Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV

893.01 Manchuria/274: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, June 20, 1932—noon.
[Received June 20—9 a.m.]

161. In amplification of my telegrams 155, June 13, 8 p.m.; and 158, June 17, 7 p.m., and with reference to Department’s 129, June 16, 6 p.m.,⁵⁹ I submit the following survey of the principal problems which are confusing and perplexing the Japanese Government in determining whether or not to extend early recognition to the Manchukuo régime. From the changing tone of his various published press interviews, and from other sources, I gather that Count Uchida is now, after his conferences in Tokyo, by no means so certain of the wisdom of that step as he was reported to be when he came.

1. Establishment of the united administration for Japan’s interests in Manchuria.

At a meeting on June 18 attended by high officials of the Ministries of War, Foreign Affairs, Overseas Affairs and Finance, a general plan is reported to have been agreed upon. Points which were reportedly not settled are the name of the new body, the method of deriving revenues to support it, and the supervising authority (whether the Premier or the Overseas Ministry).

The chief of the new administration would probably be a military officer. (General Muto is the only man so far who has been prominently mentioned as possible appointee to this position). He would have directly under his authority the Kwantung army, the Kwantung government, the South Manchuria Railway and the Japanese consular representatives in Manchuria.

2. The degree of independence to be granted.

The principal conflicts here, as in the other problems enumerated in this summary, are between the Japanese connected with the Manchukuo régime, who reportedly favor a large degree of independence and freedom from any outside control, and the Japanese having interests in Manchukuo, commercial or otherwise, which the latter fear will be endangered by too great a degree of independence, particularly if the question of extraterritoriality is involved. Friction between General Honjo in Manchuria and General Araki is said to be partly due to this question and to be responsible for some of the delay in settling it.

(There are reasons to suspect that the unexpected plan of Count Uchida to return to Dairen is partly connected with an effort to settle the foregoing question).

3. Difficulties foreseen if Manchukuo is recognized by Japan.

(a) Criticism from foreign powers.

Japanese officials seem to vacillate between saying that foreign opinion is vitally connected with the problem and that it should not be taken into consideration at all.

(b) Necessity for a commercial treaty with Manchukuo.

The large Japanese commercial interests would favor a preferential tariff but the Foreign Office sees danger in possible interference with the “open door” policy.

The question as to whether or not the Nine-Power Treaty has been violated would be brought sharply to the fore.

4. Difficulties foreseen if Manchukuo is not recognized by Japan.

(a) The popular demand in Japan for recognition of Manchukuo.

The desire for eventual recognition of Manchukuo is widespread as evidenced by the Diet resolution.

Since September the Army has sold the idea of the Manchurian enterprise to the people on the basis of its being an idealistic and humanitarian venture looking to the recognition of a new state at the earliest possible date. Failure to recognize would be misunderstood, the people having been carefully guarded against any suspicion that the present régime in Changchun was in any sense a puppet government.

(b) Faith to be kept with the government officials at Changchun.

It is expected by some Japanese that recognition will remove suspicion of the motives of the Japanese from the minds of the local Chinese who were persuaded to cooperate with the Manchukuo by promises of recognition.

(c) The taking over of the customs by Manchukuo and a preferential tariff for Japan desired by some interests would be difficult if not impossible.

The customs office at Dairen, being based on a treaty with China, presents greater difficulties than those at other ports in Manchuria both on account of administration and volume of trade.

(d) The financial burden of the maintenance of an army in Manchuria.

Many Japanese connected with the Changchun régime, including Ohashi, the Manchukuo Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, are reportedly in favor of the return to Japan of most of the Japanese troops following recognition and the granting of real independence. This it is felt would instill confidence in the Chinese members of the régime and discourage the opponents. The cost of the Japanese soldiers who were retained might be borne largely by the Manchukuo regime.

(e) The railway and land problems would, the Japanese feel, continue in their present unsatisfactory condition.

(In conclusion).

In this general connection the Department will no doubt see in the American press a long interview given by Ohashi to Don Brown, an American correspondent who has just returned to Japan from Manchuria, published yesterday in the Japan Advertiser in which Ohashi emphasizes the complete independence of Manchukuo from Japanese manipulation and is quoted as declaring “It is lack of confidence in the future of Manchukuo that makes the Tokyo officials look silly. They know nothing more about it than the blind critics in other countries”.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew

59. Latter not printed; it requested information.