693.002 Manchuria/46: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton)
113. Department’s 106, April 2, 6 p.m., your 126, April 1, 5 p.m., in [Page 674] regard to Foreign Office memorandum on subject of maintenance of integrity of Chinese Customs Administration, and previous.
It appears that the objective envisaged by the Foreign Office in this connection is different from that envisaged by the Department. The Foreign Office manifests concern for the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Customs Administration. The Department is concerned with the broader question of the maintenance of the administrative integrity of the Chinese State.
It is quite true that establishment of a separate customs administration (or separate salt and postal administrations) may be regarded as one among the logical consequences of the establishment of an independent state.
However, admitting that as perhaps axiomatic, it is quite another thing to give countenance to action on the part of political authorities who claim to be acting on behalf of an independent state, whose right so to act is not admitted and whose state is not recognized, by acquiescing without protest in situations which those authorities create or which are created through them.
It is not the Department’s understanding that the authorities at Canton declared independence of China. The Nanking Government could make “compromises” with the Canton authorities without creating the implication and risking the consequences which would follow from its making similar arrangements with the present administration in Manchuria. Any assistance which foreign powers may give toward bringing about a compromise arrangement between the present Manchuria administration and the Nanking Government must in effect amount to a contribution to the cause of the Manchuria administration and thus to the cause of any and all who are endeavoring to make Manchuria a separate state. Acquisition by the Manchuria administration of an annual revenue in the amount of some 20 million dollars (sequestered from customs receipts which belong to China) would contribute substantially toward the success of the effort which is being made to sever Manchuria from China. That effort is in plain disregard of the declared views, policies, rights or interests of various governments and the recent resolutions of the League. The same may be said of steps which are being taken in Manchuria in relation to the salt administration and the postal service.
Such evidence as the Department has indicates that Japan not only has instigated the establishment of an independent state but has taken the initiative in regard to and has practical direction of all important action taken by the new administration in Manchuria. Japan’s denials do not alter the facts, and the replies, if any, which the Japanese might [Page 675] make to objections registered and reservations made by foreign powers would not render those objections and reservations invalid.
Notwithstanding the reports made by the ambassadors at Tokyo of several powers with regard to the effect in Japan of the course which has been pursued by foreign governments in making representations of various types to the Japanese Government during the past few months, it is this Government’s estimate that this course will in the end result in more of advantage than of disadvantage from point of view of the policies and the interests of the various foreign countries most concerned and the interest of the world at large.
We note the statement that during the last few weeks His Majesty’s Government has made every effort, by means of advice, expostulations and private negotiations, both at Tokyo and at Nanking, to save the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs. We feel that the effort should be more broad, that it should be directed toward preservation of the integrity of the Chinese State, that it should concede nothing which may undermine that integrity, and that it should be participated in by other powers. Mere present preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs will be but a temporary thing if a separate state of Manchuria becomes an enduring fact. Preservation of the integrity of the Chinese customs revenues is a more important objective than preservation of the integrity of the machinery for their collection; and preservation of the integrity of the Chinese State is even more essential toward any lasting preservation of the integrity of one of its agencies.
The declaration of the independence of Manchuria and the request by the Manchuria administration for recognition were political acts which could best be met by silence. But administrative acts by that administration call for action in the nature either of acquiescence or of objection by persons and/or states affected by that action. If we make no objection, we contribute toward making successful the efforts of those who are responsible for these activities. By objecting we might place obstacles in the way of their success.
With regard, however, to the suggestion of the Foreign Office that if the American Government still desires that representations be made, these representations should ho, made orally and simultaneously to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and in London respectively, and thus only, it seems to the Department that such action would distinctly and definitely imply that we consider that the Japanese Government alone is responsible with regard to the acts in relation to [Page 676] which the representations are being made; whereas, if these representations were made in the form of notice given at Tokyo, at Nanking and in Manchuria, as we have suggested, the implication would be that it is our desire to have our position on record with any or all authorities who may be responsible for or party to the action to which we object. It is our estimate that representations made orally and to the Japanese Ambassadors only would have little or no advantageous effect, in that (a) they would be reported to only one of the various authorities concerned—that one being the one least likely to be moved by them—and (b) they would leave nothing of record; and they might have disadvantageous effect, in that they would give the Japanese the impression that we consider that authority with regard to the matter rests with them alone.
At the same time we realize that there are considerations which warrant doubt with regard to the practical expediency of making representations simultaneously at Tokyo, at Nanking and in Manchuria.
Such being the case, it occurs to us that it might be practicable and helpful if various governments would make simultaneously public statements similar or identical in text emphasizing the interest of the world in relation to the Chinese Customs, Salt and Postal administrations, outlining the situation and the facts with which we are confronted in consequence of action taken by the Manchuria administration, expressing objection, and making reservation. If the Foreign Office views this suggestion with favor and as acceptable in principle we are prepared to submit for its consideration a draft of such a proposed public statement.
We feel that silence by the powers at this juncture cannot but contribute to the strengthening of Japan’s position and the undermining of the rights and interests of the other powers individually and collectively. We feel that some at least of the powers concerned should speak. We do not feel called upon to do this by ourselves. We would be glad to speak in concert with the British Government. We have also in contemplation the possibility that the League of Nations may be pondering the situation and might welcome suggestions with regard to possible courses of action.
Please review previous communications on this subject, inform the Foreign Office of the above, and state that we would welcome indication at the earliest possible moment of their views in the light thereof.