Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94 Commission/186

The Consul General at Nanking (Peck) to the Secretary of State

No. D–237

Nanking, March 30, 1932.
[Received April 26.]

Sir: I have the honor to state that Major General Frank Ross McCoy, U. S. A., American Member of the Far Eastern Commission of the League of Nations, arrived in Nanking, with the other members of the Commission on March 27, 1932.

In accordance with the Department’s instructions, General McCoy and his party have been supplied with the services of a stenographer. Excerpts and copies of documents from the files of the Consulate General likely to be of interest to General McCoy have likewise been supplied to him. There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum prepared at the request of General McCoy. This Memorandum is dated March 29, 1932, and attempts to comment on the following questions: “Will the present Government of China last? If Manchuria were to be restored to the control of the present Government of China would the Government be able to install an efficient government in Manchuria?”.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Consul General at Nanking (Peck)

Nanking, March 29, 1932.

Subject: Capacity of China to Exercise the Powers of a State.

To General McCoy:

On March 28, 1932, you asked that I make available to you any material in the files of this Consulate, General likely to throw light on the following questions:

1. Will the present Government of China last?

2. If Manchuria were to be restored to the control of the present Government of China would the Government be able to install an efficient government in Manchuria?

Replies to these questions can hardly be based on any documentary material in the Consular files. Such replies will necessarily have the character of conjecture and prophecy, based upon individual reaction to past and present conditions and events. What follows is merely the personal view of the writer.

1. Will the present Government of China last?

The difficulties confronting the present Chinese Government in the order of relative importance are principally those arising from:

A. Lack of prestige

B. Lack of revenue

C. Factional differences.

A. Lack of Prestige.

The question of prestige, or “face”, is peculiarly important in China. If: the Government presents to the country an aspect of failure in all directions, e.g. in international relations, finance, maintenance of order throughout the country, etc., the result is not only a lack of respect on the part of the Chinese population, but also a lack of morale, enthusiasm and energy on the part of the whole personnel of the Government itself. Since September 18, 1931, the attention of the Chinese thinking public and of the Chinese Government has been engrossed by what the Chinese consider Japan’s onslaught on China. The numerous changes in personnel in the Government which have taken place since last September have been occasioned almost entirely by the difficulty of handling this problem. Several Chinese leaders have said to me seriously and with conviction that they do not believe any government of China can function so long as Japanese humiliation of China continues without some redress. It must be pointed out again that this is not only because a government failing in this regard forfeits the respect of the Chinese people; it is also because this problem, while it exists, monopolizes the energies of the officials of the Government and is taken as the sole criterion of their success.

Consequently, if the present Government of China is to last it must do one of two things, either to some extent restore China’s “face” in the conflict with Japan, or adopt a policy of desperate resistance to Japan. An heroic Government, even though it failed to eject the Japanese, might continue to have the loyalty of the people. And among the questions which must be settled with Japan the foremost, perhaps, is that of Manchuria. Manchuria is remote from the bulk of the Chinese population, but it seems to me very unlikely that a Chinese Government which should acquiesce in the alienation of this territory could survive.

B. Lack of Revenue.

Whether or not the present Government can obtain the revenue necessary for its continued operation is a moot question. Personally, I am inclined to think that if the economic depression caused by the Japanese boycott and the fighting at Shanghai had not intervened, the Government would have been able, by stringent economy, to maintain itself. Of course, in one way, the trouble with Japan has proved an advantage to the Government in this regard, in that it has distracted public attention from financial difficulties and has saved the “face” of the Government by providing an all sufficient excuse for delinquent payments to troops, cutting down of salaries, etc. Nevertheless, the Government, if it lasts, must practice the most rigid economy. But in that respect it is sharing the same experiences as other governments.

The loss of surplus customs and salt revenues from Manchuria might be a decisive factor in bringing about the disappearance of government in China.

