793.94/5254
Memorandum by the Consul General at Nanking (Peck)97
About 4:30 p.m. Mr. Ingram called at the American Consulate General and just as he and Mr. Peck were discussing the Shanghai [Page 727] negotiations Dr. Millard came in. The ensuing conversation consists largely of expressions of opinion by Dr. Millard elicited by questions put by Mr. Peck. The gist of Dr. Millard’s observations follows:
Dr. Millard is emphatically of the opinion that a signed truce agreement at Shanghai is not important from the standpoint of China’s welfare. On no account should China sacrifice anything, whether of principle or tactical advantage, to obtain such an agreement. On the contrary, as long as there is not formal agreement to refrain from hostilities the rest of the world will continue to pay close attention to Japanese actions at Shanghai, and this will be advantageous from China’s standpoint. An agreement fixing the regions which the Japanese forces should be allowed to occupy would necessarily import a certain legal sanction to the presence of Japanese forces which, in the absence of such an agreement, remains unauthorized. Dr. Millard thinks that, in point of view of fact, a resumption of hostilities is unlikely. He thinks this is realized by the commercial interests and that business will revive, even without the assurance which a formal truce would give. Such an assurance would, in any case, probably prove undependable unless the general Sino-Japanese controversy is settled. Dr. Millard said that he had expressed these views to the Chinese Government and that he had come to Nanking a day or two before for the purpose of talking with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his capacity of adviser.
Dr. Millard expressed his positive belief that the trend of international politics in the Far East will inevitably involve the United States in war with Japan within the next few years. He pointed out that the American Government has taken so positive a stand in opposition to Japan’s actions in Shanghai and Manchuria that a sharp issue has been raised which can be settled only through a complete back down either by Japan or by the United States. Dr. Millard asserted that the American Government in its approximately one hundred and fifty years of history had never backed down on a position formally taken.
Dr. Millard said that the justification which Japan professes to find for her oppressive acts in China in the alleged fact that China is “an unorganized state” is entirely unwarranted. He pointed out that the Nine-Power Treaty signed in 1922 was designed to protect China and that the avowed reason for concluding such a protecting treaty was the fact that China was not completely organized as a state. For Japan to take as an excuse for violating this treaty the very circumstance on which the treaty is based can deceive nobody. This treaty owes its existence largely to the American Government and if the American Government acquiesces in the scrapping of the treaty the [Page 728] Government not only will be abandoning all claim to influence in the Orient, but will be giving its acquiescence to the idea that all treaties are meaningless. The United States is unquestionably the most powerful and most important nation in the Pacific Ocean area; its position in regard to the sanctity of treaties is known to the world; consequently, it is unthinkable that the American Government should acquiesce in the open violation of the Nine-Power Treaty in which Japan is now engaged.
Dr. Millard pointed out that the participation of the United States in the European War was brought about by causes far less potent than those causes which he had just described as being certain to involve the United States in war with Japan. During the first two or three years of the European War there was no important sentiment in the United States in favor of entering the war. America entered the war to protect her rights as a neutral. Not only did the United States have no connection with the international relationships which brought about the war, she even entered the war in almost complete ignorance of many of the secret international agreements which had occasioned the war, or which had been concluded in the first years of the war. America did not know to what she was committing herself in joining the Allies. At the present moment, on the contrary, the issues which are at stake are clearly known to everybody and the United States is identified in the eyes of the world with the championship of these issues.
It was the opinion of Dr. Millard that the military party in Japan has forced the Japanese Government to undertake its present military adventures in China. The military party saw itself faced with extinction and deliberately compelled Japan to undertake the present military operations in Shanghai and Manchuria, in the hope that a satisfactory outcome would reestablish the military party in its former dominant position in Japanese politics. China, however, has much to hope from the probability that the enormous expense entailed by these military operation[s] may rouse the Japanese people against them and may even, if other tactics fail, bring about a revolution and the overthrow of the present Japanese Government. It is evident, therefore, that it is all to the advantage of China to protract the present situation. China can not defeat Japan in military operations, but China can involve Japan in ruinous expenditures which may bring about the downfall of the Japanese Government. Dr. Millard believes that it would not be especially advantageous for China to find a halfway solution to the Shanghai and Manchurian controversies with Japan. He is of the opinion that practically the entire peace organization of the Japanese Army is now on the mainland, in Korea [Page 729] and Manchuria, and that the Japanese Government cannot indefinitely stand the drain on its financial resources which this entails.
Dr. Millard said that he had told the Chinese Government shortly after September 18, 1931, that while the Chinese Government ought to take its grievances against Japan to the League of Nations for adjustment, the League would not be able to take effective action against Japan. Nevertheless, the League’s actions in this connection would give valuable publicity to China’s cause and its discussions, the creation and sending to China of commissions, etc., would be all to the good.
Note: On the morning of April 25th Mr. Peck had a conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of “which Dr. Lo expressed the opinion that there was no urgency from China’s standpoint in bringing the truce negotiations at Shanghai to a conclusion. He intimated that the disadvantage to China of a resumption of hostilities would be less than that entailed by the concluding of an agreement which would give a quasi-sanction to the presence of Japanese troops in the Shanghai area. He said that China could not afford to sacrifice anything, merely for the purpose of bringing about a formal truce. The only thing which would be of real benefit to China would be the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The presence of these forces is a threat to China and creates an uncertainty in the whole situation and this must be ended before China will be materially benefited. Mr. Peck observed that the American and British Ministers and their colleagues were working extremely hard in Shanghai in an endeavor to bring about a truce agreement between China and Japan, but that it was obvious they could not succeed unless they had some cooperation from China. In view of this fact, Mr. Peck said, he could not but feel that the views just expressed by Dr. Lo showed a rather inadequate appreciation of the efforts which were being made to bring about the truce. Dr. Lo insisted that China was very appreciative of the efforts being made by Mr. Johnson and Sir Miles Lampson and he said that when these two gentlemen visited Nanking recently the members of the Government had tried to show how grateful they were. Nevertheless, China had her own difficulties and could not afford to purchase a truce agreement at too high a cost in the way of sacrificing interests or principle.
The American Minister supplied the Department, in his confidential despatch of April 5, 1932, with a copy of a memorandum by Dr. Millard, dated March 30, 1932.98 In that memorandum Dr. Millard explained much more fully than he did orally to Mr. Ingram and Mr. Peck his views regarding China’s policy towards Japan, the relative [Page 730] unimportance of the League and the decisive role which the United States must play in the settlement of this Far Eastern controversy. In that memorandum Dr. Millard was careful to point out that he had expressed these various views to the Chinese Government in memoranda submitted as early as October, 1931.
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- Of a conversation with Dr. Thomas F. Millard, Adviser to the Government of the Republic of China, and Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, British Counselor of Legation. Copy of memorandum transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Nanking in his despatch No. D–258, April 28, 1932; received May 21.↩
- Neither printed.↩