693.002 Manchuria/32: Telegram

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

126. Following is prepared by Foreign Office outlining viewpoints they expressed today answering my representations made in conformity with Department’s telegraphic instruction No. 88, March 11, 1 p.m. I understand the text of this memorandum has been telegraphed to Lampson and Lindley with advices that it has been handed to me for transmission to my Government:

“The maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Customs Administration, in spite of the disruptive tendencies so frequently observed in Chinese domestic politics, has always been a cardinal point of British policy. His Majesty’s Government have, therefore, viewed with grave concern the recent developments in the Far East, which seem likely to result in the establishment of a separate independent customs administration in Manchuria. In their view, however, the establishment of such a separate customs administration is only one of the consequences—and perhaps an inevitable consequence—of the establishment of the independent state of Manchuria. It would seem to be illogical, therefore, and possibly a source of confusion, to deal with the former question prior to, and apart from, the latter. Moreover, while there can in practice be no real doubt that Japan has instigated the establishment of an independent state of Manchuria it is not at all so certain she has in fact instigated the setting up of a separate customs administration. During the last few weeks His Majesty’s Government has made every effort, by means of advice, expostulations and private negotiations, both at Tokyo and Nanking, to save the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs. The present position is that the Manchurian authorities are willing to agree to the same sort of compromise that was adopted in Canton last year, by which, in spite of Canton’s declination [declaration?] of independence, the integrity of the customs was saved. The Nanking Government—though all hope is not yet lost—show signs of obdurate refusing any compromise. There can be no doubt that Manchuria’s willingness to avoid breaking up the customs administration is due to the influence in that direction exercised on them by Japan. His Majesty’s Government are, therefore, averse to making formal representations to Japan on the point of the integrity of the customs because Japan’s reply would be that the setting up of an independent customs administration in Manchuria was the logical and possibly inevitable corollary to the establishment of an independent state; that the establishment of a separate customs administration could only be avoided by some sort of compromise between Manchuria and China; that Japan was strongly in favor of some such compromise; that Manchuria had actually offered such a compromise, but that China had obstinately refused; and that consequently the breaking up of the customs administration was due not to any instigation by Japan, but to the short-sightedness of the Chinese Government in refusing a reasonable compromise. It would seem to follow that if [Page 657] any representations are made to Japan, they should be made on the ground that Japan has instigated the establishment of an independent state of Manchuria. It is already known, however, that Japan adopts the attitude that neither the Japanese Government nor any Japanese official has had anything whatever to do with the establishment of an independent state of Manchuria. If the British or United States, or both Governments, make representations to her on this ground, she will merely reply to us, as she has replied to others, that we are knocking at the wrong door. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, do not believe that such representations would do any good, but fear on the contrary that they may do some harm. Nevertheless, if in spite of these considerations the United States Government are still anxious that representations should be made, His Majesty’s Government would not stand aside. They suggest, however, that any such representations should not take the form of a joint démarche in Tokyo, for there can be no doubt that such joint representations excite public agitation, and only play into the hands of the extremists in Japan. If the United States still desire that representations should be made, His Majesty’s Government suggest that such representations should be made verbally and simultaneously to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and London respectively. If such representations are made to the two Japanese Ambassadors, then it might be pointed out that the establishment of an independent state in Manchuria is likely to result in the disruption of the Chinese Customs Administration. Such a development would probably be regarded as unfavorably by Japanese interests as by those of the United States and Great Britain.”

Atherton