C. Factional Differences.

There is scheduled on April 7 at Loyang a “National Emergency Conference”, composed of Chinese leaders both in and outside of the Nationalist Party, to discuss means of meeting the difficulties with which the nation and the Government are confronted. It is freely rumored that a proposal will be made for the consideration of the conference that the control of the National Government by the Nationalist Party be terminated through the device of announcing that the “period of tutelage” is over. Those who advocate this measure seem to have two objectives: (1) to free the Government from interference by party politicians and from the complications of Party politics and (2) to facilitate a settlement with Japan by dethroning the agency which Japan thinks is largely responsible for instigating the anti-Japanese boycott and other Japanese agitations. It is too early to say whether the termination of Party control will be achieved, or even attempted, at the Loyang conference in April.

The country is still suffering from the prevalence of local military leaders, but I am inclined to believe that the Government could gradually deal with this question if it were not saddled with the Japanese problem. And I am more than persuaded that there is a great deal in the contention constantly made by Chinese leaders that by threats, promises, and payments of money Japan promotes rivalries and insubordination among these provincial leaders. A diplomatic victory by Japan at this moment, it is easy to see, would convince every local militarist that he must, for his own protection, give his allegiance to Japan rather than to his own Government.

The most serious factional menace to the Government today probably is the Chinese Communist Party. At present this party has no prominent central control, but in the central provinces, on both sides of the Yangtze, there are in all seven organized Soviet Governments, some of which have been in existence three or four years. It must be admitted that the Government forces have met with little success in their efforts to subdue the Soviet Governments, which are defended by well organized troops and have acquired more or less regular sources of revenue from the regions which they control. Nevertheless, if the Chinese Government were freed from the incubus of an all engrossing foreign military and diplomatic conflict, it would in all likelihood be able to suppress these scattered communist governments.

A discussion of the second question follows:

2. If Manchuria were to be restored to the control of the present Government of China would the Government be able to install an efficient government in Manchuria?

Frankly, it must be admitted that if Manchuria were to be restored to China tomorrow it is very unlikely that the Chinese Government would be able to establish in a month or two a government in Manchuria which would … satisfy the Japanese. The Japanese and the Chinese views in regard to the rights of Japan in Manchuria are so divergent that a government in Manchuria which would satisfy the Japanese would be condemned by the rest of China. If, and when, the Chinese Government is allowed to re-establish a government in Manchuria there must be a preliminary understanding between the two countries in regard to outstanding economic controversies. In former days the government of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria felt itself saddled with the duty of resisting Japanese encroachments. The new government, in my opinion, which it is to be hoped will be established by China, must be in a position to give its attention solely to governmental, as distinguished from diplomatic, functions. Provided that causes of controversy between the Chinese administration in Manchuria and the Japanese are removed, there seems to me to be ample assurance that the Chinese Government would be able to establish orderly control of the Eastern Provinces.

In closing, I venture to add what may seem to be a presumptuous comment on this subject of the Sino-Japanese controversy. The comment is that from the standpoint of world interests, and especially from the American standpoint, the question of the probable stability of the Chinese Government and its probable ability to establish an efficient government in a restored Manchuria, do not seem to be the most important factors requiring consideration in deciding whether or not Japan is to be allowed to retain advantages in China which she has gained through the exercise of a superior military force.

If what the Chinese regard as the present Japanese policy of military conquest is not restrained by the League of Nations or the Signatories to the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty, the Chinese will be faced with the necessity of conducting a long-drawn-out and probably ineffectual war of resistance, or of submitting to Japanese compulsion. In either event the Chinese people will conclude that the covenants named above are hollow shams and that the western organization for world peace ceases to be a reality, whenever a powerful nation chooses to ignore it. This realization is practically certain to produce a wave of anti-foreignism in China, and a by no means impossible aftermath would be a revulsion in favor of Japan, as a country which is, after all, Asiatic and seems to be able to over-awe the entire western world. Neither of these possibilities would seem to be one which the western Powers, and especially the United States, should welcome.

The present government of China is admittedly weak. It is comparatively young and has been facing enormous difficulties. It is hard to gainsay Chinese leaders when they point out that the only alternatives to the continuance of the present government seem to be communism or chaos, or both. Apparently, therefore, the western Powers cannot afford to reject the claims of China simply because the present Government is weak, since this Government is the only instrument on which they can rely to establish a regime in China favorable to western trade and civilization.