I may add, as of interest, that in a conversation with the French
Ambassador this evening he told me that he also had discussed the
Manchurian situation today with Sir Victor Wellesley and
shared his opinion that Japan had “bitten off a far larger venture in
Manchuria than she could chew”, and that her army of 100,000 men there
would be unable to cope with the situation. The French Ambassador gave
me to understand that he felt economic forces would eventually determine
the settlement of the Manchurian situation far more than political
pressure beyond the stand of non-recognition which has been taken by
various governments.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Chargé in Great Britain
(Atherton)
In a conversation with Sir
Victor Wellesley today I referred to the fact that in
mid-July several apparently semi-official statements had been made
in Japan indicating to the Lytton Commission that if the findings of the League
Commission did not press for an immediate solution of the Manchurian
situation unfavorable to Japan the Japanese Government would be
willing to withhold recognition. I then referred to recent press
comment that the findings of the League Commission Report had been
completed and that they were generally understood to be unfavorable
to Japan. This fact, I added, in my opinion, had probably caused
Viscount
Uchida to make his statement before the Diet, which
statement had been handed to the press textually by the Japanese
Embassy here, and which appeared in this morning’s news.
Sir Victor
Wellesley said he quite followed what I said and
informed me that the London Times had
received from America a purported digest of the findings of the
League Commission, which was indeed exceedingly unfavorable to
Japan, so much so that Sir
Victor had taken upon himself to urge the press here
not to print any unofficial survey of the Lytton findings until
they were made public at Geneva, especially since, if the findings
of the Lytton
Report were unfavorable to Japan, there was no use in stirring up
the trouble before the necessary moment had actually arrived. In
this connection I may add that I have seen no remarks on the
findings of the Lytton
[Page 208]
Report in the English
press beyond the fact that the findings of the Lytton Commission had
been completed.
Sir Victor then
went on to say that the British position, first and foremost, was
that they would take no attitude until the report of the Lytton Commission had
been discussed at Geneva. By that time Sir Victor was of the
opinion that Viscount
Uchida’s statement before the Diet indicated that
Japan would have recognized the new Manchukuo Government and the
League be faced with a fait accompli, which
would make the situation indeed more difficult than formerly.
Having in mind the statement ma de by Sir John Simon in the
House of Commons on March 22, reported in my telegram No. 115, March
23, 1 p.m.,30 and my despatch No.
2703, March 29, 1932,31 I asked Sir Victor what would
be his position relative to Viscount Uchida’s statement that no treaty
obligations prevented Manchuria from seceding from China if it were
the will of the Manchurian people. Sir Victor did not
entirely answer the question but pointed out that for a period of
years past Manchuria, under Chang-Tso-lin, had in fact been a separate entity in
all but name from China, and that the Chinese Government had made no
attempt to maintain order there, and it would be difficult to
disprove that the Manchukuo Government was set up in conformity with
the wishes of the Manchurian people, as alleged by Tokyo.
Sir Victor then
stressed the fact that Sir
John Simon was absent from London and that everything
he had said was his own personal opinion, but that he had frequently
given his views to the Foreign Office, that an attempt to solve the
Manchurian problem along economic lines would be far more successful
than the League method of viewing the question from a purely
juridical basis. I then stated that the Japanese people should not
be led to believe they had successfully completed their Manchurian
venture without recognition of the “open door” policy of the United
States since any such idea would give them confidence in the belief
that they could further continue their ventures into China.
Wellesley
then stated that, in his opinion, long before any such moment had
been reached Japan would have found that she had bitten off far more
than she could chew in Manchuria, and that she could not
economically develop the country independently. I pointed out that
possibly Japan was conscious of this fact already, and that by an
early recognition of the Manchukuo Government might attempt to
entrench herself in Manchuria to such an extent that the benefit
derived might prove impossible wholly to eliminate in further
negotiations. On the other hand, Wellesley said that
an early recognition of the Manchukuo Government by Japan might also
precipitate recognition of the Manchukuo Government by any nations
other than
[Page 209]
the Great
Powers who felt they would like to share any advantages accruing
from recognition. I stated that in my opinion early recognition of
the Manchukuo Government would carry no more economic advantages
than in the past when, although foreign goods had been sold in
Manchuria, to my knowledge the only successful method of
distribution had been through Japanese commission houses.
I then said to Wellesley that I realized that he and I were talking
entirely personally but from our conversation I gathered that his
forecast of the British position was something as follows:
- 1)
- That Britain would take no action vis-à-vis the
Japanese-Manchurian situation until the Lytton Report
reached the League of Nations.
- 2)
- That the Foreign Office could not overlook the fact that
since the Russo-Japanese War special Japanese economic
interests in Manchuria had been internationally recognized,
and that the handling of the matter since last September did
not sufficiently stress to the Japanese mind that the
question of these economic rights was not involved, and that
British policy would prefer to play a waiting part, watching
events, during such period withholding any recognition of
policy contrary to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg
Peace Pact.
- 3)
- That it was recognized that such a policy might lead to a
temporary loss of trade in Manchuria but, on the other hand,
envisage a situation where Japan must realize that
economically she had bitten off more than she could chew in
Manchuria. At such a moment it might appear feasible that
the interested Powers suggest an economic solution of the
Japanese-Chinese-Manehurian situation whereby possibly
Japanese economic rights would be recognized, China would
not be entirely deprived of her sovereignty in Manchuria,
and at the same time the treaty obligations of the various
Powers would be respected.
Wellesley said
that I had attempted to put into phrases only half formed personal
reflections of his own, but he saw at the moment no other policy
that held out any greater possibility of success in view of the
Japanese determination at the present time.
