893.01 Manchuria/367
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 1.]
Sir: The indications are that Japan will extend recognition to the “new government” of Manchukuo in the fairly near future. All organs of the Japanese Government concerned with the matter have stated that the recognition of Manchukuo is the settled policy of the nation and will be carried out despite the enmity of China and the possible opposition of the Powers and the League of Nations. As pointed out in my telegram No. 161 of June 20, 12 M., the Government [Page 144] here regards this as the only method of regularizing their position vis-à-vis Manchuria and of placing their railway and land interests on a legal footing. There are various factors tending toward a delayed recognition—all, however, indicating an eventual recognition. These factors can best, for purposes of discussion, be divided into three classes: (1) the attitude of the Japanese Army, (2) the attitude of the Foreign Office, and (3) the attitude of the people.
1. The Attitude of the Japanese Army.
The attitude of the Japanese Army is that Manchukuo must be recognized in the near future. The Army instigated and conducted the military conquest of Manchuria and undoubtedly had much to do with the establishment of the “new government” of Manchukuo. They now wish to see their gains in Manchuria consolidated and established. They distrust the slow caution of the diplomatic leaders, fearing that the advantages which have been won through their efforts will be partly lost through delay and through diplomatic negotiations. They are anxious to present a great and accomplished fact to the Japanese nation in order to justify their own position and to prevent further popular demand for land disarmament. There are also idealistic elements in the Army which sincerely desire to establish in Manchuria an ideal government, free from corrupt influences of Tokyo, and in order to accomplish this purpose, wish to cut loose, as soon as possible and to as great a degree as possible, from Tokyo. This element in the Army is perfectly willing to defy the world, if necessary, in order to accomplish their end in Manchuria.
The opinion in the Army as to the time of the recognition of Manchukuo, however, is divided. The Army in Manchuria, as represented by General Honjo, together with the Japanese officials in the government of Manchukuo, is desirous of immediate recognition. The Army officials at home, as represented by Lieutenant-General Araki, the Minister for War, are more cautious. They are in touch with the elements in Japan having vested interests in Manchuria and have learned the dangers of recognition before Manchukuo has a constitution and codes of laws and before treaties governing Japan’s rights and interests in Manchuria are arranged. Japan’s rights in Manchuria are based upon treaties with China, which would be seriously jeopardized by the recognition of Manchuria as a state independent of China. The Army authorities at home also distrust to some extent the Japanese and Chinese in the Manchukuo “government” and have no desire to give up national rights already acquired for nebulous rights which might be obtained from the new state. In accordance with this view, Lieutenant-General Araki is reported to have stated, on various occasions within the last two weeks: “The Count’s (Count Uchida’s) attitude [Page 145] on recognition of Manchuria is that Japan should not be in too great a hurry to extend recognition to the new régime. He believes that Japan should complete all necessary preparations for extending recognition. I share this view with him.” “Recognition must be given as soon as possible, but it requires preparations.” “It is naturally Japan’s fixed policy to recognize Manchukuo just as soon as opportunity offers.”
It appears, therefore, that the Army (which is the most powerful factor in the Japanese Government today) will endeavor to have Manchukuo recognized by Japan as soon as a treaty can be arranged. It seems probable that an attempt will be made to embody all the Japanese demands in this treaty. It is impossible, of course, to forecast the date or the contents of the treaty, but it seems certain that upon the conclusion of the treaty Manchukuo will be accepted by Japan as an independent state.
2. The Attitude of the Foreign Office.
The Japanese Foreign Office, until July 5, 1932, was entirely noncommittal regarding the recognition of Manchukuo. Entrusted as it is with the task of keeping the peace in international relations, fully aware (which the Army is not) of the problems in regard to violations of existing treaties and agreements which the recognition of Manchukuo will inevitably bring to the surface, and being already in receipt of protests from European Powers against the recognition, the Foreign Office could hardly be expected to be enthusiastic over the matter. On June 15, 1932, however, Viscount Saito, then Foreign Minister as well as Premier, stated that “Recognition of Manchukuo must be made on an enduring basis. Preparations are necessary. This will be done no matter who becomes Foreign Minister.” Later Mr. Arita, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador at Tokyo, that recognition of Manchukuo would not be granted until after the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry had left the Far East. This was, however, later explained as the personal opinion of Mr. Arita and not an expression of the intention of the Japanese Government. It is, however, an indication of the feeling of the permanent staff of the Foreign Office, as opposed to the opinions which are forced upon them by the military.
On July 5, 1932, the spokesman of the Foreign Office, Mr. Shiratori, stated to newspaper representatives that Japan’s policy regarding Manchuria was fixed and that nothing could alter the decision of the Government to recognize Manchukuo. This was the first expression of policy by the Foreign Office in this connection.
Count Uchida (now Minister for Foreign Affairs), while still President of the South Manchuria Railway, was frequently reported to be [Page 146] in favor of immediate recognition of Manchukuo. He had at that time the viewpoint of the Japanese Army in Manchuria. In June he was called to Tokyo to consult with Viscount Saito regarding the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. On his way to Tokyo he expressed his views as follows:
“Recognition of the Manchukuo régime is a question which requires early settlement under present conditions. Investment in Manchuria and establishment of various enterprises there cannot be made with complete satisfaction until recognition has been extended. Even from the standpoint of making the Japanese residents there feel secure, to say nothing of the Manchurian people themselves, recognition must be accorded at an early date. I believe it will do no good to consider this or that third country at this particular time.”
