Foreign Office could not overlook the fact that since the Russo-Japanese War special Japanese economic interests in Manchuria had been internationally recognized, and that the handling of the matter since last September did not sufficiently stress to the Japanese mind that the question of these economic rights was not involved, and that British policy would prefer to play a waiting part, watching events, during such period withholding any recognition of policy contrary to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Peace Pact.
3)
That it was recognized that such a policy might lead to a temporary loss of trade in Manchuria but, on the other hand, envisage a situation where Japan must realize that economically she had bitten off more than she could chew in Manchuria. At such a moment it might appear feasible that the interested Powers suggest an economic solution of the Japanese-Chinese-Manehurian situation whereby possibly Japanese economic rights would be recognized, China would not be entirely deprived of her sovereignty in Manchuria, and at the same time the treaty obligations of the various Powers would be respected.

Wellesley said that I had attempted to put into phrases only half formed personal reflections of his own, but he saw at the moment no other policy that held out any greater possibility of success in view of the Japanese determination at the present time.

  1. Vol. iii, p. 620.
  2. Not printed.