793.94/5229
The Consul General at Mukden (Myers) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received May 14.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a brief resume of political developments in South Manchuria between September 18, 1931 and March 31, 1932.69 It is thought that a review of this kind might prove of interest to the Department and the Legation and its perusal might be helpful to General McCoy, the American member of the League Commission of Inquiry. The resume is based on material on file at this Consulate General and was prepared by Vice Consul Monroe Hall.
A few observations may be of interest in this connection. In the first place, the rapidity with which the occupation of Mukden was effected and the extension of military occupation immediately to other cities in the railway zone and within a few days to Kirin city despite the absence of a menace from that quarter and the guarantees of the local officials that they would adequately protect Japanese nationals afford overwhelming evidence that the Japanese army was completely prepared for this action and that the questions at issue were not merely local or transitory ones. Attention may also be drawn to the frequent [Page 699] military manoeuvres which the Japanese army staged in the environs of Mukden during the weeks preceding the occupation and to the presence of considerable artillery in Mukden at that time which unconfirmed reports stated had been brought from Korea and discharged during the dead of night only a few days prior to the outbreak. These circumstances may be adduced as evidence in support of the conclusion, reached at that time by close observers of political conditions in Manchuria, that Japan had decided to effect a settlement of the Manchurian problems and that the much emphasized railway incident, the Nakamura case70 and other recent incidents were exaggerated far beyond their proportions for the purpose of giving the Japanese military action an appearance of reasonableness and at the same time of cloaking its real purpose.
That the Chinese authorities had at least given the Japanese ample opportunity for resorting to drastic action for protecting their interests and treaty rights cannot be gainsaid. The Chinese obviously were blinded by the seeming success of their studied policy of procrastination and disregard of agreements and protests and in spite of ominous warnings persisted in these obstructive and aggravating tactics. The situation had reached such a pass according to a recent statement of a prominent Japanese official that Japan decided that it would have to move into Manchuria or withdraw entirely.
It may be of interest to mention a few of the important events of the period covered by the résumé which definitely mark the disclosure or unmasking of Japanese plans for accomplishing the domination of Manchuria. After the initial military occupation, the events that stand out are the airplane bombardment of Chin Hsien (Chinchow—old name) on October 8, the attack on the Heilungkiang forces on the Nonni river early in November and the subsequent occupation of Tsitsihar—these steps were not taken until Japanese propaganda had disclosed that Soviet Eussia would not use military force for the protection of its sphere of influence—, the despatch of Japanese troops against Chin Hsien late in November which was so unexpectedly stopped and disavowed by the Japanese government, the long delayed expulsion of the Chinese troops from the Chin Hsien area and the elimination of Chinese rule in South Manchuria at the beginning of the year (Chin Hsien occupied on January 2, 1932) and the development of the movement for the creation of a new state which culminated on March 9, 1932, with the inauguration of P’u Yi (ex-Emperor Hsuan T’ung) as the Chief Executive of Manchoukuo at Changchun, the [Page 700] capital. It is worth while noting that Japanese interest in and connection with the independence movement which began to attract attention late in September has existed from the outset.
In the light of the developments outlined in the enclosure, the Japanese government’s protestations that they have been in no way connected or concerned with the creation of the new state cannot be taken literally but may possibly be explained by the oriental complex for keeping the records clean for the sake of appearances. As a matter of fact, all reports of persons who have had any relations with the new government unanimously state that the government is Japanese, that is, that its Japanese members completely control and actuate every department and therefore it is obviously not Manchurian in the sense that the word denotes the native inhabitants of this land—a broader interpretation of the word to include Japanese and Koreans as well may explain the Japanese insistence upon its use.
Yours respectfully,