After consultation with the authorities in Tokyo, however, Count Uchida did not appear to be so eager for immediate recognition, undoubtedly having been informed of the attitude of the Powers toward the matter. Although he has made no public announcement regarding his policy toward the question of recognition since his induction in office on July 6, 1932, it is known that he adheres to the stand that the existence of the independent state of Manchukuo is an obvious, accomplished fact, that Japan has unalterably fixed its policy in regard to the new state, and that recognition will be granted at an appropriate time, despite the protests of the Powers. It may be possible that this attitude will be changed after consultation with the Commission of the League of Nations, now in Tokyo.
3. The Attitude of the Japanese People.
Manchuria in the past has not been a concrete factor in the daily lives of the people of Japan. To the great mass, Manchuria was a vague something in which they had a sentimental interest because their fathers had fought and died there in the war with Russia. They knew that the Army placed much importance on the control of Manchuria and that Japan had important railway and other interests there, but Manchuria itself was of no immediate interest to them. When, last September, the Army acquired control of Manchuria, the people became imbued with war fever and were almost unanimously behind the Army in its actions. This was, however, only an exhibition of the aggressive military spirit manifest among Japanese and implied no comprehension of the issues involved. Throughout the campaign they were told that the Army was taking control of Manchuria for the noble purpose of protecting Japanese interests and of freeing the 30,000,000 suffering inhabitants of Manchuria from the gross misrule of former governments. By means of strict press bans the facts of many of the Army’s activities, especially the part played in the establishment of Manchukuo, were kept from the people. (See despatch [Page 147] No. 48, July 9, 193295). Although there were no press bans on the subject, there was little discussion in the press of alleged violations by Japan of international obligations or of the legal aspects of the occupation of Manchuria. The people were thus kept in ignorance of the controversial aspects of the situation and could not understand the objections of other nations to Japan’s actions.
Like the unthinking people of all nations, the Japanese people are very susceptible to ideas conveyed by catch phrases or slogans. Some time in the spring of this year the idea that Manchuria was Japan’s “life-line” was spread among the people, who seized upon the phrase with avidity, although probably not one in a thousand could explain in what respect, if any, Manchuria constituted a “life-line” for Japan.
Public opinion, which could be used later when the time for the recognition of Manchukuo arrived, was thus manufactured. In the extraordinary session of the Diet which ended on June 15th, a resolution was introduced to the effect that immediate recognition should be granted to Manchukuo by Japan. This resolution was passed uanimously by the Lower House but did not go to the House of Peers because of lack of time. It constituted the first expression of public opinion on the question (See telegram No. 155 of June 13, 8 P.M.).
General Araki is reported to have stated, on July 1st, that the Army authorities were concerned over the apparent lack of public interest in the Manchurian question and over the decreasing spirit of the people in agitating for the recognition of Manchukuo. Public opinion was therefore stimulated by the holding of mass meetings, which were addressed by Army officers, in various cities. On the day of the arrival in Tokyo of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations and on the following day, the seven leading Japanese newspapers in Tokyo, the Asahi, Nichi-Nichi, Yomiuri, Hochi, Chugai Shogyo, Yorodzu and Miyako, published editorials to the effect that Japan’s policy regarding Manchuria and the recognition of Manchukuo was fixed and that this fact must be made known to the Commission. As all of the editorials were of identical tenor, however, there can be little doubt that they were inspired and were not spontaneous expressions of public opinion.
During the past week there has been a noticeable tendency on the part of the authorities (perhaps caused by representations made by the League Commission) to “soft-pedal” the recognition question. Editorials, however, continue to appear advocating immediate recognition. Public opinion seems to have been really aroused, and once aroused, it refuses to be hushed. As an observer of conditions in Japan stated, “Public opinion in Japan usually is like a jack-in-the-box. [Page 148] When the authorities want public opinion, they open the lid and the jack pops out. When they are finished with it, they push it back into the box and close the lid. But this time they cannot push the jack back into the box.”
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all of the people of Japan are advocating immediate recognition of Manchukuo. There are many thoughtful people who regard the proposed move with misgiving. It has been pointed out in previous despatches that there is much lack of discipline throughout the Government in Japan, and that it is almost always possible for a determined group of men in a few responsible positions to force the hand of the Government and to commit the country. This seems to have been done throughout the Manchurian venture. The situation is, so far as can be seen from the outside, in the hands of a few men, most of whom are military officers. They are determined to force the issue through in spite of any opposition at home or abroad. These men play upon the feelings of the masses to obtain support for their ventures, and it is this manufactured mass feeling which passes for public opinion in Japan.
A group of thoughtful but inarticulate (under present conditions) men feel that the leaders of the Manchurian venture are undoubtedly sincere but that they lack any knowledge of economics. They are convinced that Japan has no chance of recouping its expenditures on the Army in Manchuria. The region is not rich and the population, as in other parts of China, is mostly desperately poor. Even if the Japanese succeed in time in restoring order there, and the land becomes the “happy valley” so fondly predicted, the people who will benefit will be the Chinese inhabitants. The Japanese population can never become large, and the returns to Japan from investments cannot, even under the most favorable conditions, equal the money spent on the present venture.
These opinions are widely held by thoughtful Japanese, who are not, however, in control of the Government. One Japanese of high standing, in commenting on the situation, remarked, “Let us hope that these men (the leaders of the Manchurian venture) will get some sense before Japan is completely ruined.”
Respectfully yours,
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